scholarly journals Lo que se está discutiendo en la CNUDMI: evolución o revolución en el sistema de solución de controversias inversor-Estado = What is being discussed in the UNCITRAL: evolution or revolution in the investor-State dispute

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 203
Author(s):  
Enrique Fernández Masiá ◽  
Margherita Salvadori

Resumen: La principal iniciativa para reformar el sistema de solución de controversias inversor-Estado está siendo debatida en el Grupo de Trabajo III de la CNUDMI. Se están discutiendo propuestas específicas tanto para una reforma procesal como institucional. En lo que se refiere a la reforma institucional, la Unión Europea propone el establecimiento de un tribunal multilateral de inversiones, que rompería con el sistema actual ad-hoc. Con independencia de estas propuestas, cada vez parece existir un mayor acuerdo para la adopción de un Centro de asesoramiento sobre el Derecho internacional de inversiones, que podría solventar la cuestión de la duración y costes de los procedimientos, facilitar el acceso a la justicia y, mejorar la elaboración de los futuros Acuerdos internacionales.Palabras clave: Arbitraje inversor-Estado , Grupo de Trabajo III de la CNUDMI, Tribunal Multilateral de Inversiones, Mecanismo de Apelación, Centro de Asesoramiento.Abstract: The main initiative to reform the system of investor-State dispute settlement is being debated by Working Group III appointed by the UNCITRAL. Specific proposals for a procedural and institutional reform of the system are being discussed. As concerns the institutional reform, the EU proposes the establishment of a multilateral investment court, which would break the current ad hoc-based system. Independent from these proposals, there appears to be a growing consensus on the establishment of an Advisory Centre on International Investment Law, which could address the issue of costs and duration of procedures, enhance access to justice issues, apart from improving the future treaty law-making.Keywords: Investor-State Arbitration,UNCITRAL Working Group III, Multilateral Investment Court, Appellate Mechanism, Advisory Centre.

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 301-357
Author(s):  
José Rafael Mata Dona

On 31 January 2019, Herbert Smith Freehills kindly hosted in London the 4th EFILA Annual Conference on the “European Union (EU) and the future of International Investment Law and Arbitration”. The EU’s external investment policy and its investment policy towards Asia featured as the topics of the first two panels, which were followed by a keynote speech on the construction of a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC). The conference’s last panel dealt with the EU’s energy investment policy. This report presents the most relevant developments behind the EU’s external investment policy until the end of January 2019, its implementation towards Asia and influence in new global trends in investor-State dispute settlement. Further, it confronts the arguments of followers and detractors of the idea of a permanent standing two-tier mechanism with full-time adjudicators, which is promoted by the EU as the only option that can successfully respond to all the problems and challenges of the current ad hoc system. Finally, it conveys both the EU’ and investors’ needs in the construction of new carbon-friendly infrastructure and their enquiries into the modernisation process of the Energy Charter Treaty.


Author(s):  
CÉLINE LÉVESQUE

Abstract The practice of arbitrators and counsel in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases simultaneously playing both roles — known as “double-hatting” — has been the subject of much controversy in recent debates on ISDS reform, notably, at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Working Group III where a Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in International Investment Disputes is under discussion. While Canada has been less than consistent in its approaches to ISDS in recent international investment agreements (IIAs), its position against double-hatting has been rather constant. This article explores whether this stance reveals a commitment on the part of Canada towards increased judicialization of ISDS or reflects a “flavour of the month” reform likely to change with differing IIAs and negotiating partners. Analysis of Canada’s recent IIA practices, including its model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, released in May 2021, and the positions it has taken at UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, lead the author to conclude that Canada appears committed to increased judicialization of ISDS in the long run.


Author(s):  
Laurens Ankersmit

This article analyses the aspect of the Court’s reasoning in Opinion 1/17 that focuses on the regulatory autonomy of the Parties to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) to decide on levels of protection of public interests. The European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) introduction of regulatory autonomy under EU law coincides with the wider debate around ‘regulatory chill’ under international investment law. This article finds the ECJ’s concept of regulatory autonomy to be narrower than that of the regulatory chill hypothesis put forward by critics of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). It further analyses the ECJ’s reasoning that the CETA’s investment tribunals do not have jurisdiction to call into question the levels of protection sought by the EU. In so doing, it will critically evaluate the certainty of the ECJ’s promise that there will be no negative effect on public interest decision-making through CETA’s investment chapter. Finally, it will explore the legal consequences of Opinion 1/17 for future awards and investment agreements.


Author(s):  
N. Jansen Calamita

In its recent treaties, the European Union (EU) has established a new model of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS). The EU’s new model entails the replacement of ad hoc arbitration with standing, treaty-based investment tribunals, staffed with judges appointed by the states parties. Awards produced by the EU’s new process will be subject to appellate review on issues of law and fact. The EU has indicated that it will pursue a treaty to multilateralize its new tribunal system. This article addresses the compatibility of the EU’s new ISDS model with existing instruments of the investment treaty regime: first, whether the introduction of an appellate mechanism or, indeed, the total reworking of ISDS to establish investment tribunals, renders instruments like the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention inapplicable to the modified process of ISDS; second, how the integration of any appellate mechanism with existing international investment treaties might technically be achieved.


