civilian population
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2022 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiting Wang ◽  
Laura L. Hester ◽  
Jennifer Lofland ◽  
Shawn Rose ◽  
Chetan S. Karyekar ◽  
...  

Abstract Objective To provide current estimates of the number of patients with prevalent systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE) by major health insurance types in the US and to describe patient characteristics. Four large US health insurance claims databases were analyzed to represent different types of insurance coverage, including private insurance, Medicaid, and Medicare Supplemental. Results Overall unadjusted SLE prevalence per 100,000 persons in the US ranged from 150.1 (private insurance) to 252.9 (Medicare Supplemental insurance). Extrapolating to the US civilian population in 2016, we estimated roughly 345,000 to 404,000 prevalent SLE patients with private/Medicare insurance and 99,000 prevalent SLE patients with Medicaid insurance. Comorbidities, including renal failure/dialysis were commonly observed across multiple organ systems in SLE patients (8.4–21.1%). We estimated a larger number of prevalent SLE cases in the US civilian population than previous reports and observed extensive disease burden based on a 1-year cross-sectional analysis.


2022 ◽  
pp. 121-136
Author(s):  
Ramil Iskandarli

The recent military confrontation including Armenia and Azerbaijan, which raged unabated for six weeks, has caused casualties, damages, and displacement of the local population. The fighting pushed hundreds of thousands to flee their homes for safety, of which some remain displaced and will not be able to return to their homes in the long term. The hostilities have brought damage to livelihoods, houses, and public infrastructure. Moreover, many areas have been left with mines and other unexploded ordnances, bringing significant risks for the civilian population. Despite the ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan on 10 November 2020, the humanitarian situation remains of concern. The President of Azerbaijan paid more attention to the rebuilding and reconstruction of Karabakh rather than to continue endless discussions on the status of Karabakh. Ilham Aliyev said that, during the second Karabakh war, Armenia committed war crimes. We are facing a great challenge and a great task related to the demining and reconstruction of liberated territories.


2021 ◽  
pp. 45-52
Author(s):  
Татьяна Васильевна Галкина

Подведены первые итоги реализации Всероссийского патриотического мегапроекта «Карта Победы – 2025» применительно к г. Томску и Томской области на примере локального патриотического проекта «Тыловой Томск на Карте Победы». Одна из целей проекта – выявление неучтенных потерь мирного населения Томской области в годы Великой Отечественной войны. Впервые в научный оборот введены архивные сведения Департамента записи актов гражданского состояния (ЗАГС) Томской области о количестве записей актов о смерти, зарегистрированных территориальными отделами ЗАГС за период с 1940 по 1945 г. При этом количество человеческих потерь оказалось настолько чудовищным, что сравнимо с военными потерями Томской области за годы Великой Отечественной войны: военных потерь – 60 619 человек, тыловых – 59 159. В свете этих данных представляется необходимым дальнейшее изучение феномена «тыл как социально ответственная территория». Полученные данные открывают новый пласт исторических реалий военного времени в глубоком сибирском тылу, которые необходимо оценивать с позиций нацистского геноцида против народов СССР в годы Великой Отечественной войны. Представлены организационно-педагогические технологии реализации проекта «Тыловой Томск на Карте Победы», содержащего научно-исследовательскую (историческую) и презентационную (с использованием технологии дополненной реальности – QR-кодирования) части. Многоплановость и сложность реализации патриотического проекта по тыловой проблематике являются незаменимым «полигоном» для закрепления профессиональных компетенций будущего учителя-патриота. The article is devoted to the first results of the implementation of the All-Russian Patriotic Mega-Project “Victory Map – 2025” in relation to the city of Tomsk and the Tomsk region on the example of the local patriotic project “Rear Tomsk on the Victory Map”. One of the goals of the project was to identify unaccounted losses of the civilian population of the Tomsk region during the Great Patriotic War. The article for the first time introduces into scientific circulation archival information of the Department of Civil Registration of the Tomsk region on the number of death records registered by the territorial departments of the registry office for the period from 1940 to 1945. At the same time, the number of human losses was so mon strous that it is comparable to the military losses of the Tomsk region during the Great Patriotic War: military losses – 60,619 people, rear losses – 59159 people. In the light of these data, it seems necessary to further study the phenomenon of “rear as a socially responsible territory”. The obtained figures open a new layer of historical realities of wartime in the deep Siberian rear, which was one of the bridgeheads of an invisible, but no less terrible war with huge human losses among the civilian population. The article presents organizational and pedagogical technologies for the implementation of the project “Rear Tomsk on the Victory Map”, containing research (historical) and presentation (using augmented reality technology – QR-coding) parts. The multifaceted and complexity of the implementation of the patriotic project on logistics issues is an indispensable “testing ground” for consolidating the professional competencies of the future patriotic teacher.


