scholarly journals Computational Discovery of Scientific Knowledge

Author(s):  
Sašo Džeroski ◽  
Pat Langley ◽  
Ljupčo Todorovski
2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulo Sérgio M. Dos Santos ◽  
Guilherme H. Travassos

AbstractAs a community work, scientific contributions are usually built incrementally, involving some transformation, expansion or refutation of existing conceptual and propositional networks. As the body of knowledge increases, scientists concentrate more effort on ensuring that new hypotheses and observations are needed and consistent with previous findings. In this paper, we will characterize Knowledge Engineering as an important groundwork for structuring scientific knowledge. We argue that knowledge-based computational infrastructures can support researchers in organizing and making explicit the main aspects needed to make inferences or extract conclusions from an existing body of knowledge. This view is also comparatively built, contrasting it with alternatives for manipulating scientific knowledge, namely data-intensive approaches and the computational discovery of scientific knowledge. The current state of the art is presented with 22 knowledge representations and computational infrastructure implementations, with their main relevant properties analyzed and compared. Based on this review and on the theoretical foundations of Knowledge Engineering, a high level step-by-step approach for specifying and constructing scientific computational environments is described. The paper concludes by indicating paths for further development of the view initiated here, especially related to the technical specificities that originates from applying Knowledge Engineering to scientific knowledge.


1997 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 293-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ype H. Poortinga ◽  
Ingrid Lunt

In national codes of ethics the practice of psychology is presented as rooted in scientific knowledge, professional skills, and experience. However, it is not self-evident that the body of scientific knowledge in psychology provides an adequate basis for current professional practice. Professional training and experience are seen as necessary for the application of psychological knowledge, but they appear insufficient to defend the soundness of one's practices when challenged in judicial proceedings of a kind that may be faced by psychologists in the European Union in the not too distant future. In seeking to define the basis for the professional competence of psychologists, this article recommends taking a position of modesty concerning the scope and effectiveness of psychological interventions. In many circumstances, psychologists can only provide partial advice, narrowing down the range of possible courses of action more by eliminating unpromising ones than by pointing out the most correct or most favorable one. By emphasizing rigorous evaluation, the profession should gain in accountability and, in the long term, in respectability.


1989 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 467-469
Author(s):  
Clifford I. Notarius

Author(s):  
Kathy Hirsh-Pasek ◽  
Anita Kochanoff ◽  
Nora S Newcombe ◽  
Jill de Villiers

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 180-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah L. Desmarais ◽  
Joseph Simons-Rudolph ◽  
Christine Shahan Brugh ◽  
Eileen Schilling ◽  
Chad Hoggan

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