PART III: The European Court of Human Rights’ Reluctance to Classify European Convention Violations as International Crimes Even When Those Violations Likely Constitute ‘War Crimes’ or ‘Crimes Against Humanity in Times of Armed Conflict’

Author(s):  
Sonja C. Grover
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens David Ohlin

On October 1, 2002, Magnus Gäfgen was taken into custody by the Frankfurt police in connection with the kidnapping of a young boy held for ransom. The police threatened Gäfgen with various forms of torture unless he divulged the location of the boy. Gäfgen quickly relented and led the police to the boy, who was already dead. Gäfgen was convicted of murder and the police were convicted of coercion. However, the district court concluded that the police, though culpable, were not appropriate subjects of punishment. Gäfgen, unhappy that his torturers were not punished, filed a case against Germany at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), arguing that Germany's failure to punish his torturers violated his human rights. The ECHR concluded that Gäfgen was right--the German government was obligated to punish perpetrators of torture, and by failing to do so adequately, Germany violated Gäfgen's human rights.The goal of this chapter is to show that the argument in Gäfgen is generalizable to other contexts. Although the case arose from a particular procedural posture, there is little reason to suspect that the arguments in Gäfgen will not hold for other crimes as well. At the very least, these arguments can be extended, without logical disruption, to other international crimes that states are under a legal obligation to criminalize, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Moreover, if the structure of these arguments is conceptually sound, in theory they should apply outside of the European context, unless the argument is based on a particular right that is only protected by the European Convention and not by international law.This subtle change in emphasis -- moving from punishment as a license to punishment as a legal requirement -- has profound consequences for the operation of international criminal justice. States and international tribunals are required to punish perpetrators as a matter of human rights law, and their failure to follow through on this obligation violates not just some vague or inchoate ergo omnes obligation, it also violates an obligation owed directly to the victims of that particular atrocity. This applies not just when the perpetrators are not punished at all but also when the perpetrators, like in Gäfgen's case, are not punished severely enough.


2015 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 515-531
Author(s):  
Harmen van der Wilt

This article traces the development of the foreseeability test in the context of the nullum crimen principle. While the European Court of Human Rights has introduced the ‘accessibility and foreseeability’ criteria long ago in the Sunday Times case, the Court has only recently started to apply this standard with respect to international crimes. In the Kononov case, judges of the European Court of Human Rights exhibited strongly divergent opinions on the question whether the punishment of alleged war crimes that had been committed in 1944 violated the nullum crimen principle. According to this author, the dissension of the judges demonstrates the lack of objective foreseeability, which should have served as a starting point for the assessment of the subjective foreseeability and a – potentially exculpating – mistake of law of the perpetrator. The Court should therefore have concluded that the nullum crimen principle had been violated.


Author(s):  
Mettraux Guénaël

This chapter discusses crimes against humanity under international law. Crimes against humanity were first introduced at Nuremberg as a means of criminalizing three sorts of criminality that so far had evaded the sanction of international law: atrocities committed outside the context of an armed conflict or independent of it; crimes committed against fellow nationals or nationals of allied nations; and institutionalized discriminatory violence that resulted in individuals being targeted and mistreated by a state because of their identity. Crimes against humanity seek to protect core attributes of all human beings: their dignity; their humanity; and their fundamental human rights. The notion of crimes against humanity reflects the fact that the protection of those interests and the punishment of serious violations of these interests is a matter of universal concern. It also makes it clear that the protection arising from international law does not depend on the nationality of the victim or his membership in a group, nor on his or relationship to the perpetrator. Instead, it is the sheer humanity of the victim that warrants and justifies the criminalization of such acts. And whilst the notion of genocide and crimes against humanity overlap in part in their efforts to protect these core values, unlike genocide, crimes against humanity seek to protect individuals as such, rather than groups of individuals. The chapter then looks at the relationship between crimes against humanity and other international crimes as well as the process of defining crimes against humanity.


