Research on CEO Power and Charitable Donation: Evidence from China

Author(s):  
Furong Guo ◽  
Shengdao Gan ◽  
Chengyan Zhan ◽  
Ziyang Li
2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyan Cheng ◽  
Lei Gao ◽  
Janice E. Lawrence ◽  
David B. Smith

SUMMARY Section 408 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to review the filings of all SEC registrants every three years. Our study investigates this SEC monitoring role and differs from past SEC research by focusing on the SEC Division of Corporation Finance (DCF) rather than the Division of Enforcement and specifically on DCF's “review and comment” monitoring role. We rely on past theoretical research in management, finance, and accounting that provides us with arguments suggesting the DCF may target companies with strong CEOs and weak monitoring. Our findings cast light on the power struggle between the board and CEO by suggesting that the CEO's influence over the board may adversely affect board oversight. In addition, our results indicate that the DCF-prompted restatements lead companies to re-evaluate their governance structure.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-334
Author(s):  
Eric Kades

Abstract There are powerful fairness and efficiency arguments for making charitable donations to soup kitchens 100% deductible. These arguments have no purchase for donations to fund opulent church organs, yet these too are 100% deductible under the current tax code. This stark dichotomy is only the tip of the iceberg. Looking at a wider sampling of charitable gifts reveals a charitable continuum. Based on sliding scales for efficiency, multiple theories of fairness, pluralism, institutional competence and social welfare dictate that charitable deductions should in most cases be fractions between zero and one. Moreover, the Central Limit Theorem strongly suggests that combining this welter of largely independent criteria with the wide variety of charitable gifts results in a classic bell-shaped normal curve of optimal deductions, with a peak at some central value and quickly decaying to zero at the extremes of 0% and 100%. Given that those are the only two options under the current tax code, the current charitable deduction regime inevitably makes large errors in most cases. Actually calculating a precise optimal percentage for each type of charitable donation is of course impractical. This Article suggests, however, that we can do much better than the systematically erroneous current charitable deduction. Granting a 100% deduction only for donations to the desperately poor, along with 50%, 25%, and 0% for gifts yielding progressively fewer efficiency, fairness, pluralism, and institutional competence benefits, promises to deliver a socially more desirable charitable deduction.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6329
Author(s):  
Sohail Ahmad Javeed ◽  
Tze San Ong ◽  
Rashid Latief ◽  
Haslinah Muhamad ◽  
Wei Ni Soh

Firms in developing economies generally find ways to enhance their reputation and growth in the international market. In this context, an Audit Committee (AC) is composed of multiple skilled members that control and monitor auditing activities and present a transparent image of their firm, which automatically attracts investors and builds investor confidence. Therefore, this study used CEO power and ownership concentration as moderating factors to examine the connection between AC and firm performance. For this purpose, this study used the data of Pakistani manufacturing firms for the period 2008 to 2018 and applied the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method, the Fixed Effect (FE) model, and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). To check the robustness of the results, this study used a Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) model. The findings of this study contended that AC and firm performance have a positive association with each other. Moreover, the findings revealed that CEO power positively influenced firm performance. Furthermore, lower ownership concentration is a valuable approach to maximize a firm’s performance. Importantly, the outcomes concluded that AC and firm performance have a positive connection with the moderating effects of CEO power. Moreover, AC and firm performance also have a positive association with the moderating effect of ownership concentration.


Author(s):  
Wolfgang Breuer ◽  
Manuel Hass ◽  
David Johannes Rosenbach
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Boyer

Why did CEO remuneration explode during the 1990s and persist at high levels, even after the Internet bubble burst? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox, mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy and network analysis. It is argued that the diffusion of stock options and financial market-related incentives, supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at micro and macro level. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have exploited the long-run erosion of wage earners' bargaining power. The article also discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEO and top-manager opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or a shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception.


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