Electoral Rules and Rational Voting: The Effect of Candidate Viability Perceptions on Voting Decisions

1981 ◽  
pp. 188-200
Author(s):  
R. F. Bensel ◽  
M. E. Sanders
2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Smith ◽  
Casey Devore ◽  
Prairie Slaven ◽  
Donald Saucier
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
John (Xuefeng) Jiang ◽  
Isabel Yanyan Wang ◽  
Daniel Wangerin

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-56
Author(s):  
Adelaide K. Sandler ◽  
Mary E. Hylton ◽  
Jason Ostrander ◽  
Tanya R. Smith

Disparities in voter turnout have increased significantly over the past four decades. Members of historically oppressed groups, those who are low-income, and or who have lower levels of education vote at significantly lower rates than white, wealthy and or more educated community members. These disparities correlate directly to political power and the eventual allocation of resources by elected officials. Therefore, eliminating these disparities through targeted voter engagement with client groups is particularly important for the profession of social work. This article describes the conceptualization of voter engagement as a three-legged stool, consisting of voter registration, regular voting, and basing voting decisions on self-interest.Without attention to all three legs, the potential for generating political power collapses, resulting in minimal influence on elected officials.


Author(s):  
Cynthia McClintock

During Latin America’s third democratic wave, a majority of countries adopted a runoff rule for the election of the president. This book is the first rigorous assessment of the implications of runoff versus plurality for democracy in the region. Despite previous scholarly skepticism about runoff, it has been positive for Latin America, and could be for the United States also. Primarily through qualitative analysis for each Latin American country, I explore why runoff is superior to plurality. Runoff opens the political arena to new parties but at the same time ensures that the president does not suffer a legitimacy deficit and is not at an ideological extreme. By contrast, in a region in which undemocratic political parties are common, the continuation of these parties is abetted by plurality; political exclusion provoked disillusionment and facilitated the emergence of presidents at ideological extremes. In regression analysis, runoff was statistically significant to superior levels of democracy. Between 1990 and 2016, Freedom House and Varieties of Democracy scores plummeted in countries with plurality but improved in countries with runoff. Plurality advocates’ primary concern is the larger number of political parties under runoff. Although a larger number of parties was not significant to inferior levels of democracy, a plethora of parties is problematic, leading to a paucity of legislative majorities and inchoate parties. To ameliorate the problem, I recommend not reductions in the 50% threshold but the scheduling of the legislative election after the first round or thresholds for entry into the legislature.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882199025
Author(s):  
Patrick Cunha Silva ◽  
Brian F Crisp

Electoral systems vary in terms of the choice and influence they offer voters. Beyond selecting between parties, preferential systems allow for choices within parties. More proportional systems make it likely that influence over who determines the assembly’s majority will be distributed across relatively more voters. In response to systems that limit choice and influence, we hypothesize that voters will cast more blank, null, or spoiled ballots on purpose. We use a regression discontinuity opportunity in French municipal elections to test this hypothesis. An exogenously chosen and arbitrary cutpoint is used to determine the electoral rules municipalities use to select their assemblies. We find support for our reasoning—systems that do not allow intraparty preference votes and that lead to disproportional outcomes provoke vote spoilage. Rates of vote spoilage are frequently sufficient to change control over the assembly if those votes had instead been cast validly for the second-place party.


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