Cyber Security for Nuclear Power Plants

2013 ◽  
pp. 25-35
Author(s):  
Thomas Shea ◽  
Sandro Gaycken ◽  
Maurizio Martellini
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants

Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems Upgrades in Current Generation Nuclear Power Plants

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven A. Arndt
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Plant Protection ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regulatory Compliance ◽  
Digital Systems

Over the past 20 years, the nuclear power industry in the United States (U.S.) has been slowly replacing old, obsolete, and difficult-to-maintain analog technology for its nuclear power plant protection, control, and instrumentation systems with digital systems. The advantages of digital technology, including more accurate and stable measurements and the ability to improve diagnostics capability and system reliability, have led to an ever increasing move to complete these upgrades. Because of the difficulties with establishing digital systems safety based on analysis or tests, the safety demonstration for these systems relies heavily on establishing the quality of the design and development of the hardware and software. In the United States, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has established detailed guidelines for establishing and documenting an appropriate safety demonstration for digital systems in NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition,” Chapter 7, “Instrumentation and Controls,” Revision 5, issued March 2007 [1], and in a number of regulatory guides and interim staff guidance documents. However, despite the fact that the United States has a well-defined review process, a number of significant challenges associated with the design, licensing, and implementation of upgrades to digital systems for U.S. plants have emerged. Among these challenges have been problems with the quality of the systems and the supporting software verification and validation (V&V) processes, challenges with determining the optimum balance between the enhanced capabilities for the new systems and the desire to maintain system simplicity, challenges with cyber security, and challenges with developing the information needed to support the review of new systems for regulatory compliance.

Dynamic bayesian networks based abnormal event classifier for nuclear power plants in case of cyber security threats

2020 ◽  
Vol 128 ◽  
pp. 103479
Author(s):  
Pavan Kumar Vaddi ◽  
Michael C. Pietrykowski ◽  
Diptendu Kar ◽  
Xiaoxu Diao ◽  
Yunfei Zhao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Networks ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Dynamic Bayesian Networks ◽  
Security Threats

scholarly journals New Complementary Points of Cyber Security Schemes for Critical Digital Assets at Nuclear Power Plants

IEEE Access ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 78379-78390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junyoung Son ◽  
Jonggyun Choi ◽  
Hyunsoo Yoon
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Digital Assets

Data Flow Based Cyber Security Defense-in-Depth Model of I&C System for Nuclear Power Plants

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bing Hu ◽  
Longqiang Zhang ◽  
Zhiwu Guo ◽  
Youran Li ◽  
Wei Sun ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Data Flow ◽  
Security Threat ◽  
Technical Requirements ◽  
Digital Instrumentation ◽  
Defense In Depth ◽  
Security Standards

With the introduction of digital instrumentation system, the cyber security threat to nuclear power plants is becoming more and more serious. The existing cyber security standards of nuclear power plants still need to be improved, and the technology practice of defensive strategies is lacking all over the world. In this paper, based on the comparison of domestic and foreign regulations and standards, combined with the technical practice of I&C system overall plan, a defense-in-depth model based on data flow is proposed. The overall technical requirements, hierarchy, network model, cyber security basic requirements, cyber security interface and protection of digital assets are introduced, the application of the model and the direction of research on cyber security of nuclear power plant are prospected.

scholarly journals Cyber Resilience Analysis of SCADA Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meghan Galiardi ◽  
Amanda Gonzales ◽  
Jamie Thorpe ◽  
Eric Vugrin ◽  
Raymond Fasano ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Control Systems ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Use Case ◽  
Design Features ◽  
Scada Systems

Abstract Aging plants, efficiency goals, and safety needs are driving increased digitalization in nuclear power plants (NPP). Security has always been a key design consideration for NPP architectures, but increased digitalization and the emergence of malware such as Stuxnet, CRASHOVERRIDE, and TRITON that specifically target industrial control systems have heightened concerns about the susceptibility of NPPs to cyber attacks. The cyber security community has come to realize the impossibility of guaranteeing the security of these plants with 100% certainty, so demand for including resilience in NPP architectures is increasing. Whereas cyber security design features often focus on preventing access by cyber threats and ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of control systems, cyber resilience design features complement security features by limiting damage, enabling continued operations, and facilitating a rapid recovery from the attack in the event control systems are compromised. This paper introduces the REsilience VeRification UNit (RevRun) toolset, a software platform that was prototyped to support cyber resilience analysis of NPP architectures. Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories have recently developed models of NPP control and SCADA systems using the SCEPTRE platform. SCEPTRE integrates simulation, virtual hardware, software, and actual hardware to model the operation of cyber-physical systems. RevRun can be used to extract data from SCEPTRE experiments and to process that data to produce quantitative resilience metrics of the NPP architecture modeled in SCEPTRE. This paper details how RevRun calculates these metrics in a customizable, repeatable, and automated fashion that limits the burden placed upon the analyst. This paper describes RevRun’s application and use in the context of a hypothetical attack on an NPP control system. The use case specifies the control system and a series of attacks and explores the resilience of the system to the attacks. The use case further shows how to configure RevRun to run experiments, how resilience metrics are calculated, and how the resilience metrics and RevRun tool can be used to conduct the related resilience analysis.

scholarly journals A CYBER SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE DESIGN OF I&C SYSTEMS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (8) ◽  
pp. 919-928 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jae-Gu Song ◽  
Jung-Woon Lee ◽  
Cheol-Kwon Lee ◽  
Kee-Choon Kwon ◽  
Dong-Young Lee
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Security Risk ◽  
Security Risk Assessment
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