scholarly journals Drawing Red Lines with No (Significant) Bites: Why an Individual Test Is Not Appropriate in the LM Case

Author(s):  
Agnieszka Frąckowiak-Adamska

AbstractThis contribution argues that an obligation for an executing court to conduct an individual assessment in case of systemic deficiencies of the judiciary in other Member States is not an adequate tool for ensuring the respect for the rule of law. Infringements of the independence of the judiciary require other legal mechanisms of protection than fundamental rights. Moreover, individual test is often not feasible in the European judicial area as some other acts providing for recognition of judgments in the EU do not contain the mechanisms of refusal of recognition or execution. A breach of the obligation to ensure independence of the courts should logically result in suspending the participation of a given Member State in the EU policy area at stake.

Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Bárd ◽  
Wouter van Ballegooij

This article discusses the relationship between judicial independence and intra-European Union (EU) cooperation in criminal matters based on the principle of mutual recognition. It focuses on the recent judgment by the Court of Justice of the EU in Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM. In our view, a lack of judicial independence needs to be addressed primarily as a rule of law problem. This implies that executing judicial authorities should freeze judicial cooperation in the event should doubts arise as to respect for the rule of law in the issuing Member State. Such a measure should stay in place until the matter is resolved in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU or a permanent mechanism for monitoring and addressing Member State compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Court, however, constructed the case as a possible violation of the right to a fair trial, the essence of which includes the requirement that tribunals are independent and impartial. This latter aspect could be seen as a positive step forward in the sense that the judicial test developed in the Aranyosi case now includes rule of law considerations with regard to judicial independence. However, the practical hurdles imposed by the Court on the defence in terms of proving such violations and on judicial authorities to accept them in individual cases might amount to two steps back in upholding the rule of law within the EU.


European View ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-104
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Margaritis

The rule of law is one of the founding values of the EU, as indicated in Article 2 TEU. This provision recognises that the rule of law is a core value, inherent to liberal democracy, and one which characterised the Union and its member states long before the formal establishment of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty. However, several member states, most notably Poland and Hungary, seem to have placed this value in jeopardy, leading EU institutions to disagree on how to combat this problem and its political consequences. The aim of this article is to propose a solution that involves a rather neglected, yet certainly competent actor, the Fundamental Rights Agency. The outcome would be twofold: on the one hand, the rule of law would be vitally strengthened; on the other, the role of the Agency would be fortified in line with its scope.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-33
Author(s):  
Ákos Bence Gát

The issue of the rule of law has been on the European Union’s (EU) agenda since the beginning of the 2010s. The legal history of the EU shows that the EU’s approach to the topic of the rule of law underwent significant changes. Initially, the Member States called for guarantees of fundamental rights in EU institutions. This trend began to change in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the possibility of European rule of law control over Member States and the predecessor of the current Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) were introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. However, the idea that the EU institutions can constantly monitor the Member States in the name of the rule of law has only emerged and started dominating the European political agenda since the early 2010s. Over the last decade, the EU institutions have continuously expanded their toolkit for monitoring Member States in this regard.Following calls from some Member States and the European Parliament, in 2014 the Commission set up the new EU framework to strengthen the rule of law. In the same year, the European Council introduced an annual rule of law dialogue. In 2016, the European Parliament proposed the establishment of an annual rule of law report that monitors all Member States. At first, the European Commission was reluctant to accept this idea, but finally it introduced an annual rule of law report in 2020. However, the EU’s policy on the rule of law suffers from fundamental shortcomings, which were especially visible during the first wave of the coronavirus crisis in the spring of 2020. In the pandemic situation, it has become even more apparent that the EU’s policy on the rule of law raises a significant issue of EU institutions exceeding their competences and stands on a questionable legal basis.Criticisms formulated against Hungary during the pandemic have revealed that the EU institutions do not provide sufficient guarantees for an objective examination of the situation of the rule of law in the Member States. The situation brought about by the coronavirus has also raised a number of questions regarding the lawful functioning of EU institutions, which shows the need for a rule of law mechanism capable of verifying that the EU institutions themselves also properly respect the rule of law.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


