C. S. Lewis’s Use of Scripture in the ‘Liar, Lunatic, Lord’ Argument

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-66
Author(s):  
Leslie Baynes
Keyword(s):  
First Century ◽  
Son Of God ◽  
Scriptural Interpretation ◽  
The Liar

C. S. Lewis’s ‘Liar, Lunatic, Lord’ argument elicits important questions about Jesus and scriptural interpretation that need addressing, not least because of its immense popularity in some Christian circles. Did Jesus really go about saying that he was God, or the Son of God, or that he had always existed? After examining the biblical record, must one conclude that Jesus was either a liar, a lunatic, or God? Are there really no alternatives? The point of this paper is most emphatically not to attempt to disprove Jesus’ divinity, but rather to demonstrate that Lewis’s use of the gospels is insufficient to prove it. The paper argues that even without deeming the gospels ‘legends,’ but rather accepting them as a reliable portrayal of the words of Jesus, Lewis’s argument falls short because he fails to put the gospels into their first-century context. He instead reads post-Nicene Christology into Hellenistic Judeo-Christian documents.

Pluralism and the Liar

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory Wright ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Treatment ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Recent Attempt ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

Pluralists maintain that there is more than one truth property in virtue of which bearers are true. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how they diagnose the liar paradox or what resources they have available to treat it. This chapter considers one recent attempt by Cotnoir (2013b) to treat the Liar. It argues that pluralists should reject the version of pluralism that Cotnoir assumes, discourse pluralism, in favor of a more naturalized approach to truth predication in real languages, which should be a desideratum on any successful pluralist conception. Appealing to determination pluralism instead, which focuses on truth properties, it then proposes an alternative treatment to the Liar that shows liar sentences to be undecidable.

Microlanguages, Vagueness, and Paradox

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ludlow ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Dynamic Theory ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Context Sensitivity ◽  
Static Picture ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

This chapter follows recent work in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, which rejects the standard, static picture of languages and highlights its context sensitivity—a dynamic theory of the nature of language. On the view advocated, human languages are things that we build on a conversation-by-conversation basis. The author calls such languages microlanguages. The chapter argues that thinking of languages in terms of microlanguages yields interesting consequences for how we should think about the liar paradox. In particular, we will see that microlanguages have admissible conditions that preclude liar-like sentences. On the view presented in the chapter, liar sentences are not even sentences of any microlanguage that we might construct (or assertorically utter). Accordingly, the proper approach to such a paradoxical sentence is to withhold the sentence—not permitting it to be admitted into our microlanguage unless, or until, certain sharpening occurs.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradley Armour-Garb ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

In this chapter, after introducing a few versions of the liar paradox and identifying the pathology that the versions of the paradox appear to present, the author considers some proposals for how to understand ‘paradox’ and goes on to offer a particular reading of that notion. He then identifies a number of projects the completion of which would contribute to our understanding—or, in some cases, our resolution—of the liar paradox and, after considering certain “treatments” of the paradox, highlights certain “revenge” problems that arise for such treatments. In the concluding section, the author summarizes each of the chapters that are contained in the volume.

Exploring fake news identification using word and sentence embeddings

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
V.T Priyanga ◽  
J.P Sanjanasri ◽  
Vijay Krishna Menon ◽  
E.A Gopalakrishnan ◽  
K.P Soman
Keyword(s):  
Machine Learning ◽  
Social Media ◽  
Network Analysis ◽  
Supervised Machine Learning ◽  
Breeding Ground ◽  
Fake News ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Highly Correlated ◽  
Use Of Social Media ◽  
The Liar

The widespread use of social media like Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp, etc. has changed the way News is created and published; accessing news has become easy and inexpensive. However, the scale of usage and inability to moderate the content has made social media, a breeding ground for the circulation of fake news. Fake news is deliberately created either to increase the readership or disrupt the order in the society for political and commercial benefits. It is of paramount importance to identify and filter out fake news especially in democratic societies. Most existing methods for detecting fake news involve traditional supervised machine learning which has been quite ineffective. In this paper, we are analyzing word embedding features that can tell apart fake news from true news. We use the LIAR and ISOT data set. We churn out highly correlated news data from the entire data set by using cosine similarity and other such metrices, in order to distinguish their domains based on central topics. We then employ auto-encoders to detect and differentiate between true and fake news while also exploring their separability through network analysis.

scholarly journals The Liar Without Relativism

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Poppy Mankowitz
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Full Understanding ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox ◽  
Semantic Relativism

AbstractSome in the recent literature have claimed that a connection exists between the Liar paradox and semantic relativism: the view that the truth values of certain occurrences of sentences depend on the contexts at which they are assessed. Sagi (Erkenntnis 82(4):913–928, 2017) argues that contextualist accounts of the Liar paradox are committed to relativism, and Rudnicki and Łukowski (Synthese 1–20, 2019) propose a new account that they classify as relativist. I argue that a full understanding of how relativism is conceived within theories of natural language shows that neither of the purported connections can be maintained. There is no reason why a solution to the Liar paradox needs to accept relativism.

Leibniz's Law and the Antinomy of the Liar

1969 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vito F. Sinisi
Keyword(s):  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
The Liar
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