Towards Monetary Union in the European Community: Why and How

1994 ◽  
pp. 95-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Gros ◽  
Niels Thygesen
1994 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. J. Kondonassis ◽  
A. G. Malliaris

Author(s):  
Ian Bache ◽  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Owen Parker

This chapter examines the various attempts to create the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which first became an official objective of the European Community (EC) in 1969 but was achieved only thirty years later. In December 1969, the Hague Summit meeting of the EC heads of government made a commitment to the achievement of EMU ‘by 1980’. However, France and West Germany disagreed over how to do it. Germany made anti-inflationary policies the priority, while France made economic growth the priority, even at the risk of higher inflation. The chapter first provides a historical background on efforts to create the EMU before discussing the launch of the single currency, the euro, and its subsequent progress up to and including the eurozone crisis in the late 2000s. It also considers some of the explanations for and critiques of EMU that have been offered by various academic commentators.


1991 ◽  
Vol 138 ◽  
pp. 63-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
lain Begg ◽  
David Mayes

With completion of the EC internal market in sight and economic and monetary union by the end of the decade looking probable, concern about social and economic disparities within the European Community has been growing. In the single market, the intensification of competition can be expected to expose the weakness of regions in difficulty, while the transition to EMU will place considerable burdens of adjustment on inflation-prone economies. On the whole, it is parts of the Community which are already disadvantaged, such as Greece or the South of Italy, which are most vulnerable to these changes.


1993 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Sandholtz

At their Maastricht summit, heads of state of the European Community (EC) countries agreed to establish a single currency and a common central bank by the end of the century. For students of international political economy, the treaty on monetary union offers intriguing puzzles: Why did EC governments commit themselves to such a far-reaching sacrifice of sovereignty? Why did national political leaders in some cases outrun public opinion in their enthusiasm for monetary integration? This study seeks a political explanation of the choices that produced the late-1980s movement for monetary union in Europe. It examines the conversion to monetary discipline in several EC states during the 1980s, arguing that the shift toward anti-inflationary rigor was a necessary precondition for discussions on monetary union. The article outlines three general options for a European monetary regime, based variously on unilateral commitments, multilateral arrangements, and full integration. Treating national preference formation as endogenous and requiring explanation, the article weighs five propositions that explain the motives and preferences of national leaders.


Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Owen Parker ◽  
Ian Bache ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Charlotte Burns

This chapter examines the various attempts to create the economic and monetary union (EMU), which first became an official objective of the European Community (EC) in 1969 but was achieved only thirty years later. The chapter first provides a historical background on efforts to create the EMU, including long-standing debates between France and West Germany on its design, before discussing the launch of the single currency, the euro, and its subsequent progress up to and including the eurozone crisis in the late 2000s. On the eurozone crisis, it considers both the short-term efforts at crisis management and the long-term reforms that were implemented in an attempt to prevent further crises. Finally, it considers some of the explanations for and critiques of EMU, including critiques of the responses to the eurozone crisis that have been offered by various academic commentators.


1996 ◽  
pp. 95-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Gros ◽  
Niels Thygesen ◽  
Alan G. Isaac

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