2021 ◽  
pp. 113-124
Author(s):  
S. A. Parakhin ◽  
V. B. Bezgin

The article examines the practice of using the supreme punishment - execution, used by the repressive bodies of the Soviet government in the fight against peasant protests in the Tambov province during the civil war. The research was carried out on the basis of archival sources introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. The work uses historical-comparative and systemic methods. An analysis of the facts of the execution of peasants carried out by punitive agencies during the suppression of rural "riots" of 1918-1919 and the period of the struggle against the uprising of 1920-1921 in the Tambov province is given. The facts of extrajudicial killings in the form of public executions of peasant rebels and hostages from among the civilian population, which were resorted to by the military-party administration in the occupied regions, were established. The role of the institution of hostages as a repressive measure in the actions of government troops to suppress the peasant uprising has been clarified. It is concluded that if during the period of rural "riots" in 1918-1919 execution was applied only to their organizers, then during the peasant uprising of 1920-1921 this form of the death penalty for "active" insurgents was given a systemic character, and the shooting of hostages from among local residents became widespread.


Author(s):  
Ioanna Voudouri

Abstract Despite the existence of a definition of civilian status in international humanitarian law (IHL), differences in the application of this definition – both in theory and in practice – continue to be observed. One of the contexts where these differences remain palpable (and do so for various fighting parties) is Afghanistan, a country where civilian harm has remained high for several years. This article explores the legal concepts of civilian and civilian population, including how they have been formed and interpreted and, ultimately, what protection they afford to persons who belong in these categories. The second part of the article brings these questions into the Afghan context, one that is complex and where cultural and religious implications should not be overlooked. Public statements, reports and codes of fighting parties in the country which touch upon civilian status are presented, followed by the civilian experience in Afghanistan, particularly focusing on the reported harm. Ultimately, it is proposed that despite the factual and contextual confusion, the existing legal rules and interpretations, when applied in good faith, suffice to ensure both that those who are civilians under IHL are protected and that the threats which some civilians’ behaviour might pose can be effectively addressed without a status change.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-92
Author(s):  
Daniel Galily ◽  
David Schwartz

This study aims to present the strategies from “Shock and Awe” to asymmetric warfare in modern military warfare. The main points in the article are: Introduction: The lessons of a war - The Yom Kippur War; In the years before the Yom Kippur War; After the Yom Kippur War, the American military understood that it had to focus on mobile and rapid warfare against regular armies, an issue that had been neglected over the past decade; The “Shock and Awe” battle strategy. In conclusion: a very important element for coping with asymmetric warfare is the psychological strength of the civilian population. As stated, one of the ways of warfare of the weak side against the strong side is the marking the psychological sensitivity of the civilian population of the strong side as a target. A psychological attack on the civilian population can manifest itself in the launching of missiles at it, the control of its information, the multiplicity of casualties of its soldiers and the sowing of a sense of frustration in it due to prolonged confrontation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332110440
Author(s):  
Austin J Knuppe

How do military tactics shape civilian support for foreign intervention? Critics contend that invasive tactics undermine popular support by alienating the civilian population. Counterexamples suggest that civilians will support invasive tactics when foreign counterinsurgents are willing and able to mitigate a proximate threat. I reconcile these divergent findings by arguing that civilian support is a function of threat perception based on three interacting heuristics: social identity, combatant targeting, and territorial control. To evaluate my theory, I enumerate a survey among Iraqi residents in Baghdad during the anti-ISIS campaign. Respondents preferred more invasive tactics when foreign counterinsurgents assisted the most effective local members of the anti-ISIS coalition. Across sectarian divides, however, respondents uniformly opposed the deployment of foreign troops. These findings suggest that in regime-controlled communities, civilians will support counterinsurgents who are invasive enough to mitigate insurgent threats, but not too invasive as to undermine local autonomy.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Amy Russell

