20. Economic and Monetary Union

Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Owen Parker ◽  
Ian Bache ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Charlotte Burns

This chapter examines the various attempts to create the economic and monetary union (EMU), which first became an official objective of the European Community (EC) in 1969 but was achieved only thirty years later. The chapter first provides a historical background on efforts to create the EMU, including long-standing debates between France and West Germany on its design, before discussing the launch of the single currency, the euro, and its subsequent progress up to and including the eurozone crisis in the late 2000s. On the eurozone crisis, it considers both the short-term efforts at crisis management and the long-term reforms that were implemented in an attempt to prevent further crises. Finally, it considers some of the explanations for and critiques of EMU, including critiques of the responses to the eurozone crisis that have been offered by various academic commentators.

Author(s):  
Ian Bache ◽  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Owen Parker

This chapter examines the various attempts to create the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which first became an official objective of the European Community (EC) in 1969 but was achieved only thirty years later. In December 1969, the Hague Summit meeting of the EC heads of government made a commitment to the achievement of EMU ‘by 1980’. However, France and West Germany disagreed over how to do it. Germany made anti-inflationary policies the priority, while France made economic growth the priority, even at the risk of higher inflation. The chapter first provides a historical background on efforts to create the EMU before discussing the launch of the single currency, the euro, and its subsequent progress up to and including the eurozone crisis in the late 2000s. It also considers some of the explanations for and critiques of EMU that have been offered by various academic commentators.


Author(s):  
Etienne Schneider ◽  
Felix Syrovatka

After more than seven years of fiscal austerity and neoliberal structural reforms, the fundamental imbalances that led to the Eurozone crisis have remained unresolved and the project of European integration as such appears to be in the deepest crisis it has experienced so far. This has prompted the dominant forces in the EU to at least partially reconsider their present crisis management strategies, envisioning deeper integration towards a “Genuine Economic and Monetary Union” and outlining different future scenarios for the EU. While especially the Five President’s Report does acknowledge fundamental construction problems and crisis tendencies of the Economic and Monetary Union, the strategies to address them either fall tremendously short of this diagnosis or lack assertiveness. We argue that this inability to confront these crisis tendencies results from the growing economic and political asymmetry in the axis between France and Germany as the principal mechanism of compromise which undergirded previous cycles of European economic integration. At the bottom of this paralysis lies a gradual shift in the dominant internationalization patterns of the German political economy within the European division of labor: away from Southern Europe and France and towards Eastern Europe and the Emerging Markets.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 237802311668533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Geist ◽  
Sarah Brauner-Otto

Using five waves of the German Panel Analysis of Intimate Relationships and Family Dynamics ( pairfam), we examine how economic circumstances are related to fertility intentions in childless young men and women in East and West Germany. We explore multiple dimensions of fertility intentions: short-term intentions for the next two years, long-term expectations about family size, and uncertainty about these short- and long-term intentions. Our findings suggest that economic circumstances constrain fertility intentions and increase uncertainty. Although fertility intentions differ between men and women and by region, the broad mechanisms that predict intentions are very similar across groups for long-term intentions and uncertainty. However, group differences emerge in short-term intentions.


Author(s):  
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol

The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) created in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty was famously incomplete. The decision to create a European single currency was taken without agreeing at the same time on the introduction of traditional accompanying features of some other monetary unions, namely: substantial financial transfers from richer to less developed regions, a credible framework for macroeconomic policy coordination, and European-wide provisions for banking regulation and supervision, to name but a few. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty set out an unfinished, or ‘lopsided union’, with the predominance of monetary union over economic union. The titles of the multiple reports published since 1992, such as the Van Rompuy report of 2012, ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, the Five Presidents’ Report of 2015, ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’, and the Commission’s ‘Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union’ of 2017 highlight this lopsidedness very well.


1998 ◽  
Vol 33 (S1) ◽  
pp. 23-37
Author(s):  
Tim Congdon

The project to introduce a single currency is the most daring step so far in European integration. Indeed, it can be correctly described as revolutionary. It is much more far-reaching than previous moves in this direction over the last 15 years, such as the harmonisation of regulations or the ending of exchange controls; it is intended not as an incremental advance, but as a complete transformation of Europe's financial arrangements.The audacity of the single currency project is the more striking, in that it is a “revolution from above” rather than a “revolution from below”. The driving force has not been popular dissatisfaction with the existing currency arrangements, but the integrationist ambition of certain members of the European élite, particularly the German Chancellor, the French President and the President of the European Commission. (The integrationist ambition appears to attach to the positions ex officio and to be quite unaffected by the particular individuals who currently fill them.) These members of the élite emphasize the political nature of the single currency project, not the economic benefits. For example, Chancellor Kohl has said that European economic and monetary union (EMU) should prevent future wars in Europe.


2012 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-434
Author(s):  
Jan Winiecki

A look at the Western debate about West’s problems reveals what the present writer regards in a large measure as an irritating superficiality. Nowhere is it better visible than in the mainstream discussions about the euro zone and its problems, where most debaters glide over the fundamentals of Europe’s long-term problems and concentrate on the superficial and short-term issues. The discussions on how to “save” the euro zone strangely forget the defects in its creation, glide over the lessons to be drawn from policies pursued during the past decade, and defend the virtue of maintaining its present membership. But the problems of Europe run much deeper than the survival or collapse of the monetary union. Even if we assume that the problems of confidence the member states have in each other’s behaviour are restored and the rest of the world regains confidence in the institutions of the monetary union, the fundamental problems will remain unsolved. A clue to the real long-term problems may be found in the answer to a rather simple question. It runs as follows: “Why is the large majority of European countries indebted to such an extent that any further increase in debt to GDP ratio generates panic reactions among potential lenders?”


1991 ◽  
Vol 138 ◽  
pp. 63-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
lain Begg ◽  
David Mayes

With completion of the EC internal market in sight and economic and monetary union by the end of the decade looking probable, concern about social and economic disparities within the European Community has been growing. In the single market, the intensification of competition can be expected to expose the weakness of regions in difficulty, while the transition to EMU will place considerable burdens of adjustment on inflation-prone economies. On the whole, it is parts of the Community which are already disadvantaged, such as Greece or the South of Italy, which are most vulnerable to these changes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Justyna Bokajło

The European financial and economic crisis made Germany a leader trying to introduce the principles of order to the Economic and Monetary Union in line with the ideas of German governance policy (Ordnungspolitik), which is explained by ordoliberalism. However, there is strong relativism visible in constructing European reality, resulting from the fact that the adopted ordoliberal assumptions do not fit into the macroeconomic, diversified space of the eurozone, and, what is more, cannot be implemented during the recession, because their effectiveness is determined by the long-term perspective and national identity. Moreover, the role of the leader does not comply with the principles of Ordnungspolitik. On the other hand, the partnership with France, which is necessary to maintain stability of the eurozone, causes a move away from the conceptual assumptions of ordoliberalism. The aim of the article is to draw attention to Germany’s ambivalence in solving the economic problems of EMU, as well as to show ambivalent attitude of other Member States towards Germany.


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