The Categorical Imperative of Speed: Acceleration as Moral Duty

Mediated Time ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 25-43
Author(s):  
Thomas Sutherland
2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 257-269
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Stawrowski

The contemporary cultural trends that introduce regulations weakening parental rights have also come to Poland. Under the influence of utilitarian-statist ideology, which sees the state and its officials as the primary educators and guardians of children, powers naturally enjoyed by parents are being questioned under various pretexts. One of these is the use of violence against children. Due to actions taken by the state towards family, institutional violence used by the state – which is often much more severe for children – often becomes a remedy for parental violence. This text attempts to solve the problem by referring to the basic Kantian distinction between justified and unjustified violence, and to the priority of family and parental rights over the powers of the state. In the same way that the state can use violence towards citizens, so parents can use violence towards their children, as long as its scope and form stems from what is most important for the parental relationship: the categorical imperative of responsible love, aimed at encouraging a child on his or her way of growing up into responsible freedom. A symbol of such parental action is the act of spanking, which – when properly understood and properly used – is sometimes a moral duty of parents.


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (910) ◽  
pp. 59-67
Author(s):  
David Rieff

AbstractIs remembrance an absolute moral duty or is it better thought of in more ethically constricted pragmatic and empirical terms? This essay argues that both individuals and societies should strive for remembrance where possible, but accept that there are times and places where more forgetting is the only safe choice to make. One may hope that at some point in the future the need to remember will sweep away a prudential decision to forget, but while we are within our moral rights to hope that, in a given case, forgetting itself will outlive its usefulness, conflating our wishes with teleological certainties is an exercise in hubris, not morality. But on no account should memory be thought of as a categorical imperative.


2021 ◽  
Vol - (6) ◽  
pp. 6-15
Author(s):  
Anatoliy Yermolenko

The article discusses the concepts of communicative practical philosophy as a component of hermeneutic-linguistic-pragmatic-semiotic turn in philosophy, associated with the transition from the paradigm of subjectivity to the paradigm of intersubjectivity. In particular, the concept of “I” is considered as a factor in the internalization of intersubjectivity, because it is from the very beginning woven into the context of speech practice with the pronoun “I”, which is marked by the reflective “I am I”. The transcendental “I” is the internalization of the transcendental communicative community; the classic concept of “adulthood”, associated with “the courage to be guided by one’s own mind”, is an internal manifestation of communicative competence, which in an internalized form is part of the structure of identity. The mind appears in such definitions as “discourse”, “argumentation”, “consensus”. In turn, discourse differs from other speech practices, such as conversation, talk, debate, dialogue, which also have their own internalizations, forming a complex identity structure. The article deals with the internal “maintenance of discourse” both in the process of substantiation of human knowledge and in the process of justification (legitimation) of the correctness of moral duty. In particular, this is manifested in the formulation of the categorical imperative of moral practice, which is considered in the light of the transition from the monologue dimension to the transcendental-pragmatic one. The article also shows the need to move from a monologue concept of responsibility to a communicative concept of shared responsibility. It is emphasized that such a transition is an urgent need of modern times, a sign of which is the desire to overcome the crisis civilization of “risks and threats” and the formation of a civilization of dialogue based on the argumentative understanding, for which the guiding idea is the “transcendental consensus”.


Author(s):  
أ.د.عبد الجبار احمد عبد الله

In order to codify the political and partisan activity in Iraq, after a difficult labor, the Political Parties Law No. (36) for the year 2015 started and this is positive because it is not normal for the political parties and forces in Iraq to continue without a legal framework. Article (24) / paragraph (5) of the law requires that the party and its members commit themselves to the following: (To preserve the neutrality of the public office and public institutions and not to exploit it for the gains of a party or political organization). This is considered because it is illegal to exploit State institutions for partisan purposes . It is a moral duty before the politician not to exploit the political parties or some of its members or those who try to speak on their behalf directly or indirectly to achieve partisan gains. Or personality against other personalities and parties at the expense of the university entity.


Author(s):  
Christie Hartley

This chapter develops the idea of public reason based on the shared reasons account of public justification. It is argued that the moral foundation for political liberalism delimits a narrow scope for the idea of public reason, such that public reasons are required only for matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. It is also argued that where public reason applies, persons as citizens have a moral duty to never appeal to their comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public reasoning. Hence, an exclusive account of public reason is vindicated. Finally, we respond to various potential objections to our view, such as the claim that the shared reasons view requires identical reasoning and the claim that public reason is interderminate or inconclusive.


Author(s):  
Stephanie Collins

Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. This book asks (i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members. It defends a ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties, which divides groups into three fundamental categories. First, combinations are collections of agents that do not have any goals or decision-making procedures in common. Combinations cannot bear moral duties. Instead, we should re-cast their purported duties as a series of duties—one held by each agent in the combination. Each duty demands its bearer to ‘I-reason’: to do the best they can, given whatever they happen to believe the others will do. Second, coalitions are groups whose members share goals but lack decision-making procedures. Coalitions also cannot bear duties, but their alleged duties should be replaced with members’ several duties to ‘we-reason’: to do one’s part in a particular group pattern of actions, on the presumption that others will do likewise. Third, collectives have group-level procedures for making decisions. They can bear duties. Collectives’ duties imply duties for collectives’ members to use their role in the collective with a view to the collective doing its duty.


1970 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 222-224
Author(s):  
Thomas E. (Thomas English) Hill

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-194
Author(s):  
Shailendra Kumar Singh

The theme of nationalism in the works of Premchand, the pre-eminent Urdu–Hindi writer of the 1920s and 1930s, not only serves as an organising principle but also constitutes a protean and contentious field of study, which has resulted in conflicting interpretations. On the one hand, his nationalist narratives are categorically denounced for their apparent lack of radicalism, while on the other hand, they are unequivocally valorised for their so-called subversive content. Both these diametrically opposed schools of criticism, however, share a common lacuna, that is, both of them tend to conflate the writer’s nationalist narratives with his peasant discourse, thereby precluding the possibility of different themes yielding different interpretations. This article examines the theme of nationalism in Premchand’s works, in general, and the question of civil resistance in particular, in order to demonstrate how the writer’s politics of representation in his nationalist writings differs from the one that we find in his peasant narratives. It argues that as opposed to the authorial valorisation of the fictive peasant’s conformity to the exploitative status quo, civil resistance in Premchand’s nationalist narratives is not only necessary and desirable but also synonymous with dharma (moral duty) itself.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document