A Policy Evaluation on the Challenges of a Universal Basic Income for Referendum in Taiwan

In recent years, the Universal Basic Income (UBI) has become a frequently discussed issue around the world. Recently, Spain may issue permanent basic income as a method to flight COVID-19. Italy's government proposed the introduction in 2018. Also, Swiss citizens voted on the introduction by referendum in June 2016. But, would such a referendum be possible in Taiwan and what would be the outcome in Taiwan? The amended Taiwanese Referendum Act passed by the Legislative Yuan and enacted by President Tsai in January 2018 facilitates the referendum process and lowered the preconditions for citizens to launch a proposal. Currently, only 1,879 supporters required it in the first phase, and around 280,000 signatures in the second phase are necessary to support such an initiative; the acceptance quorum was then lowered to only 4,890,000 required voters. This chapter focuses on the public and empirical discussion of UBI in Taiwan and UBI as a possible referendum with learnings from the Swiss UBI experience.

The Influence of Incumbency and Partisanship on Fenno’s Paradox: Evidence from Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan

Fenno’s Paradox—the preference for one’s own legislator while disliking the legislature as a whole—remains one of the most consistent findings in American politics. This tendency increases the likelihood for incumbents to win reelection, despite being a part of a less popular institution. Little analysis looks at whether Fenno’s Paradox exists outside of the US in other legislative contexts, or whether incumbency itself or partisan identification is the larger influence. Using 2012 survey data from Taiwan, a mixed member system, this analysis examines individual level divergence between preference for a legislator and institutional preference. Consistent with work in American politics, we find a marginal incumbency advantage, but this effect is attenuated by the partisanship of the district legislator.

Taiwan in 2016

The opposition Democratic Progressive Party won decisive victories in the Legislative Yuan and presidential elections. Despite these victories, 2016 proved to be a difficult year for Taiwan’s new ruling party. As 2016 drew to a close, polls showed that most of Taiwan’s population disapproved of Tsai Ing-wen’s performance as president.

The Influence of the Sunflower Movement on the Civic Movement in Taiwan

The paper aims to discuss the reasons, and the dynamics of the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan. The Author looks for answers to the questions why the students occupied the Legislative Yuan, why their actions got so many people’s support as well as what reasons can explain these developments and what kind of impact such actions would bring about, particularly the impact on the citizens’ movement.

Who Supports the Sunflower Movement? An Examination of Nationalist Sentiments

The Sunflower Movement—an occupation of the Legislative Yuan (the Congress) for 24 days—was an unprecedented moment in the history of Taiwan. We examine the social foundation of the Movement and explore an important factor that has long been missing in the literature of Taiwanese politics: nationalism. We divide nationalism into three dimensions: national attachment, national chauvinism, and feelings toward other countries. Using original survey data collected six months after the Movement, we find that national attachment (being proud of Taiwan) and anti-China feelings are unique dimensions and both lead to a higher level of support for the Sunflower Movement. National chauvinism, on the other hand, is not associated with supports for the Movement. Furthermore, the impact of nationalism is contingent on sociotropic views. People who express higher levels of nationalism are more responsive to the issue of rising income inequality when evaluating the Movement. The underlying logic is when people are more nationalistic they care more about the potential social impact of expanding socio-economic exchanges with another country. These results point to it being necessary to disentangle various components of nationalism and further investigate their effects on individuals’ political behaviors.

The Electoral Fortunes of Taiwan's Green Party: 1996–2012

The Green Party Taiwan (GPT) represents an important case both for scholars of environmental politics but also Taiwanese politics. Established in 1996, it is the oldest Asian green party and is one of the most active parties in the Asia-Pacific Greens network. The party has enjoyed mixed electoral fortunes. After promising early election results, the GPT virtually ceased contesting elections between 2000 and 2005. However, from 2006 the party began a gradual revival in its vote shares. This process culminated in the January 2012 Legislative Yuan election when the GPT surprised many observers by coming fifth in the proportional party vote. Considering the limited resources at the party's disposal this was quite an achievement. In this study, we examine and explain the changing electoral fortunes of the GPT since its establishment in 1996. We are interested to see whether standard theories for explaining small or ecological party success, that have been developed in western Europe, work well in the Taiwan context. Our research is based on a range of new fieldwork conducted between 2012 and 2014. These include in-depth interviews with campaigners and party leaders, focus group sessions with party leaders and candidates, and interviews with party supporters.

Dual Defection Incentives in One System: Party Switching under Taiwan's Single non-transferable Vote

Political scientists generally consider that the incentive for legislators to switch parties lies in their desire to be re-elected. While some scholars attribute defection to the legislators’ popularity and strong connections with their constituents which enable them to be re-elected without relying on party labels, others assert that legislators switch if they perceive that staying put might threaten their chances of re-election. In this paper, we find that the two assumptions, to some extent, contradict each other. More surprisingly, the two contradictory hypotheses cohabit under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. From an analysis of the switching in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, the empirical evidence shows that because of fierce intraparty competition in the multimember districts, not only barely elected but also top-ranked legislators switched party affiliation in order to avoid the loss in votes or even seats to their copartisans and to maximize their chances of re-election.

Referendum and the Taiwanese National Identity

Chapter 5 focuses on the debate over the resolution of Taiwanese national identity through referendums. It provides a comprehensive historical and political overview of the issues involved, and examines the prospects for future referendums and their policy implications. The chapter examines the referendum proposal adopted by the DPP, the referendum law debated in the legislative Yuan, and the administrative regulation proposed by the Executive Yuan. It also examines the manipulative aspect of referendum and suggests that a future referendum should follow the guidelines of deliberative democracy to achieve a deliberative referendum.

Taiwan election race stalls cross-Strait engagement

Subject Electoral politics in Taiwan. Significance At the party congress of the ruling Kuomintang on June 19, Hung Hsiu-chu, deputy speaker of the Legislative Yuan, was formally recommended to represent the party in the presidential election on January 16, 2016. Hung will face Tsai Ing-wen, the chairwoman and presidential nominee of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who ran unsuccessfully for the presidency in 2012. Barring a strong showing by an independent candidate, Taiwan will elect its first female president in 2016. Impacts Cross-strait agreements will stall during the election season and are unlikely to progress quickly under a DPP administration. Taiwan-US relations will improve as a result of Washington's growing frustration with Beijing. Unlike last time, Tsai will not face the perception that Washington favours the Kuomintang. A Tsai presidency would mean less business-friendly economic policies and moves toward decommissioning Taiwan's nuclear power plants. However, the Kuomintang is likely to retain control of the legislature, which would curtail Tsai's power considerably.