Author(s):  
Gabriela Belova ◽  
◽  
Gergana Georgieva ◽  
Anna Hristova ◽  
◽  
...  

Although in the last years the international community has adopted a broad approach, the definition of foreign investors and foreign investments is still very important for the development of international investment law. The nationality of the foreign investor, whether a natural person or legal entity, sometimes is decisive, especially in front of the international jurisdictions. The paper tries to follow the examples from bilateral investment agreements as well as from multilateral instrument such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention. An important case concerning Bulgaria in past decades is also briefly discussed. The authors pay attention to some new moments re-developing the area of investment dispute settlement within the context of EU Mixed Agreements, especially after the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement.


Author(s):  
Crina Baltag

Abstarct Recent developments in investment arbitration and international investment law, in general, are prompting the review of the role of amici curiae in investment arbitration proceedings. The latest initiatives addressing the challenges to the investor-State dispute settlement (‘ISDS’) system, including under the auspices of the UNCITRAL Working Group III, alluded to the participation of the amici in ISDS proceedings. The new generation of international investment agreements (‘IIAs’) is also tackling an enhanced role of amicus curiae, whereas the proposal for the amendment of the ICSID Arbitration Rules includes sizeable amendments to Rule 37(2), to reflect these developments and other concerns raised so far in the practice. This paper addresses the role of amici curiae in these turbulent times for ISDS, emphasizing that, before anything, the role of these non-disputing parties is to assist arbitral tribunals.


2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-484
Author(s):  
Marc Bungenberg ◽  
August Reinisch

The Investment Chapter of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) can be seen as an unofficial blueprint of future EU Investment Agreements and Chapters. It was developed under immense public pressure and had to fulfil multiple conditions resulting from the EU constitutional framework. This contribution highlights the political and juridical background of EU investment policy, and then analyses the most significant new approaches in international investment law - both with regard to substantive standards and investor-State dispute settlement - as exemplified in the CETA. With regard to the substance, it can be witnessed that states are more proactive in defining investment protection standards, leaving less discretion for adjudicators. With regard to dispute settlement, the EU managed to introduce a completely new Investment Court System (ICS) with preselected adjudicators and an appellate mechanism. In light of all these developments, this article argues that we are currently facing a complete change of paradigms in EU investment law, heading towards the EU’s long-term goal of establishing a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC).


2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 471-491
Author(s):  
Eric De Brabandere ◽  
Paula Baldini Miranda da Cruz

Abstract In this article, we examine the place of proportionality and related tests in international investment law and arbitration by looking specifically at the challenges faced by this field on applying proportionality coherently and consistently. We also assess where proportionality has been used in international investment law and arbitration. We argue that a sound appreciation of proportionality in international investment law requires taking into account the inherently imbalanced conception of international investment agreements, the incoherence of the international investment law regime, and the ad hoc dispute settlement method tasked with applying and interpreting a variety of imprecise and diverging norms. Therefore, international investment law and arbitration have not developed an institutionalised approach towards proportionality. Since investment agreements and international investment arbitration form a rather incoherent collective of cases and, as a result, have not developed a single or uniform approach towards proportionality, there is a tendency to individually approach cases.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Prabhash Ranjan

Purpose The dominant narrative in the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) system is that it enables powerful corporations to encroach upon the regulatory power of developing countries aimed at pursuing compelling public interest objectives. The example of Phillip Morris, the tobacco giant, suing Uruguay’s public health measures is cited as the most significant example to prove this thesis. The other side of the story that States abuse their public power to undermine the protected rights of foreign investors does not get much attention. Design/methodology/approach This paper reviews all the ISDS cases that India has lost to ascertain the reason why these claims were brought against India in the first place. The approach of the paper is to study these ISDS cases to find out whether these cases arose due to abuse of the State’s public power or affronted India’s regulatory autonomy. Findings Against this global context, this paper studies the ISDS claims brought against India, one of the highest respondent-State in ISDS, to show that they arose due to India’s capricious behaviour. Analysis of these cases reveals that India acted in bad faith and abused its public power by either amending laws retroactively or by scrapping licences without following due process or going back on specific and written assurances that induced investors to invest. In none of these cases, the foreign investors challenged India’s regulatory measures aimed at advancing the genuine public interest. The absence of a “Phillip Morris moment” in India’s ISDS story is a stark reminder that one should give due weight to the equally compelling narrative that ISDS claims are also a result of abuse of public power by States. Originality/value The originality value of this paper arises from the fact that this is the first comprehensive study of ISDS cases brought against India and provides full documentation within the larger global context of rising ISDS cases. The paper contributes to the debate on international investment law by showing that in the case of India most of the ISDS cases brought were due to India abusing its public power and was not an affront on India’s regulatory autonomy.


De Jure ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Steliyana Zlateva ◽  
◽  
◽  

The Judgement of the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in the long Micula v. Romania investment treaty dispute confirmed that the arbitral awards of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), rendered by tribunals established under intra-EU BITs, could be enforced in the UK. The Micula case concerns the interplay between the obligations under the ICSID Convention and EU law. In particular, it addresses the question of whether the award obtained by the Micula brothers against Romania constitutes state aid prohibited by EU law, as well as the enforcement obligations under the ICSID Convention in view of the EU duty of sincere cooperation.


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