scholarly journals Leakage-Resilient Pseudorandom Functions and Side-Channel Attacks on Feistel Networks

2010 ◽  
pp. 21-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yevgeniy Dodis ◽  
Krzysztof Pietrzak
Keyword(s):  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Pseudorandom Functions ◽  
Leakage Resilient ◽  
Feistel Networks

Continuous Leakage-Resilient Identity-Based Encryption with Tight Security

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (8) ◽  
pp. 1092-1105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanwei Zhou ◽  
Bo Yang ◽  
Hongxia Hou ◽  
Lina Zhang ◽  
Tao Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Identity Based Encryption ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Communication Efficiency ◽  
Leakage Resilient ◽  
Novel Method ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
Tight Security

Abstract In the actual applications, an adversary can break the security of cryptography scheme through various leakage attacks (e.g. side-channel attacks, cold-boot attacks, etc.), even the continuous leakage attacks. That is, a practical cryptography scheme must maintain its claimed security in the continuous leakage setting. However, the previous constructions on the leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme could tolerate a leakage that is bounded, and cannot resist the continuous leakage attacks. In order to further achieve the better security, a novel method to build the continuous leakage-resilient IBE scheme with tight security is presented in this paper, and the scheme’s security is proved, in the standard model, based on a stronger security assumption that depends on the number of queries made by the adversary. In addition, our proposal has several advantages over previous such constructions, e.g. shorter public parameters, higher communication efficiency, tight security, etc.

scholarly journals Leakage-Resilient Certificate-Based Signature Resistant to Side-Channel Attacks

IEEE Access ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 19041-19053 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jui-Di Wu ◽  
Yuh-Min Tseng ◽  
Sen-Shan Huang ◽  
Tung-Tso Tsai
Keyword(s):  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Leakage Resilient

scholarly journals Retrofitting Leakage Resilient Authenticated Encryption to Microcontrollers

2020 ◽  
pp. 365-388
Author(s):  
Florian Unterstein ◽  
Marc Schink ◽  
Thomas Schamberger ◽  
Lars Tebelmann ◽  
Manuel Ilg ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Side Channel ◽  
Authenticated Encryption ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Non Invasive ◽  
Cryptographic Keys ◽  
Protection Mechanisms ◽  
Leakage Resilient ◽  
Commercial Off The Shelf ◽  
Iot Devices ◽  
Physical Access

The security of Internet of Things (IoT) devices relies on fundamental concepts such as cryptographically protected firmware updates. In this context attackers usually have physical access to a device and therefore side-channel attacks have to be considered. This makes the protection of required cryptographic keys and implementations challenging, especially for commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) microcontrollers that typically have no hardware countermeasures. In this work, we demonstrate how unprotected hardware AES engines of COTS microcontrollers can be efficiently protected against side-channel attacks by constructing a leakage resilient pseudo random function (LR-PRF). Using this side-channel protected building block, we implement a leakage resilient authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) scheme that enables secured firmware updates. We use concepts from leakage resilience to retrofit side-channel protection on unprotected hardware AES engines by means of software-only modifications. The LR-PRF construction leverages frequent key changes and low data complexity together with key dependent noise from parallel hardware to protect against side-channel attacks. Contrary to most other protection mechanisms such as time-based hiding, no additional true randomness is required. Our concept relies on parallel S-boxes in the AES hardware implementation, a feature that is fortunately present in many microcontrollers as a measure to increase performance. In a case study, we implement the protected AEAD scheme for two popular ARM Cortex-M microcontrollers with differing parallelism. We evaluate the protection capabilities in realistic IoT attack scenarios, where non-invasive EM probes or power consumption measurements are employed by the attacker. We show that the concept provides the side-channel hardening that is required for the long-term security of IoT devices.

scholarly journals Leakage-Resilient Outsourced Revocable Certificateless Signature with a Cloud Revocation Server

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 464-481
Author(s):  
Yuh–Min Tseng ◽  
Jui-Di Wu ◽  
Sen-Shan Huang ◽  
Tung-Tso Tsai
Keyword(s):  
Public Key Cryptography ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Key Generation ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Signature Schemes ◽  
Certificateless Cryptography ◽  
Secret Keys ◽  
Leakage Resilient ◽  
Certificateless Signature

Certificateless public-key system (CL-PKS) is a significant public-key cryptography and it solves both the key escrow and certificate management problems. Outsourced revocable certificateless public-key system (ORCL-PKS) with a cloud revocation server (CRS) not only provides a revocation mechanism, but also further outsources the revocation functionality to the CRS to reduce the computational burden of the key generation center (KGC). Recently, side-channel attacks have threatened some existing conventional cryptography (including CL-PKS). Indeed, adversaries can apply side-channel attacks to derive fractional constituents of private (or secret) keys to damage the security of these cryptographic protocols (or schemes). To withstand such attacks, leakage-resilient cryptography is an attractive approach. However, little research concerns with leakage-resilient certificateless cryptography. In this paper, the first leakage-resilient outsourced revocable certificateless signature (LR-ORCLS) scheme is presented. The proposed scheme allows adversaries to continually derive fractional constituents of private (or secret) keys and possesses overall unbounded leakage property. In the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, our scheme is shown to be existential unforgeable against adversaries. Finally, the comparisons between the proposed scheme and the previous revocable certificateless signature schemes are provided to demonstrate the merits of the proposed scheme.

Countermeasure for Cryptographic Chips to Resist Side-Channel Attacks

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (11) ◽  
pp. 2990-2998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tao ZHANG ◽  
Ming-Yu FAN
Keyword(s):  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks

scholarly journals ThermalAttackNet: Are CNNs Making It Easy to Perform Temperature Side-Channel Attack in Mobile Edge Devices?

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 146
Author(s):  
Somdip Dey ◽  
Amit Kumar Singh ◽  
Klaus McDonald-Maier
Keyword(s):  
Information Flow ◽  
Heat Dissipation ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Information Flow Control ◽  
On Chip ◽  
Temperature Side ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Memory Efficient

Side-channel attacks remain a challenge to information flow control and security in mobile edge devices till this date. One such important security flaw could be exploited through temperature side-channel attacks, where heat dissipation and propagation from the processing cores are observed over time in order to deduce security flaws. In this paper, we study how computer vision-based convolutional neural networks (CNNs) could be used to exploit temperature (thermal) side-channel attack on different Linux governors in mobile edge device utilizing multi-processor system-on-chip (MPSoC). We also designed a power- and memory-efficient CNN model that is capable of performing thermal side-channel attack on the MPSoC and can be used by industry practitioners and academics as a benchmark to design methodologies to secure against such an attack in MPSoC.

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