scholarly journals Multiple-Time Signature Schemes against Adaptive Chosen Message Attacks

2004 ◽  
pp. 88-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Pieprzyk ◽  
Huaxiong Wang ◽  
Chaoping Xing
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Time ◽  
Signature Schemes ◽  
Time Signature

scholarly journals Security of signature schemes in the presence of key-dependent messages

2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-29
Author(s):  
Madeline González Muñiz ◽  
Rainer Steinwndt
Keyword(s):  
Random Oracle Model ◽  
Random Oracle ◽  
Signature Scheme ◽  
Forward Security ◽  
Signature Schemes ◽  
Encryption Schemes ◽  
Time Signature ◽  
Made In

Abstract In recent years, quite some progress has been made in understand- ing the security of encryption schemes in the presence of key-dependent plaintexts. Here, we motivate and explore the security of a setting, where an adversary against a signature scheme can access signatures on key-dependent messages. We propose a way to formalize the security of signature schemes in the pres- ence of key-dependent signatures (KDS). It turns out that the situation is quite different from key-dependent encryption: already to achieve KDS-security under non-adaptive chosen message attacks, the use of a stateful signing algorithm is inevitable-even in the random oracle model. After discussing the connection be- tween key-dependent signing and forward security, we present a compiler to lift any EUF-CMA secure one-time signature scheme to a forward secure signature scheme offering KDS-CMA security.

Chameleon Hash Functions and One-Time Signature Schemes from Inner Automorphism Groups

2013 ◽  
Vol 126 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping Pan ◽  
Licheng Wang ◽  
Yixian Yang ◽  
Yuanju Gan ◽  
Lihua Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Automorphism Groups ◽  
Hash Functions ◽  
Signature Schemes ◽  
Inner Automorphism ◽  
Time Signature ◽  
Chameleon Hash

scholarly journals HORSIC+: An Efficient Post-Quantum Few-Time Signature Scheme

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (16) ◽  
pp. 7350
Author(s):  
Jaeheung Lee ◽  
Yongsu Park
Keyword(s):  
Security Analysis ◽  
Random Oracle Model ◽  
Random Oracle ◽  
Security Level ◽  
Signature Scheme ◽  
Signature Schemes ◽  
Security Proof ◽  
Time Signature ◽  
Resistant Family ◽  
Cryptographic Hash Functions

It is well known that conventional digital signature algorithms such as RSA and ECDSA are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. Hash-based signature schemes are attractive as post-quantum signature schemes in that it is possible to calculate the quantitative security level and the security is proven. SPHINCS is a stateless hash-based signature scheme and introduces HORST few-time signature scheme which is an improvement of HORS. However, HORST as well as HORS suffers from pretty large signature sizes. HORSIC is proposed to reduce the signature size, yet does not provide in-depth security analysis. In this paper, we propose HORSIC+, which is an improvement of HORSIC. HORSIC+ differs from HORSIC in that HORSIC+ does not apply f as a plain function to the signature key, but uses a member of a function family. In addition, HORSIC+ uses the chaining function similar to W-OTS+. These enable the strict security proof without the need for the used function family to be a permutation or collision resistant. HORSIC+ is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks, assuming a second-preimage resistant family of undetectable one-way functions and cryptographic hash functions in the random oracle model. HORSIC+ reduces the signature size by as much as 37.5% or 18.75% compared to HORS and by as much as 61.5% or 45.8% compared to HORST for the same security level.

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