Working Group III

Author(s):  
L. H. Grimme ◽  
S. Dumontet
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
CÉLINE LÉVESQUE

Abstract The practice of arbitrators and counsel in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases simultaneously playing both roles — known as “double-hatting” — has been the subject of much controversy in recent debates on ISDS reform, notably, at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Working Group III where a Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in International Investment Disputes is under discussion. While Canada has been less than consistent in its approaches to ISDS in recent international investment agreements (IIAs), its position against double-hatting has been rather constant. This article explores whether this stance reveals a commitment on the part of Canada towards increased judicialization of ISDS or reflects a “flavour of the month” reform likely to change with differing IIAs and negotiating partners. Analysis of Canada’s recent IIA practices, including its model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, released in May 2021, and the positions it has taken at UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, lead the author to conclude that Canada appears committed to increased judicialization of ISDS in the long run.


Energy Policy ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 414-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuele Massetti ◽  
Carlo Carraro ◽  
Sujata Gupta ◽  
Jochen Harnish ◽  
Raymond J. Kopp

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 203
Author(s):  
Enrique Fernández Masiá ◽  
Margherita Salvadori

Resumen: La principal iniciativa para reformar el sistema de solución de controversias inversor-Estado está siendo debatida en el Grupo de Trabajo III de la CNUDMI. Se están discutiendo propuestas específicas tanto para una reforma procesal como institucional. En lo que se refiere a la reforma institucional, la Unión Europea propone el establecimiento de un tribunal multilateral de inversiones, que rompería con el sistema actual ad-hoc. Con independencia de estas propuestas, cada vez parece existir un mayor acuerdo para la adopción de un Centro de asesoramiento sobre el Derecho internacional de inversiones, que podría solventar la cuestión de la duración y costes de los procedimientos, facilitar el acceso a la justicia y, mejorar la elaboración de los futuros Acuerdos internacionales.Palabras clave: Arbitraje inversor-Estado , Grupo de Trabajo III de la CNUDMI, Tribunal Multilateral de Inversiones, Mecanismo de Apelación, Centro de Asesoramiento.Abstract: The main initiative to reform the system of investor-State dispute settlement is being debated by Working Group III appointed by the UNCITRAL. Specific proposals for a procedural and institutional reform of the system are being discussed. As concerns the institutional reform, the EU proposes the establishment of a multilateral investment court, which would break the current ad hoc-based system. Independent from these proposals, there appears to be a growing consensus on the establishment of an Advisory Centre on International Investment Law, which could address the issue of costs and duration of procedures, enhance access to justice issues, apart from improving the future treaty law-making.Keywords: Investor-State Arbitration,UNCITRAL Working Group III, Multilateral Investment Court, Appellate Mechanism, Advisory Centre.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 392-399
Author(s):  
Crina Baltag

The doctrine of police powers is increasingly raised as a defence by host States in investment arbitration proceedings, in particular in the context of claims with an environmental component. The succinct analysis below highlights that while the doctrine can effectively be enforced by arbitral tribunals in determining that a measure taken by a host State and resulting in loss of property of an investor does not constitute expropriation, certain concerns with the application of this doctrine must still be addressed. The limitations to the police powers, as well as the issue of burden of proof, as recently discussed in Les Laboratoires Servier v. Poland, are few of the matters of concern. Further, the discussion is even more timely in the context of the investor-State dispute settlement reform and the discussions in the UNCITRAL Working Group III.


Author(s):  
J. D. Burton ◽  
P. G. Brewer ◽  
R. Chesselet
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document