CEO hubris and Islamic banks’ performance: Investigating the roles of Sharia board vigilance and CEO power

The purpose of the study is to thoroughly outline how the hubris behavior of chief executive officers (CEO) is detrimental to Islamic banks’ (IBs) performance. Specifically, this study attempts to examine the role of the Sharia supervisory board (SSB), board vigilance, and CEO power in the relationship between CEO hubris behavior and decreased IBs’ performance. This study observes IBs’ performance during the period from 2014 to 2020 and develops eight models to test their determinants. Empirical testing of all models shows that CEO hubris has a detrimental impact on IBs’ performance. The moderating impact test shows the following results: firstly, the presence of SSB, which is represented by the reputation of its members, reduces the detrimental impact of hubris behavior by CEOs on IBs’ performance, while that impact, which is represented by member expertise, does not have a moderating effect. Second, the size and independence of the BOC both weaken the negative relationship between CEO hubris and IBs’ performance. Third, CEO power as represented by tenure and ownership has no moderating effect.

Does CEO power moderate the link between corporate social responsibility and bank earnings management

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and earnings management (EM) in US commercial banks and examines whether the chief executive officer (CEO) power can moderate this relationship. Design/methodology/approach For a sample of American commercial banks covering 2009–2018, several equations and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for bank EM. The authors use the fixed effects model and generalized method of moment to investigate the CSR–EM relationship. Findings The authors find a significant positive relation between CSR and EM. Moreover, the authors find that CEO power moderates the CSR–EM relationship. This study also suggests a bidirectional relationship between CSR and EM. Research limitations/implications The findings of this paper have important policy implications for policymakers, regulators and investors in their attempts to constrain EM practices and enhance the quality of financial reporting in US commercial banks. Originality/value The study contributes to the literature by exploring the relationship between CSR practices and firm EM by particularly focusing on banking. This study offers new insights into whether the association between CSR practices and EM is moderated by the CEO power. To the best of the knowledge, the relationship between CSR and EM is not studied yet with the moderating role of CEO power.

Are All Narcissistic CEOs Socially Responsible? An Empirical Investigation of an Inverted U-Shaped Relationship Between CEO Narcissism and Corporate Social Responsibility

We investigate the relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We suggest an alternative to the current assumption of a linear relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR. Instead, we propose an inverted U relationship between the two. Although narcissistic CEOs may engage in CSR, we argue that highly narcissistic CEOs may be drawn to actions that would garner greater attention and they may be less inclined to engage in CSR. Based on a sample of Fortune 500 firms during the period 2006–2013, we find support for an inverted U relationship and support for our arguments that CEO power moderates the relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR.

Does CEO Power Backfire? The Impact of CEO Power on Corporate Strategic Change

In today’s dynamic economic environment, enterprises must maintain sensitivity and flexibility when responding to the market through continuous strategic change. Anchored in the approach–inhibition theory of power, this study explores the relationship between CEO power and corporate strategic change and examines the moderating effects of company underperformance and product market competition. The study uses data from all A-share listed companies in China during 2006–2017. The results indicate that first, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO power and corporate strategic change. Appropriate centralization of CEO power helps promote corporate strategic change, whereas excessive centralization hinders strategic change. Second, low underperformance strengthens the inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO power and strategic change. Finally, high product market competition strengthens the inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO power and strategic change.