<p>Moral philosophers and the international political community alike have traditionally valued the lives of civilians over those of soldiers. The first part of jus in bello, the doctrine which aims to characterise the just conduct of war, states that 'civilians, as non-combatants, must not be attacked or killed', whereas the only requirement concerning the killing of soldiers is that any attack must meet the requirement of proportionality: it must not cause so much harm that the good it does is overridden. Similarly, Article 51 of the Geneva Protocols states that 'the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations', and that 'the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack'. The requirement of proportionality is mentioned only with reference to the protection of civilian life or cultural objects, except in the general statement that 'it is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.' The specific protections offered to combatants are limited to wounded, sick or shipwrecked combatants, and prisoners of war - those combatants who most closely resemble civilians. The Protocols do state that all attacks must be limited to 'military objectives', but the definition of these objectives is permissive, to say the least: 'Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.' To kill enemy soldiers in large numbers surely offers a definite military advantage. This thesis examines the moral basis for the distinction that these laws and doctrines draw between soldiers and civilians. I explain why the distinction between combatant and non-combatant casualties is not, in a significant proportion of cases, a morally sound one. I argue that any moral justification of the principle of non-combatant immunity must be of a utilitarian nature, pointing to its ability to limit the overall carnage of warfare. The implications for jus in bello of recognising that the principle can be justified only on these grounds are wide-ranging and important. If we want to retain civilian immunity, we must accept a utilitarian simulacrum of that doctrine. I argue that applying utilitarian standards to the just conduct of war will lead us to prefer very different sorts of policies from those currently embodied by jus in bello. Thus what we think about civilian immunity may have consequences for what we think about the moral foundation of our doctrine of just war.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Amy Russell

<p>Moral philosophers and the international political community alike have traditionally valued the lives of civilians over those of soldiers. The first part of jus in bello, the doctrine which aims to characterise the just conduct of war, states that 'civilians, as non-combatants, must not be attacked or killed', whereas the only requirement concerning the killing of soldiers is that any attack must meet the requirement of proportionality: it must not cause so much harm that the good it does is overridden. Similarly, Article 51 of the Geneva Protocols states that 'the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations', and that 'the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack'. The requirement of proportionality is mentioned only with reference to the protection of civilian life or cultural objects, except in the general statement that 'it is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.' The specific protections offered to combatants are limited to wounded, sick or shipwrecked combatants, and prisoners of war - those combatants who most closely resemble civilians. The Protocols do state that all attacks must be limited to 'military objectives', but the definition of these objectives is permissive, to say the least: 'Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.' To kill enemy soldiers in large numbers surely offers a definite military advantage. This thesis examines the moral basis for the distinction that these laws and doctrines draw between soldiers and civilians. I explain why the distinction between combatant and non-combatant casualties is not, in a significant proportion of cases, a morally sound one. I argue that any moral justification of the principle of non-combatant immunity must be of a utilitarian nature, pointing to its ability to limit the overall carnage of warfare. The implications for jus in bello of recognising that the principle can be justified only on these grounds are wide-ranging and important. If we want to retain civilian immunity, we must accept a utilitarian simulacrum of that doctrine. I argue that applying utilitarian standards to the just conduct of war will lead us to prefer very different sorts of policies from those currently embodied by jus in bello. Thus what we think about civilian immunity may have consequences for what we think about the moral foundation of our doctrine of just war.</p>


Author(s):  
Maxime Nijs

Abstract Siege warfare and its devastating humanitarian consequences have been one of the defining features of contemporary armed conflicts. While the most apparent restriction of siege warfare appears to be provided by the prohibition against starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare, the prevailing restrictive interpretation of this prohibition has left civilians remaining in a besieged area unprotected from the hardships they endure. This article demonstrates that shifting the focus from the prohibition against starvation to the rules regulating humanitarian relief operations does not seem helpful due to the ambiguities regarding the requirement of consent and the right of control of the besieging party. In remedying this protection gap, this article examines whether and how the principle of proportionality applies in the context of a siege. After analyzing whether the encirclement and isolation aspect of a siege can be considered an attack in the sense of Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I (AP I), to which the proportionality principle applies, the article investigates how this principle operates in the context of a siege. It will be demonstrated that Article 57(2)(b) of AP I requires that the proportionality of a siege must be continuously monitored.


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