scholarly journals Overlapping Coalition Formation

2008 ◽  
pp. 307-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgios Chalkiadakis ◽  
Edith Elkind ◽  
Evangelos Markakis ◽  
Nicholas R. Jennings
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation

Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players

1979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amnon Rapoport ◽  
James P. Kahan ◽  
Sandra G. Funk ◽  
Abraham D. Horowitz
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation

Minority Presidents in a Coalitional World

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Chaisty ◽  
Nic Cheeseman ◽  
Timothy J. Power
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Cost Minimization ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
System Level ◽  
Current State ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter summarizes the main parameters of coalitional presidentialism and the key concepts, definitions, explanatory frameworks, indicators, and propositions. It summarizes our understanding of coalitional presidentialism; the distinction between coalition formation and maintenance; the definition of coalitions; the multidimensional understanding of coalition management (the ‘presidential toolbox’); and an analytical framework that emphasizes the motivation of presidents to achieve cost minimization under constraints determined by system-level, coalition-level, and conjunctural factors. It also summarizes our main empirical findings: (1) the characteristics of presidential tools, (2) the substantive patterns of their deployment, (3) the factors that shape the costs of using these tools, (4) the actual (observed) costs of using them, and (5) the potential for imperfect substitutability of these tools. Finally, it concludes with some reflections on the current state of the research on comparative presidentialism.

scholarly journals Joint Auction-Coalition Formation Framework for Communication-Efficient Federated Learning in UAV-Enabled Internet of Vehicles

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Jer Shyuan Ng ◽  
Wei Yang Bryan Lim ◽  
Hong-Ning Dai ◽  
Zehui Xiong ◽  
Jianqiang Huang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Internet Of Vehicles

Human-computer Coalition Formation in Weighted Voting Games

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Moshe Mash ◽  
Roy Fairstein ◽  
Yoram Bachrach ◽  
Kobi Gal ◽  
Yair Zick
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Weighted Voting ◽  
Weighted Voting Games ◽  
Voting Games

Coalitions and Government Formation: An Empirically Relevant Theory

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Budge ◽  
Valentine Herman
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Real World ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
The Real ◽  
Relevant Theory ◽  
The Government ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Government Coalition

Traditional theories of government coalition formation concentrate on formal criteria inspired by – if not directly drawn from – game theory. One such criterion is that the coalition which forms must be winning; another is that it should have no surplus members without whom it would still be winning, i.e. it should be minimal; and a third is that the number of parties should be as few as possible. The closest that such theories come to considering the substantive issues affecting the formation of coalitions in the real world is their focus on reducing the ideological diversity of parties within the government. On many occasions, however, such ideological considerations receive negligible attention from politicians, who often ignore size factors altogether.

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