Are qualified majority rules special?

Public Choice ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shmuel Nitzan ◽  
Jacob Paroush

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-220
Author(s):  
Uuganbaatar Ninjbat


2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 1137-1158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Maggi ◽  
Massimo Morelli

Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, others by (simple or qualified) majority rules. Standard voting models, which assume that the decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a hard time explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that the organization cannot rely on external enforcement mechanisms: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to comply with the collective decision or, in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The model identifies conditions under which the organization adopts the unanimity rule, and yields rich comparative-statics predictions on the determinants of the mode of governance.



2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Casajus ◽  
Helfried Labrenz ◽  
Tobias Hiller


Orthopedics ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (9) ◽  
pp. 967-968
Author(s):  
Aaron G Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  


Author(s):  
Hans Gersbach ◽  
Bernhard Pachl
Keyword(s):  


2002 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonella Ianni ◽  
Valentina Corradi


2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 754-758 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Nie ◽  
Tian-Guang Zhan ◽  
Tian-You Zhou ◽  
Ze-Yun Xiao ◽  
Guo-Fang Jiang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  


IG ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-131
Author(s):  
Miriam Hartlapp

Design and adoption of common social policy is conditional. Limited competencies, institutional and organizational heterogeneity among member states, and ideological-programmatic majorities in the institutions of the European Union (EU) have led to far fewer new legal instruments in recent decades. One of the key challenges is the unanimity requirement in the Council, enshrined in the Treaties in areas of great member state sovereignty. In 2019 the Commission proposed to allow a transition to qualified majority voting. This paper discusses what the transition entails in legal and procedural terms and highlights three key advantages it holds. To this aim it provides an overview of the policy areas and instruments that the Commission would like to transfer to qualified majority voting. It outlines how the potential that majority voting offers for EU social policy could be exploited better with more ambitious initiatives and discusses differentiated integration as an alternative.



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