You only Lie Twice: A Multi-round Cyber Deception Game of Questionable Veracity

2019 ◽  
pp. 65-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Bilinski ◽  
Kimberly Ferguson-Walter ◽  
Sunny Fugate ◽  
Ryan Gabrys ◽  
Justin Mauger ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Deception Game

On a deception game with three boxes

1993 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
King -Tak Lee
Keyword(s):  
Deception Game

scholarly journals The Trickster Hero in M. Frisch’s Novel My Name Be Gantenbein

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-95
Author(s):  
Ivan V. Kuzin
Keyword(s):  
Classical Tradition ◽  
Semantic Space ◽  
Methodological Principle ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Non Linear ◽  
Deception Game ◽  
Self Organizing

The article offers an interpretation and analysis of the novel My Name Be Gantenbein, allowing to find an explanation to the genre uncertainty of the work of the Swiss writer M. Frisch. Due to the non-linear stylistics of the narrative, the image of Gantenbein eludes an unambiguous classification in terms of moral and ethical problematics lying on the surface. The hero of the novel turns into a methodological principle that clarifies the fundamental existences of life. In classical tradition, these included the concepts of freedom and law, truth and lies, truth and deception, game and life. The complicated plot makes Gantenbein a functional representative of both freedom and blind law. They create semantic space of self-organizing life. As a result, the character is endowed with properties of a trickster, because he accepts the complexity of such a life at the level of his existence. The investigation reveals that the game, roles and masks create the ideological basis of the story. This framework directs the reader to perceive life in its everyday manifestations, contributing to the development of an antidote to escapism.

scholarly journals Influence of Network Size on Adversarial Decisions in a Deception Game Involving Honeypots

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harsh Katakwar ◽  
Palvi Aggarwal ◽  
Zahid Maqbool ◽  
Varun Dutt
Keyword(s):  
Network Size ◽  
Deception Game

A Deception Game

1973 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 416-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Spencer
Keyword(s):  
Deception Game

scholarly journals SOD2G: A Study on a Social-Engineering Organizational Defensive Deception Game Framework through Optimization of Spatiotemporal MTD and Decoy Conflict

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (23) ◽  
pp. 3012
Author(s):  
Sang Seo ◽  
Dohoon Kim
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Social Engineering ◽  
Positive Direction ◽  
Organizational Environments ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Player Game ◽  
Deception Game ◽  
Zero Sum

Existing moving target defense (MTD) and decoy systems are conceptually limited in avoiding and preventing attackers’ social-engineering real-time attacks by organization through either structural mutations or induction and isolation only using static traps. To overcome the practical limitations of existing MTD and decoy and to conduct a multi-stage deception decision-making in a real-time attack-defense competition, the current work presents a social-engineering organizational defensive deception game (SOD2G) as a framework, consi dering hierarchical topologies and fingerprint characteristics by organization. The present work proposed and applied deception concepts and zero-sum-based two-player game models as well as attacker and defender decision-making process based on deceivable organizational environments and vulnerability information. They were designed in consideration of limited organizational resources so that they could converge in the positive direction to secure organizational defender dominant share and optimal values of the defender deception formulated by both scenario and attribute. This framework could handle incomplete private information better than existing models and non-sequentially stratified, and also contributed to the configuration of the optimal defender deception strategy. As the experimental results, they could increase the deception efficiency within an organization by about 40% compared to existing models. Also, in the sensitivity analysis, the proposed MTD and decoy yielded improvements of at least 60% and 30% in deception efficiency, respectively, compared to the existing works.

scholarly journals Time pressure and honesty in a deception game

2019 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 93-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Jonathan Schulz ◽  
David G. Rand
Keyword(s):  
Time Pressure ◽  
Deception Game

scholarly journals Is there a link between endowment inequality and deception? – An analysis of students and chess players

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Gruener ◽  
Ilia Khassine
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Basic Design ◽  
Initial Endowment ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Standard Population ◽  
Deception Game ◽  
Chess Players ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Two Alternatives

This paper investigates experimentally the relationship between inequality in endowment and deception. Our basic design is adopted from Gneezy (2005): two players interact in a deception game. It is common knowledge that player 1 has private information about the payoffs for both players of two alternative ac-tions. Player 1 sends a message to player 2, indicating which alternative putatively will end up in a higher payoff for player 2. The message, which can either be true or false, does not affect the payoffs of the players. Player 2 has no information about the payoffs. However, player 2 selects one of the two alternatives A or B, which is payoff-relevant for both players. Our paper adds value to the literature by extending Gneezy (2005) in two elements. First, we systematically vary the initial endowment of the players 1 and 2 (common knowledge to both of them). Second, we do not limit ourselves to the standard population of university students but also recruit chess players that are not enrolled in any degree program. Doing so, we want to find out if our results remain robust over a non-standard subject population which is known to be experienced to some extent in strategic interactions. Our main findings are: (i) non-students behave more honestly than students, (ii) students are more likely to trust the opponent’s message, and (iii) students and non-students be-have differently to variation in initial endowment.

Influence of Probing Action Costs on Adversarial Decision-Making in a Deception Game

2022 ◽  
pp. 649-658
Author(s):  
Harsh Katakwar ◽  
Palvi Aggarwal ◽  
Zahid Maqbool ◽  
Varun Dutt
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Deception Game
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