Author(s):  
Grono Nick ◽  
Wheeler Anna de Courcy

This Chapter examines in which circumstances, and under what conditions, the prospect of prosecution by the ICC may act to curtail the actions of government or rebel leaders by shifting the strategic calculus in favour of avoiding war crimes or crimes against humanity. It studies ICC engagement and its impact in Uganda, the DRC, Colombia, Sudan, Kenya, and Mali. It argues that success or failure of ICC deterrence rests to a large degree on its ability to pursue successful prosecutions. It concludes that potential to deter future atrocity crimes may not exist in all cases, and probably not in the midst of armed conflict, but could exist in those situations where the commission of crimes is one of a series of policy options available to a leader facing a challenge to his or her authority.


2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-122
Author(s):  
Evelyn W. Kamau

AbstractThe increased domestication of international core crimes like genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes has placed national prosecutors and judges on unfamiliar ground. Specifically, though very welcome, the recognition of acts of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as constituting core international crimes poses a further challenge. The circumstances surrounding the commission of SGBV as international core crimes, coupled with their unique elements and manner of proof, makes their domestic prosecution seem that much more difficult. An understanding of how acts of SGBV constitute international core crimes, their constituent elements and the manner of proving them, coupled with how to treat victims and witnesses of SGBV, goes a long way in easing the perceived challenge of domestically prosecuting them. This article is geared towards achieving that and is directed at people who are involved in or are considering carrying out domestic prosecutions and adjudications of SGBV as international core crimes.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Hubert ◽  
Ariela Blätter

In 2005 the UN’s World Summit endorsed the idea that its members have a responsibility to prevent and halt genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Insufficient attention has been paid to clarifying how the definitions and evolving jurisprudence relating to these international crimes can provide clarity in identifying the unlawful acts that the Responsibility to Protect seeks to prevent and to halt. Specifically, an analysis of the elements of the crimes establishes the following parameters: attacks directed against any civilian population, committed in a widespread or systematic manner, in furtherance of a state or organizational policy, irrespective of the existence of discriminatory intent or an armed conflict. This conclusion makes reference to four ‘crimes’ redundant: crime against humanity alone provides an appropriate framework for conceptualizing and implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Although analysts focused on international crimes tend to prioritize accountability, such an approach need not be reactive. The essence of the Responsibility to Protect is best characterized as international crimes prevention.


Author(s):  
Robert Cryer

This chapter first discusses the overlaps between human rights and international criminal law, focusing on four international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. It then considers prosecutions and non-prosecutorial options, concluding with an analysis of the pros and cons of using international criminal law to protect human rights.


Author(s):  
Tilmann Altwicker

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed a rights-based conception of precautions that has implications both for law enforcement and military operations alike. In the military context, the rights-based conception bears some resemblance with the IHL concept of precautions in and against the effects of attacks. The ECtHR’s builds its conception of precautions on a wide interpretation of the right to life contained in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In human rights doctrine, precautions in attack can be addressed as positive obligations relating to organization and procedure, precautions against the effects of attack can be classified as positive obligations to protect. In contrast to its IHL counterpart, the rights-based conception of precautions does not only entail operational obligations, but also legislative obligations. A rights-based conception of precautions can be of particular value especially with regard to precautions against the effects of attacks in non-international armed conflict. The ECtHR is, however, well-advised to develop its rights-based conception of precautions in close alignment with its IHL counterpart.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 675-704
Author(s):  
James Gallen

Abstract In recent years, both transitional justice and the role of the European Court of Human Rights in dealing with historical abuses have evolved. Transitional justice has begun to address widespread or systemic human rights abuses outside of the contexts of armed conflict and authoritarian regimes. In three key recent judgments, El-Masri v Macedonia, Janowiec v Russia and O’Keeffe v Ireland, the Court has clarified and expanded its approach to addressing historical human rights violations relevant to transitional justice in significant, if inconsistent, ways. To date, there is no exploration of the relationship between transitional justice, historical abuse outside the contexts of armed conflict or authoritarian rule and the European Convention of Human Rights. This article seeks to address that gap by considering the potential opportunities and obstacles for the use of the Convention to address historical abuse in consolidated democracies as a part of transitional justice.


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