European Union Preferential Trading Arrangements: Evolution, Content and Use

Author(s):  
Lars Nilsson
2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (Special Edition) ◽  
pp. 111-133
Author(s):  
Irfan ul Haque Irfan ul Haque

This paper examines and critiques the worldwide mushrooming of preferential trading arrangements and traces its implications for Pakistan. It points out that this development is fundamentally contrary to the principle of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, which was the cornerstone of the post-war multilateral trading system as embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The causes of the rise in bilateral and regional trading arrangements are discussed and it is shown that they pose a real threat to many relatively small economies, including Pakistan. The paper discusses the various preferential trade agreements Pakistan has already signed. It notes that, with the exception of its trade agreement with China, Pakistan has not succeeded in concluding preferential trading arrangements with any of the strategically and systemically more important countries, viz., the US, European Union, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) could potentially be of considerable importance for Pakistan’s long-term economic growth, but this potential might not be realized if India and Pakistan fail to overcome their mutual differences. Finally, the paper explores steps that might be taken to promote Pakistan’s economic interests in its bilateral relations.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD D. MANSFIELD ◽  
HELEN V. MILNER ◽  
JON C. PEVEHOUSE

Since the Second World War, preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have become increasingly pervasive features of the international economic system. A great deal of research has addressed the economic consequences of these arrangements, but far less effort has been made to identify the political factors leading states to enter them. In this article, the domestic political factors affecting whether countries enter PTAs are investigated, placing particular emphasis on the number of veto players within a state. It is argued that the probability of forming a PTA declines as the number of such players rises. The results, covering 194 countries from 1950 to 1999, strongly support this argument. Holding various political and economic factors constant, increasing the number of veto players within a country significantly reduces the probability of signing a PTA.


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