Aspect-Oriented QoS Modeling of Cyber-Physical Systems by the Extension of Architecture Analysis and Design Language

Author(s):  
Lichen Zhang ◽  
Shuguang Feng
Procedia CIRP ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 104 ◽  
pp. 1339-1344
Author(s):  
Patrick Denzler ◽  
Daniel Scheuchenstuhl ◽  
Daniel Ramsauer ◽  
Wolfgang Kastner

Processes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariam Ibrahim ◽  
Qays Al-Hindawi ◽  
Ruba Elhafiz ◽  
Ahmad Alsheikh ◽  
Omar Alquq

Cyber-attacks threaten the safety of cyber physical systems (CPSs) as a result of the existence of weaknesses in the multiple structural units constituting them. In this paper, three cyber physical systems case studies of a pressurized water nuclear power plant (NPP), an industrial control system (ICS), and a vehicular network system (VNS) are examined, formally presented, and implemented utilizing Architecture Analysis and Design Language, determining system design, links, weaknesses, resources, potential attack instances, and their pre-and post-conditions. Then, the developed plant models are checked with a security property using JKind model checker embedded software. The attack graphs causing plants disruptions for the three applications are graphically visualized using a new graphical user interface (GUI) windows application.


Systems ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Baoluo Meng ◽  
Daniel Larraz ◽  
Kit Siu ◽  
Abha Moitra ◽  
John Interrante ◽  
...  

The ever-increasing complexity of cyber-physical systems is driving the need for assurance of critical infrastructure and embedded systems. However, traditional methods to secure cyber-physical systems—e.g., using cyber best practices, adapting mechanisms from information technology systems, and penetration testing followed by patching—are becoming ineffective. This paper describes, in detail, Verification Evidence and Resilient Design In anticipation of Cybersecurity Threats (VERDICT), a language and framework to address cyber resiliency. When we use the term resiliency, we mean hardening a system such that it anticipates and withstands attacks. VERDICT analyzes a system in the face of cyber threats and recommends design improvements that can be applied early in the system engineering process. This is done in two steps: (1) Analyzing at the system architectural level, with respect to cyber and safety requirements and (2) by analyzing at the component behavioral level, with respect to a set of cyber-resiliency properties. The framework consists of three parts: (1) Model-Based Architectural Analysis and Synthesis (MBAAS); (2) Assurance Case Fragments Generation (ACFG); and (3) Cyber Resiliency Verifier (CRV). The VERDICT language is an Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) annex for modeling the safety and security aspects of a system’s architecture. MBAAS performs probabilistic analyses, suggests defenses to mitigate attacks, and generates attack-defense trees and fault trees as evidence of resiliency and safety. It can also synthesize optimal defense solutions—with respect to implementation costs. In addition, ACFG assembles MBAAS evidence into goal structuring notation for certification purposes. CRV analyzes behavioral aspects of the system (i.e., the design model)—modeled using the Assume-Guarantee Reasoning Environment (AGREE) annex and checked against cyber resiliency properties using the Kind 2 model checker. When a property is proved or disproved, a minimal set of vital system components responsible for the proof/disproof are identified. CRV also provides rich and localized diagnostics so the user can quickly identify problems and fix the design model. This paper describes the VERDICT language and each part of the framework in detail and includes a case study to demonstrate the effectiveness of VERDICT—in this case, a delivery drone.


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