Monotonicity, Duplication Monotonicity, and Pareto Optimality in the Scoring-Based Allocation of Indivisible Goods

2019 ◽  
pp. 173-189
Author(s):  
Benno Kuckuck ◽  
Jörg Rothe
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Indivisible Goods

scholarly journals Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Goods

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rupert Freeman ◽  
Sujoy Sikdar ◽  
Rohit Vaish ◽  
Lirong Xia
Keyword(s):  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Real World ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Indivisible Goods ◽  
Preference Data ◽  
Novel Algorithm

In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. While prior work has studied (approximate) equitability in isolation, we consider equitability in conjunction with other well-studied notions of fairness and economic efficiency. We show that the Leximin algorithm produces an allocation that satisfies equitability up to any good and Pareto optimality. We also give a novel algorithm that guarantees Pareto optimality and equitability up to one good in pseudopolynomial time.  Our experiments on real-world preference data reveal that approximate envy-freeness, approximate equitability, and Pareto optimality can often be achieved simultaneously.

A novel feature selection approach with Pareto optimality for multi-label data

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guohe Li ◽  
Yong Li ◽  
Yifeng Zheng ◽  
Ying Li ◽  
Yunfeng Hong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Feature Selection ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Label Data ◽  
Selection Approach ◽  
Feature Selection Approach

Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 934-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Zeckhauser
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
The Political ◽  
Voting Systems ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Economic Decisions

The market is a decentralized system that can bring about efficient economic decisions. This paper examines whether social choice mechanisms can duplicate this success in the political arena. The famed Arrow result tells us centralized systems cannot achieve efficient, nondictatorial outcomes unless they rely on cardinal preferences. With decentralization, efficiency comes to require something more: the truthful revelation of preferences. Schemes that elicit honest preferences are derived here. By their very structure they are shown to lead to inefficient outcomes. This negative result leads to the question whether the validity of the initial analogy continues. Market-based standards of performance may be innappropriate for investigations of political phenomena.

Welfare, Workfare, and Pareto Optimality

1973 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
George E. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality

How Well Do We Know Pareto Optimality?

1991 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vijay K. Mathur
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality

Some Sufficiency Conditions for Pareto-Optimal Control

1973 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 356-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Leitmann ◽  
W. Schmitendorf
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Optimal Control Problem ◽  
Control Problem ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Optimal Control Theory ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Vector Valued ◽  
Sufficiency Conditions

We consider the optimal control problem with vector-valued criterion (including cooperative games) and seek Pareto-optimal (noninferior) solutions. Scalarization results, together with modified sufficiency theorems from optimal control theory, are used to deduce sufficient conditions for Pareto-optimality. The utilization of these conditions is illustrated by various examples.

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Beyond Additive Valuations

2021 ◽  
pp. 103633
Author(s):  
Mohammad Ghodsi ◽  
MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi ◽  
Masoud Seddighin ◽  
Saeed Seddighin ◽  
Hadi Yami
Keyword(s):  
Fair Allocation ◽  
Indivisible Goods
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