scholarly journals Gesetze des Denkens? Von Husserls und Freges Psychologismus-Kritik zu einem transzendentalen Kern der Logik

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-531
Author(s):  
David Löwenstein
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Rational Criticism

Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological 'laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion of Quine's holism, which at first appears to make the idea of the necessity of logical laws even less plausible, but eventually turns out to speak in favor of this view.

The return of metaphysics as a subject matter of historical ontology: analytical review (ending)

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-197
Author(s):  
Olga Stoliarova
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Theoretical Justification ◽  
Historical Ontology ◽  
New Realism ◽  
Role Meaning ◽  
Analytical Review ◽  
Cognitive Experience ◽  
Scientific Ontology

The second part of the article continues the analytical and historiographical overview of the problems that are substantively related to the question of the role, meaning and historical fate of metaphysics. The author focuses on the phenomenon of the return of metaphysics to the philosophy of our time. The author traces the gradual rehabilitation of metaphysical problems in post-positivist studies of sci-ence. An attempt is made to differentiate these studies from the viewpoint of the opposition between internalism and externalism. The author shows the limits of this differentia-tion and highlights the mixed type of re-search, which focuses on the interaction of “external” and “internal” determinants of knowledge. It is shown that the postpositivist idea of the background knowledge extends not only to scientific (empirical) knowledge, but also to its philosophical (theoretical) justification, which is recognized by many re-searchers as historically and culturally conditioned. This opens up the possibility of a historical critique of the ontological presuppositions of the epistemological (transcendental) justification of science. Such presuppositions are considered in relation to the dis-course of negative ontology, which prohibits the cognitive experience of transcendent be-ing. The author shows that the criticism of these assumptions is carried out in the form of a regressive transcendental argument, which, comparing them with a new, philo-sophically revised scientific ontology, reveals their historically limited character. Thus, the regressive transcendental argument allows us to go beyond the negative ontology of the transcendental justification of science. This leads to the replacement of historical epistemology, whose subject matter is limited to knowledge and its historically mobile structures, with historical ontology, which returns to the description and explanation of reality. The author considers the concepts of new re-alism in the context of historical ontology and traces the connection of the new realism with the post-metaphysical and metametaphysical discourses.

Sartre’s Transcendental Phenomenology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Webber
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
The World

The first phase of Sartre’s philosophical publications displays an apparent ambivalence toward Husserl’s transcendental turn. Sartre accepts both major aspects of that turn, the phenomenological reduction and the use of transcendental argumentation. Yet his rejection of the transcendental ego that Husserl derives from this transcendental turn overlooks an obvious transcendental argument in favor of it. His books on emotion and imagination, moreover, make only very brief comments about the transcendental constitution of the world of experience. In each case, these appear at the end of the book and can seem to contradict the book’s central analysis. The problem underlying these features of his works of phenomenological psychology is clarified and resolved, however, when Sartre articulates his own transcendental phenomenology and ontology in Being and Nothingness a decade after he first encountered the work of Husserl. This resolution raises a new problem that animates the next phase of his philosophy.

Hegel’s Speculative Identity Thesis

2020 ◽  
pp. 65-122
Author(s):  
Karen Ng
Keyword(s):  
Three Dimensional ◽  
The Self ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Early Presentation ◽  
Identity Thesis ◽  
Refutation Of Idealism ◽  
Dimensional Argument

This chapter explores Hegel’s speculative identity thesis, defending the importance of Schelling for Hegel’s appropriation of Kant’s purposiveness theme. It provides an interpretation of Hegel’s first published text, the Differenzschrift, and analyzes the relation between “subjective subject-objects” and “objective subject-objects” as an early presentation of Hegel’s philosophical method. In addition to defending the contribution of Schelling, this chapter provides an interpretation of Fichte’s contribution via his notion of the self-positing activity of the I. It then turns to a reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, demonstrating that the notion of “negativity” can be understood along the lines of speculative identity. The chapter argues that Hegel presents life as constitutive for self-consciousness by way of a three-dimensional argument: the employment of an analogy; a transcendental argument; and a refutation of idealism argument. It concludes by briefly outlining how the speculative identity thesis is carried forward in the Science of Logic.

Heidegger

2021 ◽  
pp. 241-296
Author(s):  
Guy Elgat
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Transcendental Argument

This chapter argues that Martin Heidegger can be read as providing a synthesis of sorts of the views considered in the previous chapters. Specifically, it focuses on Heidegger’s analysis of Being-guilty in his Being and Time and argues that while for Heidegger we are indeed not causa sui, as the naturalists hold, we are nevertheless guilty as such or are characterized by ontological guilt, as the metaphysicians hold, and this is because for Heidegger, not being causa sui is a condition of our ontological guilt. Moreover, it is our Being-guilty that makes our factical or empirical guilt possible. After introducing some of the main concepts and themes of Heidegger’s discussion, the chapter turns to reconstruct Heidegger’s transcendental argument to the effect that our Being-guilty is a necessary condition of the possibility of factical guilt. It then turns to discuss Heidegger’s concepts of the call of conscience and of wanting-to-have-a-conscience.

Transcendental arguments

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Transcendental Arguments ◽  
Do So

Transcendental arguments seek to answer scepticism by showing that the things doubted by a sceptic are in fact preconditions for the scepticism to make sense. Hence the scepticism is either meaningless or false. A transcendental argument works by finding the preconditions of meaningful thought or judgment. For example, scepticism about other minds suggests that only the thinker themselves might have sensations. A transcendental argument which answered this scepticism would show that a precondition for thinking oneself to have sensations is that others do so as well. Expressing the scepticism involves thinking oneself to have sensations; and the argument shows that if this thought is expressible, then it is also false. Arguments with such powerful consequences have, unsurprisingly, been much criticized. One criticism is that it is not possible to discover the necessary conditions of judgment. Another is that transcendental arguments can only show us how we have to think, whereas defeating scepticism involves showing instead how things really are.

scholarly journals To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-32
Author(s):  
Nadine Elzein ◽  
Tuomas K. Pernu
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Libertarian Free Will

A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not justified in asserting P. While such arguments often appeal to principles with wide appeal, such as the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they also require a commitment to principles that seem far less compelling, e.g. the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’ or the principle that having an obligation entails being responsible. It is argued here that these further principles are dubious, and that it will be difficult to construct a valid transcendental argument without them.

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