Odious Debt: Driving Change in Sovereign Debt Governance

Odious Debt ◽  
2011 ◽  
pp. 107-143
Author(s):  
Stephania Bonilla
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Odious Debt

scholarly journals Embedded Contracts and a Continuum of Sovereign Debt

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Odette Lienau
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
Debt Market ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Potential Challenge ◽  
Odious Debt

6 Accounting, Economics, and Law 263-272 (2016)What is the relationship of a government to its population as itpertains to sovereign debt? And how does this fit into the larger web of relationshipsand obligations that make up the international financial arena? Thesequestions are incredibly difficult to think through – beyond the capacity of oneauthor alone. I am therefore grateful to have the company of Yuri Biondi, BarryHerman, Tomoko Ishikawa, and Kunibert Raffer in beginning to consider them.In addressing their thoughtful and thought-provoking comments, I see thisresponse less as an opportunity to answer every potential challenge or differentialemphasis. Indeed, the comments by and large extend the analysis of thebook in incredibly insightful ways. Instead, I take this brief essay as a chance toidentify several themes uniting the responses, and to highlight how thesethemes raise additional questions for the sovereign debt regime going forward.In particular, the comments suggest the ways in which the issues and actionsassociated with questions of sovereign legitimacy in the debt market exist not asdichotomies but rather on a continuum. I fully agree with this implicit characterization,and contend that – given that this is the case – challenging themarket narrative that supports the repayment of odious debt should help toundermine resistance to reforming the regime for restructuring sovereign debtmore generally. In addition, the comments emphasize how sovereign debt canbe thought of as embedded in two types of social contract, both of which shouldshape how we think of appropriate policy responses to the challenges of thecontemporary moment.

Odious Debt, Adverse Creditors, and the Democratic Ideal

2018 ◽  
pp. 425-445
Author(s):  
Margot E Salomon ◽  
Robert Howse
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Political Freedom ◽  
The Political ◽  
Representative Government ◽  
Democratic Ideal ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
The People ◽  
Odious Debt

In the context of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, the odious debt doctrine has often been raised as a claim to adjust or sever sovereign debt obligations, based on the purported odiousness of the previous regime and the notion that the debt it incurred did not benefit, or was used to repress, the people. Ultimately, the normative force of the odious debt doctrine comes from the primacy of the democratic ideal: when the debt was contracted not only was this done by a non-representative government but the debt served the purpose of that government in denying the political freedom of the people. Using Greece as an example, the chapter demonstrates how odious debt applies to debt incurred not only by dictators but by democracies and how, in the latter circumstances, international creditors are implicated in ‘hostile’ acts against the demos. It concludes with suggestions on the remediation of odious debt.

Defences to Repayment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hayk Kupelyants
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Capacity ◽  
Odious Debt

Chapter 6 addresses the range of substantive defences that the sovereign debtor may raise against the repayment of the debt. The chapter argues for full repayment of sovereign debt, unless one or more legal defences can be raised against repayment. The defences discussed include the following: act of State, prescription, champerty, odious debt, capacity to issue bonds, capacity to repay, frustration, counterclaims and so on.

6 Defences to Repayment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kupelyants Hayk
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Capacity ◽  
Odious Debt

Chapter 6 addresses the range of substantive defences that the sovereign debtor may raise against the repayment of the debt. The chapter argues for full repayment of sovereign debt, unless one or more legal defences can be raised against repayment. The defences discussed include the following: act of State, prescription, champerty, odious debt, capacity to issue bonds, capacity to repay, frustration, counterclaims and so on.

scholarly journals Embedded Contracts and a Continuum of Sovereign Debt

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-272
Author(s):  
Odette Lienau
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
Debt Market ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Potential Challenge ◽  
Odious Debt

Abstract What is the relationship of a government to its population as it pertains to sovereign debt? And how does this fit into the larger web of relationships and obligations that make up the international financial arena? These questions are incredibly difficult to think through – beyond the capacity of one author alone. I am therefore grateful to have the company of Yuri Biondi, Barry Herman, Tomoko Ishikawa, and Kunibert Raffer in beginning to consider them. In addressing their thoughtful and thought-provoking comments, I see this response less as an opportunity to answer every potential challenge or differential emphasis. Indeed, the comments by and large extend the analysis of the book in incredibly insightful ways. Instead, I take this brief essay as a chance to identify several themes uniting the responses, and to highlight how these themes raise additional questions for the sovereign debt regime going forward. In particular, the comments suggest the ways in which the issues and actions associated with questions of sovereign legitimacy in the debt market exist not as dichotomies but rather on a continuum. I fully agree with this implicit characterization, and contend that – given that this is the case – challenging the market narrative that supports the repayment of odious debt should help to undermine resistance to reforming the regime for restructuring sovereign debt more generally. In addition, the comments emphasize how sovereign debt can be thought of as embedded in two types of social contract, both of which should shape how we think of appropriate policy responses to the challenges of the contemporary moment.

Lending to the Borrower from Hell

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
The United States ◽  
Philip Ii ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
The Right ◽  
Intelligent Model ◽  
New Evidence

Why do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? As the United States and many European nations struggle with mountains of debt, historical precedents can offer valuable insights. This book looks at one famous case—the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Ruling over one of the largest and most powerful empires in history, King Philip defaulted four times. Yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again within a year or two of each default. Exploring the shrewd reasoning of the lenders who continued to offer money, the book analyzes the lessons from this historical example. Using detailed new evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, the book examines the incentives and returns of lenders. It provides powerful evidence that in the right situations, lenders not only survive despite defaults—they thrive. It also demonstrates that debt markets cope well, despite massive fluctuations in expenditure and revenue, when lending functions like insurance. The book unearths unique sixteenth-century loan contracts that offered highly effective risk sharing between the king and his lenders, with payment obligations reduced in bad times. A fascinating story of finance and empire, this book offers an intelligent model for keeping economies safe in times of sovereign debt crises and defaults.

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