scholarly journals ThermalAttackNet: Are CNNs Making It Easy to Perform Temperature Side-Channel Attack in Mobile Edge Devices?

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 146
Author(s):  
Somdip Dey ◽  
Amit Kumar Singh ◽  
Klaus McDonald-Maier
Keyword(s):  
Information Flow ◽  
Heat Dissipation ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Information Flow Control ◽  
On Chip ◽  
Temperature Side ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Memory Efficient

Side-channel attacks remain a challenge to information flow control and security in mobile edge devices till this date. One such important security flaw could be exploited through temperature side-channel attacks, where heat dissipation and propagation from the processing cores are observed over time in order to deduce security flaws. In this paper, we study how computer vision-based convolutional neural networks (CNNs) could be used to exploit temperature (thermal) side-channel attack on different Linux governors in mobile edge device utilizing multi-processor system-on-chip (MPSoC). We also designed a power- and memory-efficient CNN model that is capable of performing thermal side-channel attack on the MPSoC and can be used by industry practitioners and academics as a benchmark to design methodologies to secure against such an attack in MPSoC.

scholarly journals ThermalAttackNet: Are CNNs Making It Easy To Perform Temperature Side-Channel Attack In Mobile Edge Devices?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Somdip Dey ◽  
Amit Kumar ◽  
Klaus D. Mcdonald-Maier
Keyword(s):  
Information Flow ◽  
Heat Dissipation ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Information Flow Control ◽  
On Chip ◽  
Temperature Side ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Memory Efficient

<div><div><div><p>Side-channel attacks remain a challenge to information flow control and security in mobile edge devices till this date. One such important security flaw could be exploited through temperature side-channel attacks, where heat dissipation and propagation from the processing cores are observed over time in order to deduce security flaws. In this brief, we study how computer vision based convolutional neural networks (CNNs) could be used to exploit temperature (thermal) side-channel attack on different Linux governors in mobile edge device utilizing multi- processor system-on-chip (MPSoC). We also designed a power- and memory-efficient CNN model that is capable of performing thermal side-channel attack on the MPSoC and can be used by industry practitioners and academics as a benchmark to design methodologies to secure against such an attack in MPSoC.</p></div></div></div>

scholarly journals ThermalAttackNet: Are CNNs Making It Easy To Perform Temperature Side-Channel Attack In Mobile Edge Devices?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Somdip Dey ◽  
Amit Kumar ◽  
Klaus D. Mcdonald-Maier
Keyword(s):  
Information Flow ◽  
Heat Dissipation ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Information Flow Control ◽  
On Chip ◽  
Temperature Side ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Memory Efficient

<div><div><div><p>Side-channel attacks remain a challenge to information flow control and security in mobile edge devices till this date. One such important security flaw could be exploited through temperature side-channel attacks, where heat dissipation and propagation from the processing cores are observed over time in order to deduce security flaws. In this brief, we study how computer vision based convolutional neural networks (CNNs) could be used to exploit temperature (thermal) side-channel attack on different Linux governors in mobile edge device utilizing multi- processor system-on-chip (MPSoC). We also designed a power- and memory-efficient CNN model that is capable of performing thermal side-channel attack on the MPSoC and can be used by industry practitioners and academics as a benchmark to design methodologies to secure against such an attack in MPSoC.</p></div></div></div>

Adaptive multilevel fuzzy-based authentication framework to mitigate Cache side channel attack in cloud computing

2018 ◽  
Vol 09 (05) ◽  
pp. 1850045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bharati Ainapure ◽  
Deven Shah ◽  
A. Ananda Rao
Keyword(s):  
Cloud Computing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Privacy Preservation ◽  
Virtual Machines ◽  
Fuzzy Rule ◽  
Data Access ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Cloud Providers

Cloud computing supports multitenancy to satisfy the users’ demands for accessing resources and simultaneously it increases revenue for cloud providers. Cloud providers adapt multitenancy by virtualizing the resources, like CPU, network interfaces, peripherals, hard drives and memory using hypervisor to fulfill the demand. In a virtualized environment, many virtual machines (VMs) can run on the same core with the help of the hypervisor by sharing the resources. The VMs running on the same core are the target for the malicious or abnormal attacks like side channel attacks. Among various side channel attacks in cloud computing, cache-based side channel attack is one that leaks private information of the users based on the shared resources. Here, as the shared resource is the cache, a process can utilize the cache usage of another by cache contention. Cache sharing provides a way for the attackers to gain considerable information so that the key used for encryption can be inferred. Discovering this side channel attack is a challenging task. This requires identification of a feature that influences the attack. Even though there are various techniques available in the literature to mitigate such attacks, an effective solution to reduce the cache-based side channel attack is still an issue. Therefore, a novel fuzzy rule-based mechanism is integrated to detect the cache side channel attackers by monitoring the cache data access (CDA). The factor that determines the attack is CDA in a log file created by the framework during authorization. The proposed framework also utilizes certain security properties including ECC and hashing for the privacy preservation and the decision is made with the aid of a fuzzy logic system.

Optical Fault Injection Attacks against Cipher Chip

2014 ◽  
Vol 1044-1045 ◽  
pp. 1498-1502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Sheng Wang ◽  
Dao Gang Ji ◽  
Yang Zhang ◽  
Kai Yan Chen ◽  
Kai Song
Keyword(s):  
Fault Injection ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Secret Information ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Cryptographic Algorithms ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks

Cipher chips, such as microprocessors, are playing the important role in most cryptosystems, and implementing many public cryptographic algorithms. However, Side channel attacks pose serious threats to Cipher chips. Optical Side channel attack is a new kind of method against cipher chips. Two methods are presented in this paper, which shows how to implement optical fault injection attacks against RSA and AES algorithms running on AT89C52 microchip, and demonstrates how to exploit secret information under attack.

The Hardware Implementation of a Lightweight Block Cipher Algorithm and a Message Authentication Algorithm

2012 ◽  
Vol 546-547 ◽  
pp. 1489-1494
Author(s):  
Yi Kun Hu ◽  
Zun Yang Qin
Keyword(s):  
Hardware Implementation ◽  
Block Cipher ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Message Authentication ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Processing Efficiency ◽  
New Family ◽  
Lightweight Block Cipher ◽  
Lightweight Cipher

Among the block cipher algorithms, AES or DES is an excellent and preferred choice for most block cipher applications. But AES and DES are not very suitable for hardware implementation because of the high cost that they require large areas of routing and the processing efficiency is low, relatively. So lightweight cipher algorithms come into beings, among which PRESENT is very competitive. Along with the structure of a message authentication algorithm ALRED, a new family of Tunable Lightweight MAC based on PRESENT is proposed, that is TuLP. However, PRESENT is not able to resist side channel attack, so is TuLP, of course. For the above reason, in this paper, we provide an improvement of PRESENT by inserting random dummy cycles as well as shuffling to strengthen the security of PRESENT against side channel attacks. We will implement PRESENT and TuLP in Verilog and do simulation on Xilinx ISim platform. At last, we would like to provide the power analyzing of Xilinx XPower.

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