First Modern Historian of the Jews: Rational Criticism versus Xenophobia and the Wall of Silence

Author(s):  
Gerald Cerny
Keyword(s):  
Theology ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 75 (625) ◽  
pp. 338-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Elliott

1967 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Lukes

In what follows I shall discuss a philosophical problem arising out of the practice of anthropologists and sociologists which may be stated, in a general and unanalysed form, as follows: when I come across a set of beliefs which appear prima facie irrational, what should be my attitude towards them? Should I adopt a critical attitude, taking it as a fact about the beliefs that they are irrational, and seek to explain how they came to be held, how they manage to survive unprofaned by rational criticism, what their consequences are, etc? Or should I treat such beliefs charitably: should I begin from the assumption that what appears to me to be irrational may be interpreted as rational when fully understood in its context? More briefly, the problem comes down to whether or not there are alternative standards of rationality.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-90
Author(s):  
Dounia Mahlouly

This review postulates that today's digital environments unveil an era of connectivity, in which digital communication devices exercise a general influence on social interactions and public deliberation. From this perspective, it argues that connective practices are likely to affect two main components of the normative public sphere, namely rational criticism and ideological sustainability. Drawing on the case of the 2011 Arab revolutions, in which social media proved to have a strategic function, this paper illustrates the ideological heterogeneity of social networks. Additionally, this article considers how issues of rational criticism and ideological sustainability could be improved by regulating online interactions and proposes that the digital divide could act as a natural process of regulation for today's connective and transnational public sphere.


1971 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 278-294
Author(s):  
David Griffin

“It is certainly the case that much theological talk about revelation has been associated with an anti-rational approach to religious truth; in fact, much of the motivation in modern theology for making revelation a central concept has been to have a starting point immune from the onslaughts of rational criticism, criticism based on biblical studies, the history of religions, hostile world views, and epistemologies, and the demands of logic and morality. But the idea of revelation as such has no necessary connection with irrational approaches in the quest for truth.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Md. Sayeed Al-Zaman

A healthy and democratic political community is built on effective and meaningful communication among diverse political groups and individuals. Political engagement in earlier days was confined to a limited number of people, which often impeded the rational criticism and effective- ness of public policies. In Bangladesh, many people remain outside the boundaries of policymaking. To a cer- tain degree, traditional media failed to bridge the gap be- tween public and political authority. Digital media has re- cently entered into public life and offers various groups a chance to engage in political communication. Even com- munication through digital media has started to deter- mine the fortune of political events in Bangladesh like elsewhere in the world. Therefore, digital media, as a key player in political communication, has to be studied care- fully. In this article, it has been discussed why and how digital media has earned power regarding political com- munication. This study also seeks the state of democracy and political pluralism in contemporary Bangladesh. Identifying three key players of Bangladesh politics: polit- ical leaders, political activists, and grassroots citizens, this article further elucidates the nature of their chemistry in the digital age.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Hubbs

The classical ethical questions of whether and to what extent moral criticism is a sort of rational criticism have received renewed interest in recent years. According to the approach that I refer to as rationalist, accounts of moral responsibility are grounded by explanations of the conditions under which an agent is rationally answerable for her actions and attitudes. In the sense that is relevant here, to answer for an attitude or action is to give reasons that at least purport to justify it. To hold someone answerable for an attitude or action is thus to hold her rationally liable for it. T. M. Scanlon’s view is perhaps the most well-known example of this approach. The rationalist approach has recently been attacked by David Shoemaker for being too narrow: the charge is that attitudes exist for which an agent is responsible even though she cannot, in the relevant sense, answer for them. If there are morally significant attitudes that are attributable to an agent even though she cannot answer for them, then it would seem incomplete, misguided, or worse to treat morality as fundamentally a matter of demanding and giving reasons. By developing some remarks based on G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention, I defend the rationalist approach against this critique. I show how an agent may be answerable for an attitude even though she cannot answer for it. The objective of this paper is thus twofold: to contribute to the discussion of the connection between rational liability and ethical responsibility, and to provide an example of the broad relevance of Anscombe’s thought to contemporary practical philosophy.


2000 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 1180
Author(s):  
Thomas Docherty ◽  
Carl Rapp
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-531
Author(s):  
David Löwenstein

Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological 'laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion of Quine's holism, which at first appears to make the idea of the necessity of logical laws even less plausible, but eventually turns out to speak in favor of this view.


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