The functioning of labour markets in welfare state capitalism Employment ratios, labour productivity and levels of prosperity in The Netherlands and 15 other OECD-countries

Abstract In academia and beyond, it has become commonplace to regard populist parties – in particular, those on the radical right – as the archetypical embodiment of politics of nostalgia. Demand-side studies suggest that nostalgic sentiments motivate populist radical-right (PRR) voting and welfare chauvinist attitudes, yet systematic analyses of the nostalgic discourse that these parties promote have not been forthcoming. This paper seeks to fill that lacuna by analysing how the Freedom Party of Austria, the Dutch Party for Freedom and the Sweden Democrats framed the historical fate of the welfare state in their electoral discourse between 2008 and 2018. It demonstrates that their commitment to welfare chauvinism finds expression in a common repertoire of “welfare nostalgia,” manifested in the different modes of “reaction,” “conservation” and “modernisation.” Giving substance to a widespread intuition about PRR nostalgia, the paper breaks ground for further research into nostalgic ideas about social policy.

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Social Investment, Employment and Policy and Institutional Complementarities: A Comparative Analysis across 26 OECD Countries

Journal of Social Policy ◽

10.1017/s0047279421000386 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-23

Author(s):

VINCENT BAKKER ◽

OLAF VAN VLIET

Keyword(s):

Welfare State ◽

Positive Association ◽

Oecd Countries ◽

Employment Outcomes ◽

Social Investment ◽

Investment Policies ◽

Employment Rates ◽

Marginal Returns ◽

Welfare State Regimes

Abstract Raising employment has been at the heart of EU strategies for over twenty years. Social investment, by now a widely debated topic in the comparative welfare state literature, has been suggested as a way to pursue this. However, there are only a couple of systematic comparative analyses that focus on the employment outcomes associated with social investment. Analyses of the interdependence of these policies with regard to their outcomes are even more scarce. We empirically analyse the extent to which variation in employment rates within 26 OECD countries over the period 1990-2010 can be explained by effort on five social investment policies. We additionally explore the role of policy and institutional complementarities. Using time-series cross-section analyses we find robust evidence for a positive association between effort on ALMPs and employment rates. For other policies we obtain mixed results. ALMPs are the only policies for which we observe signs of policy interdependence, which point at diminishing marginal returns. Additionally, our analysis demonstrates that the interdependence of social investment policies varies across welfare state regimes. Together, this indicates that the employment outcomes of social investment policies are also contingent on the broader framework of welfare state policies and institutions.

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Labour productivity growth trends in OECD countries: selection of subperiods

International Journal of Manpower ◽

10.1108/01437729510082786 ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 16 (1) ◽

pp. 46-57

Author(s):

David Sapsford ◽

Yanis Varoufakis

Keyword(s):

Productivity Growth ◽

Labour Productivity ◽

Oecd Countries ◽

Growth Trends ◽

Labour Productivity Growth ◽

Selection Of

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The Difference Principle, Capitalism, and Property-Owning Democracy

Moral Philosophy and Politics ◽

10.1515/mopp-2017-0012 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 5 (1) ◽

pp. 151-172

Author(s):

Andrew Lister

Keyword(s):

Welfare State ◽

Equal Opportunity ◽

Main Idea ◽

Political Influence ◽

Income Growth ◽

Difference Principle ◽

State Capitalism ◽

Long Run ◽

The Future ◽

The Difference

Abstract Jason Brennan and John Tomasi have argued that if we focus on income alone, the Difference Principle supports welfare-state capitalism over property-owning democracy, because capitalism maximizes long run income growth for the worst off. If so, the defense of property-owning democracy rests on the priority of equal opportunity for political influence and social advancement over raising the income of the worst off, or on integrating workplace control into the Difference Principle’s index of advantage. The thesis of this paper is that even based on income alone, the Difference Principle is not as hostile to property-owning democracy as it may seem, because the Difference Principle should not be interpreted to require maximizing long run income growth. The main idea is that it is unfair to make the present worst off accept inequality that doesn’t benefit them, for the sake of benefitting the future worst off, if the future worst off will be better off than they are anyway.

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