The Chewa Logical Concept of Truth

2018 ◽  
pp. 91-105
Author(s):  
Grivas Muchineripi Kayange
Keyword(s):  
Logical Concept ◽  
Concept Of Truth

Conversation with a Truth Seeker

2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaap Bos
Keyword(s):  
History Of Psychoanalysis ◽  
History Of ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
Forms Of Knowledge

This paper is an invited response to Peter Rudnytsky's ‘Guardians of truth’ article. Taking issue with what are presented as fundamental theoretical and methodological caveats, this article discusses the question of when and how differing discourses on the history of psychoanalysis may or may not be compatible. In particular the author questions the validity of a concept of truth as defined from within a field of knowledge, to arrive at definitions of discourse and dialogue that can be useful to acquire new forms of knowledge.

Revising Inconsistent Concepts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Scharp ◽  
Stewart Shapiro ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Question ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
Constitutive Principles ◽  
Insight Into

This chapter investigates the question of when it is reasonable to replace an inconsistent concept. After surveying a number of proposals for how one might understand constitutive principles, it goes on to endorse Burgess’s (2004) account of being pragmatically analytic, as a possible source of insight into constitutive principles. The chapter then raises a question: If truth is an inconsistent concept, does it need to be replaced? According to the argument in the chapter, when an inconsistent concept paralyzes valuable projects, it is time to replace it. And if we are to replace a concept, our replacement should be able to do the work that the inconsistency-yielding one did. This, of course, raises a fundamental question concerning what work the notion of truth does for us. The chapter mounts a case for the claim that inflationists, but not obvious deflationists, about truth should offer a replacement for the concept of truth.

Cowper's Concept of Truth

1978 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 367-373
Author(s):  
John D. Baird
Keyword(s):  
Concept Of Truth

scholarly journals Truth Degrees Theory and Approximate Reasoning in 3-Valued Propositional Pre-Rough Logic

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Yingcang Ma ◽  
Juanjuan Zhang ◽  
Huan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Approximate Reasoning ◽  
Logical Formula ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
Truth Degrees ◽  
Truth Degree

By means of the function induced by a logical formulaA, the concept of truth degree of the logical formulaAis introduced in the 3-valued pre-rough logic in this paper. Moreover, similarity degrees among formulas are proposed and a pseudometric is defined on the set of formulas, and hence a possible framework suitable for developing approximate reasoning theory in 3-value logic pre-rough logic is established.

Philosophical implications of Tarski's work

1988 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Suppes
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
English Translation ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Congress ◽  
Unity Of Science ◽  
Scientific Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Texts ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Philosophical Questions

In his published work and even more in conversations, Tarski emphasized what he thought were important philosophical aspects of his work. The English translation of his more philosophical papers [56m] was dedicated to his teacher Tadeusz Kotarbiński, and in informal discussions of philosophy he often referred to the influence of Kotarbiński. Also, the influence of Leśniewski, his dissertation adviser, is evident in his early papers. Moreover, some of his important papers of the 1930s were initially given to philosophical audiences. For example, the famous monograph on the concept of truth ([33m], [35b]) was first given as two lectures to the Logic Section of the Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1930. Second, his paper [33], which introduced the concepts of ω-consistency and ω-completeness as well as the rule of infinite induction, was first given at the Second Conference of the Polish Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1927. Also [35c] was based upon an address given in 1934 to the conference for the Unity of Science in Prague; [36] and [36a] summarize an address given at the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy in Paris in 1935. The article [44a] was published in a philosophical journal and widely reprinted in philosophical texts. This list is of course not exhaustive but only representative of Tarski's philosophical interactions as reflected in lectures given to philosophical audiences, which were later embodied in substantial papers. After 1945 almost all of Tarski's publications and presentations are mathematical in character with one or two minor exceptions. This division, occurring about 1945, does not, however, indicate a loss of interest in philosophical questions but is a result of Tarski's moving to the Department of Mathematics at Berkeley. There he assumed an important role in the development of logic within mathematics in the United States.

A Grammar of Religious “Truth”: Pragmatic Considerations on the Nature of Religious Truth

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 338-356
Author(s):  
Lars Albinus
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Religious Discourse ◽  
Religious Expression ◽  
Cultural Contexts ◽  
Religious Truth ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Concept Of Truth

Abstract This article explores various ways in which the concept of truth is actually used across discursive boundaries separating common sense, science, mathematics, and religion. Although my overall approach is pragmatic, I argue that we also need to take some semantic restrictions into consideration. The main objective of the article is the issue of translating concepts of truth in various linguistic and cultural contexts without losing sight of the particular network of connotations. I come to the conclusion that with regard to a religious discourse, a translatable concept of truth typically enters the grammatical place of the subject rather than the predicate. From this position the discursive constraints of authority, authenticity and expressivity are held in check by an internal predetermination of the implied possibility of falsehood. Most of all, however, the article focuses on non-propositional aspects of a religious expression of truth, in which case the very distinction between true and false becomes patently irrelevant.

The Soviet concept of truth

1964 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Karl G. Ballestrem
Keyword(s):  
Concept Of Truth

scholarly journals Truth, body and religion

2011 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jarl-Thure Eriksson
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
The Body ◽  
Religious Context ◽  
New Information ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
Stored Information

This paper is based on the words of welcome to the symposium on Religion and the Body on 16 June 2010.  In a religious context ‘truth’ is like a mantra, a certain imperative to believe in sacred things. The concept of truth and falseness arises, when we as humans compare reality, as we experience it through our senses, with the representation we have in our memory, a comparison of new information with stored information. If we look for the truth, we have to search in the human mind. There we will also find religion.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document