W.E.B. Du Bois’s Constructivist Theory of Justice

This essay presents the normative foundation of W.E.B. Du Bois’s constructivist theory of justice in three steps. First, I show that for Du Bois the public sphere in Anglo-European modern states consists of a dialectical interplay between reasonable persons and illiberal rogues. Second, under these nonideal circumstances, the democratic ideal of autonomy grounds reasonable persons’ deliberative openness, an attitude of public moral regard for others which is necessary to construct the terms of political rule. Though deliberative openness is the essential vehicle of construction, reasonable persons only have a pragmatic political obligation to forge ties of deliberative reciprocity with likeminded persons whom they trust will listen and not harm them. Finally, I present Du Bois’s defense of black suffragists’ support of the 19th Amendment to illustrate pragmatic political obligation in action. I sketch successful democratic engagement that reconstitutes a nonideal public sphere.

Democracy in Ireland

How democratic is the political system of the Republic of Ireland? Answering this question requires recognizing that the term ‘democracy’ denotes both a normative ideal and a set of political practices aimed at advancing that ideal. In this chapter, I argue that the democratic ideal has both an individual and a collective component. At an individual level, a democracy must embody a conception of democratic equality. At a collective level, a democracy must embody popular sovereignty. I then relate this two-part ideal to Ireland’s political institutions. This task, I will argue, is complicated by the fact that Ireland, like most real-world democracies, employs several different democratic decision-making methods—what I will call direct democracy, electoral democracy, and aleatory democracy. It is difficult, I conclude, to specify how all three methods can be reconciled within a single story about the democratic ideal.

The sounds of silence: Democracy and the referendum on (FYRO)/(North) Macedonia

Prevailing studies on silence and democracy, in spite of silence’s inherently ambiguous nature, focus on subscribing meaning(s) to silence. Such attempts of turning silence into speech, point to an adversary relationship between silence and democratic theory. First, this article conducts an onto-epistemological critique of democratic theory’s treatment of silence (as meaning). Second, it suggests that there are self-reflective analytical benefits for scholars of democratic theory should they broaden up their gaze from silence as meaning toward silence-as-doing. This article argues that this can be done by shifting the epistemological focus from interpreting possible meanings behind the nonvoters’ silence into analyzing the context and/of interpretations of silence as ambiguous. Third, to illustrate this, the article uses the 2018 name referendum in North Macedonia which shows how the speech-centered approach of democratic theory is utilized to serve political goals rather than reaching the democratic ideal of “everyone having a vo-ice/te.”

is there a form of citizenship specific to philosophy for children?

Due to the obvious and widely studied Deweyan foundations in the educational program elaborated by philosopher Mathew Lipman, Philosophy for Children (P4C) is often presented as a continuation of Dewey’s democratic ideal, as a mode of associated living. I argue that there is a democratic model specific to Lipman’s P4C, that cannot be reduced to Dewey’s theories. To do so, I propose to compare Dewey’s and Lipman’s educational models through the Bourdieusian notion of habitus, understood as a set of lasting mental dispositions, following a specific social conditioning, revealed by some practical habits. Studying in depth Dewey’s and Lipman’s educational recommendations concerning inquiry does not only reveal that they are structured according to different rationalities, it also highlights the fact that they tend to develop different habits and dispositions in the child, that ultimately form two distinct citizen habitus. Dewey’s habitus could be called experimental and Lipman’s habitus dialogical and they both correspond to their respective reflections on democracy and the role a citizen should be playing. I conclude by highlighting the interesting possibilities that stem from the analysis and comparison of educational models through the notion of habitus.Resumen: En razón de las indudables y ampliamente estudiadas fundaciones deweyana en la pedagogía elaborada por el filósofo Mathew Lipman, la filosofía para niños es generalmente presentada como una continuación del ideal democrático de John Dewey, como un modo de vida asociada. Sostengo que existe un modelo democrático específico a la filosofía para niños como la que fue elaborada por Lipman, que no se puede reducir a las teorías de Dewey. Para mostrar eso, propongo de comparar las pedagogías de Dewey y de Lipman a través de la noción bourdieusiana del habitus, entendida como un conjunto de disposiciones mentales duraderas, proveniente de un condicionamiento social específico, que se manifiesta por hábitos prácticos. Un estudio en profundidad de las recomendaciones educativas de Dewey y de Lipman en cuento a la encuesta no sólo revela que están organizadas por racionalidades diferentes, sino también que desarrollan hábitos y disposiciones diferentes en el niño, que últimamente forman dos habitus ciudadanos distintos. El habitus de Dewey se puede llamar experimental, y el de Lipman un habitus dialógico, los dos corresponden a sus reflexiones respectivas sobre la democracia y el rol del ciudadano. Concluyo subrayando las posibilidades interesantes que emerjan de la analiza y comparación de las pedagogías a través de la noción de habitus.

Centralization efforts in the transformation of the Hungarian local government system

Following a change of government in 2010, the Hungarian local government system underwent a period of significant transformation. The question of how it is viewed and the effects it may have are currently being debated. However, the fact that 2011 saw a reform of a more than a 20-year-old unyielding system seems difficult to argue with. Laced with the democratic ideal of self-government, the Hungarian regime change of 1989 resulted in a fragmented local government system with a considerable degree of management authority. The local government model opted for by Hungary, which can indeed be dubbed as the champion of decentralisation, could function uninterruptedly until 2010 with minor adjustments. The centralising effort of the government had already become clear beyond a shadow of a doubt before the adoption of the Cardinal Act or the Fundamental Law (2011) itself. The reorganisation of territorial public administration was the first series of measures which allowed to make inferences about the public administration system and the forthcoming centralisation of local governments.

Changing hearts and minds: Cristina Lafont on democratic self-legislation

Lafont argues for a participatory version of deliberative democracy that shares key features with other contemporary approaches, while departing from them in decisive ways. It is based on the Rousseauian–Kantian idea of democratic self-legislation, interpreted as the idea that citizens must be able to see themselves as the authors of the laws and public policies to which they are subject. She insists that her specification of the ideal of democratic self-legislation is a general one, aiming to appeal to readers with different understandings of the core democratic values of equality, freedom and democratic control. This is questionable. I show that she interprets the democratic ideal of freedom as a distinctive, normatively robust conception of citizen self-determination. Those drawn to travel with her on the long participatory road should be aware of this and ready to explore the implications. By downplaying the distinctiveness and normative robustness of her idea of freedom, she does her model a disservice.

Referendums, for Populists Only? Why Populist Parties Favour Referendums and How Other Parties Respond

Populists are generally known as supporters of referendums and several populist parties have promoted direct democracy in recent years. To deepen our understanding of the populism referendum link, this study analyses how populist parties in Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands defend a greater use of referendums and how their non-populist counterparts respond to this populist call for referendums. An analysis of election manifestos shows that populist parties justify their referendum support by characterizing referendums as a purely democratic ideal, by presenting it as an alternative to decision-making by ‘bad’ political elites or by promoting referendums as a tool to realise their preferred policy decisions. Populist referendum support is thus related to people-centrism and ant-elitism, as elements of a populist ideology, but also to strategic considerations. These lines of argument are used by both populists on the right and the left, but anti-elitism is particularly prominent in manifestos of radical rightwing populist parties. Populists are not the only supporters of direct democracy – however, there is no evidence that non-populist parties did become more favourable towards referendums to adapt to the populist call for a greater referendum use.