Incentive Regulation in Network Industries: Experience and Prospects in the U.S. Telecommunications, Electricity, and Natural Gas Industries

2003 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross C. Hemphill ◽  
Mark E. Meitzen ◽  
Philip E. Schoech

We trace the development of incentive regulation in the U.S. telecommunications, electricity, and natural gas industries. Telecom has moved much more in the direction of pure price cap regulation. Incentive regulation in electricity and gas has generally not strayed far from rate-ofreturn regulation. Reasons for these differences include differences in regulatory commitment, industry concentration, technological change and productivity growth, service quality concerns, and externalities. We conclude that electricity and gas can evolve to purer forms of price caps as they gain more experience with incentive regulation, and if the unique features of these industries are considered in plan design.

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna WOLSZCZAK-DERLACZ

In this study we apply Malmquist methodology, based on the estimation of distance measures through Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), to a sample of 500 universities (in 10 European countries and the U.S.) over the period 2000 to 2010 in order to assess and compare their productivity. On average, a rise in TFP is registered for the whole European sample (strongest for Dutch and Italian HEIs), while the productivity of American HEIs suffered a slight decline. Additionally, we show that productivity growth is negatively associated with size of the institution and revenues from government, and positively with regional development in the case of the European sample, while American HEI productivity growth is characterised by a negative association with GDP and a positive one with the share of government resources out of total revenue.


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