scholarly journals The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as the Most Promising Way of Enforcing the Rule of Law against EU Member States

Author(s):  
András Jakab
Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.


Author(s):  
T. Romanova ◽  
E. Pavlova

The article examines how the normative power, which the EU puts forward as an ideological basis of its actions in the world, manifests itself in the national partnerships for modernization between Russia and EU member states. The authors demonstrate the influence of the EU’s normativity on its approach to modernization as well as the difference in the positions of its member countries. It is concluded that there is no unity in the EU’s approach to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the new classification of EU member states, which is based on their readiness to act in accordance with the Union’s concept of normative power, is offered.


Author(s):  
Artur Nowak-Far

AbstractAt present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of their identification and enforcement.


Author(s):  
Jean-Claude Piris

Este estudio surge de los acontecimientos producidos en 2014 y 2015 en Escocia (referéndum sobre la independencia) y en Cataluña («consulta informal» y elecciones autonómicas). En ambos casos, los movimientos secesionistas deseaban que un nuevo Estado nacido de la secesión llegara a ser (según ellos, «siguiera siendo») parte de la UE. Esta convicción les fortalece, ya que la UE es vista como un «refugio seguro », que permite la independencia sin la amenaza de quedar aislado. Los Tratados de la UE ni prevén ni prohiben la división de un Estado miembro. No obstante, para llegar a ser parte de la UE, la región secesionista debería primero ser reconocida como Estado por la comunidad internacional, y específicamente por los 28 Estados miembros de la UE (incluyendo España y el Reino Unido). Esto sería legalmente posible si el nuevo Estado naciera respetando completamente el Estado de Derecho, pero en cambio excluiría un «Estado» que hubiera declarado unilateralmente su independencia violando la Constitución nacional. Así, un nuevo Estado reconocido podría ser candidato a incorporarse a la UE. El autor muestra que debería seguirse el procedimiento del artículo 49 del Tratado de la UE y no el del artículo 48 (enmiendas a los Tratados). Tomando Escocia como ejemplo, el autor describe los pasos legales necesarios que deben darse después de la secesión. Señala que la división de un Estado de la UE ya no debería verse como un asunto estrictamente nacional; dadas sus consecuencias sobre la UE en conjunto y sobre otros Estados miembros, es un asunto que no puede ser ignorado por la UE.This study starts from the 2014-2015 events in Scotland (referendum on independence) and in Catalonia («informal consultation» and regional elections). Secessionists movements in both cases wished that a new State born from the secession would become (according to them «continues to be») part of the EU. That conviction strengthens them, as the EU is seen as a «safe haven», allowing independence without the threat of being isolated. The EU Treaties neither provide for, nor prohibit the partition of a Member State. However, in order to become part of the EU, the secessionist region should first be recognized as a State by the international community, and specifically by the 28 EU Member States (including Spain and the UK). This would be legally possible if the new State was born in full respect of the Rule of Law, but would exclude a «State» having unilaterally declared its independence in violation of the national Constitution. Then, a new State recognised could be a candidate to the EU. The author shows that the procedure of article 49 of the Treaty on EU woud have to be followed (accession of a new State) and not that of article 48 (amendments to the Treaties). Taking Scotland as an example, the author describes the necessary legal steps to be accomplished after the secession. He stresses that the partition of an EU State should not anymore being regarded as a strictly national matter. Given its consequences on the EU as a whole and on other Member States, it is a matter that cannot be ignored by the EU.


2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 552-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Safjan

In some countries of central Europe the rule of law is directly threatened by a new type of legislation based on the zeal of the political majority to establish a completely different political system than the one that was built after the collapse of the communist system. From that perspective, there is little place for the principle of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary is threatened. This contribution discusses the multilevel dimension of the rule of law principle in the EU, issues in the context of the disrespect for the rule of law as a case of systemic deficiencies, followed by a brief discussion of the Copenhagen accession criteria. The article concludes that the rule of law principle as recognised under EU law is by no means of a merely symbolic nature, and that domestic legislation abolishing key safeguards of the rule of law can be scrutinized not only under the EU Charter of fundamental rights, where applicable, but also under the TEU. Without the solidarity of all Europeans, however, the preservation of our basic values and the future of the EU are in serious danger.


European View ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-104
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Margaritis

The rule of law is one of the founding values of the EU, as indicated in Article 2 TEU. This provision recognises that the rule of law is a core value, inherent to liberal democracy, and one which characterised the Union and its member states long before the formal establishment of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty. However, several member states, most notably Poland and Hungary, seem to have placed this value in jeopardy, leading EU institutions to disagree on how to combat this problem and its political consequences. The aim of this article is to propose a solution that involves a rather neglected, yet certainly competent actor, the Fundamental Rights Agency. The outcome would be twofold: on the one hand, the rule of law would be vitally strengthened; on the other, the role of the Agency would be fortified in line with its scope.


Author(s):  
Matthias Schmidt ◽  
Piotr Bogdanowicz

AbstractThis chapter builds on an assessment of infringement proceedings in the EU rule of law crisis that we previously published in the Common Market Law Review. We offer a close reading of two recent prominent infringement cases by the European Commission against Poland (cases C-619/18 and C-192/18). Noteworthy advancements in EU law made with them are in particular a clarification on the parallel use of Articles 7 TEU and 258 TFEU, the use of both interim relief and an expedited procedure prior to the judgment, and, as regards the merits, further substance for the functioning of Articles 19 TEU and 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights regarding the operationalisation of the rule of law in EU law. We offer a critical assessment of the Court’s findings and contextualise in light of two Commission communications on the rule of law published in 2019.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Dieter Classen

The book presents the constitutional systems of the 27 EU member states in an integrated form. Basic principles such as democracy and the rule of law, constitutionalismincluding constitutional jurisdiction, state organs (parliament, government, head of state) and state functions (legislation, administration, jurisdiction, foreign policy) are dealt with. Thus, common European basic principles are elaborated, but above all, the different manifestations of many constitutional principles are clarified. The book is aimed at all those who wish to inform themselves in a clear form about the constitutional systems of the EU member states on which the European Union is based.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 133-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier de Schutter

It has been argued in many places, and in different forms, that the establishment between the EU Member States of an internal market, and now of an area of freedom, security and justice, requires the European Union to legislate in the field of fundamental rights, either in order to avoid a form of regulatory competition between the Member States or in order to ensure mutual trust allowing for mutual cooperation between judicial, police and administrative national authorities. ‘Negative integration’, in the form of the lowering of barriers to the movement of goods, services, persons and capital, or in the form of mutual recognition of judicial decisions or exchange of information between national authorities, should thus be followed with, or compensated by, ‘positive integration’, in the form of the setting of common standards applicable throughout the EU Member States. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, moreover, provides the baseline from which to act, since it represents a set of values which all the Member States have agreed to consider as fundamental. The question (so it would seem) is now that of implementing the Charter, by using the legal bases provided for in the treaties to the fullest extent possible.


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