Freedom, Spiritual Praxis and Categorical Imperative

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-133
Author(s):  
Meera Chakravorty
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative

On the Rationale of Kant’s Categorical Imperative

2000 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-208
Author(s):  
Nicholas Rescher
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative

The Concept of the Categorical Imperative (review)

1970 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 222-224
Author(s):  
Thomas E. (Thomas English) Hill
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative

scholarly journals Multiplicity and the Social Order

1919 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-164
Author(s):  
J. Loewenberg
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
German Philosophy ◽  
German Politics ◽  
The Social ◽  
American Citizenship

It is generally assumed that in fighting Germany we were fighting a specific doctrine of life. Many crusaders are now in search of the doctrine which has brought on this iniquitous war. To hunt down the German philosophy has become a favorite indoor sport. But what is the result? The result threatens to blur all distinctions. The adjective “German” now connotes everything and denotes nothing. If, for instance, the national differentia of both German philosophy and German politics be Egotism, as has been maintained, many doctrines having their origins outside the boundaries of Germany would have to be defined as “German.” Again, if Germany's national trait be “Absolutism” in logic and morals (and this too has been seriously held), what shall we do with Belgium? Shall we call her German because in defiance of all consequences she remained absolutely true to her duty? Not Germany but Belgium is the nation that acted in conformity with Kant's Categorical Imperative. If it is true that America's national philosophy is pragmatism, then the “masters” of Germany are entitled to American citizenship.

Über Gewissen und Gewissheit

2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dina Emundts
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Status

AbstractThis paper suggests an understanding of the concept of “Gewissen” (conscience) according to which Gewissen is best understood as a receptivity to moral principles that corresponds to certain moral feelings. In the first part of the paper this suggestion is spelled out and alternatives to it are discussed. As is shown in the second part, this suggestion goes back to the thought of Immanuel Kant, but it can be developed even if one does not follow Kant in his understanding of the categorical imperative as an a priori principle. However, if one does not follow Kant with respect to the status of the categorical imperative, there are some interesting consequences for our understanding of conscience and especially for our understanding of its relation to knowledge and certainty. These consequences are discussed in the third part of this paper.

Interpreting the categorical imperative

1998 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-236
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Scarre
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative

scholarly journals The contstructivistic defence of the objectivity of moral standards and natural law that does not require the debate on moral realism

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 653-663
Author(s):  
Slavenko Sljukic
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Relativism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Social Fact ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
Theories Of Justice

The main goal of Kenneth R. Westphal?s How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism is to defend the objectivity of moral standards and natural law and thus avoid the discussion about moral realism and its alternatives by interpreting Hume and Kant in a constructivistic sense. The reason behind the author?s disagreement with both: moral realism and non-realism (its alternative) is our inability to properly understand and answer one of the two parts in Socrates? question to Euthyphro: ?Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?? Moral realists cannot provide an answer to its second part, since it is not possible to prove that moral standards are not artificial; conversely, moral non-realists cannot provide an answer to its first part, since it is not possible to avoid the relatitvity of moral standards. The author tends to solve this problem by avoiding the confrontation between moral realism and non-realism and thus choosing the constuctivistic stance that, as he argues, can be found in both Hume?s and Kant?s theories. The main point of this stance is that moral standards are indeed artificial, yet not arbitrary. He proves this by pointing out that both Hume and Kant treat the moral standards as a social fact (that is, artificial), but also as objective. Westphal points out that Hume explicitly writes about moral standards as a social fact, while showing that, at the same time, his theory of justice, which precedes all of the moral standards, is established independently of his theory of moral sentiments (potentially leading to moral relativism). In this manner, he provides the objectivity of those standards. On the other hand, Kant?s theory is interpreted as advanced, yet similar to Hume?s in its structure. The crucial similarity is that both Hume and Kant interpret the moral standards as a social fact (that is, as an artificial) and, at the same time, as the objective ones. Kant, unlike Hume, provides this objectivity by using a specific moral criterion - a categorical imperative. Those assumptions will be used as the main premises of a distinctively inspiring interpretation of Hume?s and Kant?s theories of justice.

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