Significance The EU treaty’s Article 7 may be invoked in response to concerns about the state of democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in a member state. Yesterday's decision by the European Commission is the first time the procedure has been used. It may next be used against Hungary. However, the power of Poland and Hungary to veto it shows the lack of instruments to enforce common values. Impacts The EU’s inability to rein in non-compliant members may encourage reneging on democratic commitments elsewhere in CEE. Continued EU values breaches will jeopardise the EU’s coherence in talks with Serbia and Turkey. Values conflicts with Hungary and Poland threaten cohesion within the EU, increasing Russia’s strategic wriggle room.


Author(s):  
Nick Sitter ◽  
Elisabeth Bakke

Democratic backsliding in European Union (EU) member states is not only a policy challenge for the EU, but also a potential existential crisis. If the EU does too little to deal with member state regimes that go back on their commitments to democracy and the rule of law, this risks undermining the EU from within. On the other hand, if the EU takes drastic action, this might split the EU. This article explores the nature and dynamics of democratic backsliding in EU member states, and analyses the EU’s capacity, policy tools and political will to address the challenge. Empirically it draws on the cases that have promoted serious criticism from the Commission and the European Parliament: Hungary, Poland, and to a lesser extent, Romania. After reviewing the literature and defining backsliding as a gradual, deliberate, but open-ended process of de-democratization, the article analyzes the dynamics of backsliding and the EU’s difficulties in dealing with this challenge to liberal democracy and the rule of law. The Hungarian and Polish populist right’s “illiberal” projects involve centralization of power in the hands of the executive and the party, and limiting the independence of the judiciary, the media and civil society. This has brought both governments into direct confrontation with the European Commission. However, the EU’s track record in managing backsliding crises is at best mixed. This comes down to a combination of limited tools and lack of political will. Ordinary infringement procedures offer a limited toolbox, and the Commission has proven reluctant to use even these tools fully. At the same time, party groups in the European Parliament and many member state governments have been reluctant to criticize one of their own, let alone go down the path of suspending aspect of a states’ EU membership. Hence the EU’s dilemma: it is caught between undermining its own values and cohesion through inaction on one hand, and relegating one or more member states it to a second tier—or even pushing them out altogether—on the other.


Author(s):  
Miguel Poiares Maduro ◽  
Benedita Menezes Queiroz

The rule of law is under threat in the European Union. Systemic violations of fundamental rights are affecting the rule of law, democracy, and judicial independence in some Member States and consequently the EU legal order. The level of interdependence between the Member States and the EU legal order is such that systemic violations of those principles in the Member States end up impacting on EU compliance with the same principles. Article 7 TEU did not prove, however, to be the most effective tool to face these problems due to its political nature. The EU’s intervention in the form of infringement actions to safeguard the rule of law at the national level may be a suitable action to address some these serious violations of fundamental rights. Despite of the earlier hesitation to take a bolder action in this regard, the EU Commission, after the Court of Justice’s recent decisions in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portuguese and LM, brought infringement proceedings against Poland challenging this country reforms that put into question the independence of its judiciary. The Court established its power of judicial review over the rule of law in the Member States in C-619/18 Commission v Poland. Ultimately, this decision highlighted the role of EU law in safeguarding the rule of law in its Member States, but more importantly in safeguarding the rule of law in the EU legal order as a whole.


Author(s):  
T. Romanova ◽  
E. Pavlova

The article examines how the normative power, which the EU puts forward as an ideological basis of its actions in the world, manifests itself in the national partnerships for modernization between Russia and EU member states. The authors demonstrate the influence of the EU’s normativity on its approach to modernization as well as the difference in the positions of its member countries. It is concluded that there is no unity in the EU’s approach to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the new classification of EU member states, which is based on their readiness to act in accordance with the Union’s concept of normative power, is offered.


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