Regulatory Commitment and Investments

Author(s):  
Alberto Asquer
2003 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross C. Hemphill ◽  
Mark E. Meitzen ◽  
Philip E. Schoech

We trace the development of incentive regulation in the U.S. telecommunications, electricity, and natural gas industries. Telecom has moved much more in the direction of pure price cap regulation. Incentive regulation in electricity and gas has generally not strayed far from rate-ofreturn regulation. Reasons for these differences include differences in regulatory commitment, industry concentration, technological change and productivity growth, service quality concerns, and externalities. We conclude that electricity and gas can evolve to purer forms of price caps as they gain more experience with incentive regulation, and if the unique features of these industries are considered in plan design.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 973-1000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Moner-Colonques ◽  
Santiago J. Rubio

Abstract This paper evaluates the strategic behavior of a polluting monopolist to influence environmental policy, either with taxes or with standards, comparing two alternative policy games. The first of the games assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the policy instrument. The second one is the time-consistent policy game. We find that the strategic behavior of the firm is welfare improving and leads to more environmental innovation than under regulatory commitment if a tax is used to control pollution. However, the contrary occurs if an emission standard is used. Under commitment, it is shown that both policy instruments are equivalent. We conclude that the optimal environmental policy is to use an emission tax since it yields the same welfare level than an emission standard for a committed regulator yet a larger welfare for a non-committed regulator.


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene YH Ng ◽  
Yi Ying Ng ◽  
Poh Choo Lee

Singapore’s Progressive Wage Model, introduced in 2012 and mandatory in the cleaning industry since 2015, is a skills- and productivity-based approach to redesigning jobs and restructuring wages in the largely outsourced cleaning, security and landscaping sectors. Focusing on cleaning work in the food and beverage industry, this case study examines some early outcomes of this national drive to reduce wage inequality by improving the pay and conditions of commodified work in a sector subject to outsourcing-based cost competition. Based on interviews with cleaners, supervisors and managers, the findings suggest that in general, government and the trade union and employers’ association have worked together, to set wages and conditions transparently. Nevertheless, enforcement issues mean that cleaners remain vulnerable. They have limited information about their employment benefits and face various types of poor conditions, some sanctioned by and others in violation of labour laws. These vulnerabilities have structural roots, including rent imbalances and cheap sourcing, factors that commodify jobs. The implementation of the Progressive Wage Model may have helped de-commodify cleaning jobs for Singaporeans and permanent residents, but such outcomes are still dependent on non-systemic and unenforceable factors such as the kindness of individual supervisors. While a promising start has been made, Singapore’s initial efforts to improve incomes and conditions in low-wage work will nevertheless require stronger regulatory commitment. JEL Codes: I38, J31, J48, &58, J88


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