Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der EU-Sozialpolitik: effizientere Entscheidungsfindung durch Mehrheitsentscheidungen und differenzierte Integration?

IG ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-131
Author(s):  
Miriam Hartlapp
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Member State ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Differentiated Integration ◽  
Aktuelle Entwicklungen ◽  
Organizational Heterogeneity

Design and adoption of common social policy is conditional. Limited competencies, institutional and organizational heterogeneity among member states, and ideological-programmatic majorities in the institutions of the European Union (EU) have led to far fewer new legal instruments in recent decades. One of the key challenges is the unanimity requirement in the Council, enshrined in the Treaties in areas of great member state sovereignty. In 2019 the Commission proposed to allow a transition to qualified majority voting. This paper discusses what the transition entails in legal and procedural terms and highlights three key advantages it holds. To this aim it provides an overview of the policy areas and instruments that the Commission would like to transfer to qualified majority voting. It outlines how the potential that majority voting offers for EU social policy could be exploited better with more ambitious initiatives and discusses differentiated integration as an alternative.

The Nice Treaty: Reforming European Union Institutions in Anticipation of Eastern Enlargements

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Finn Laursen
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Treaty ◽  
Member States ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
The Future ◽  
Eastern European Countries ◽  
Year 2000

The Nice Treaty negotiated during the year 2000, signed in 2001 and in force from 2003, focused on institutional changes considered necessary, especially by the larger member states, for the anticipated large enlargement of the European Union with several central and eastern European countries. Efforts to adopt such changes in the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations in 1996–1997 had failed. The Nice Treaty therefore dealt with what was known as the “Amsterdam leftovers,” namely size and composition of the European Commission, reweighting of votes in the Council of Ministers, and increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council. Concerning the reweighting of votes the intergovernmental conference agreed to increase the number of votes per member state, but the larger member states got a relatively larger increase that the smaller member states. This should make it more difficult for the smaller member states to dominate in the future, something feared by the larger states. Concerning the Commission, it was decided that each member state would nominate one commissioner in the future from January 1, 2005. When the membership of the union reached 27 the size would have to be reduced. How much and how would be decided later. Concerning the use of qualified majority voting the decision was to extend the use to some policy areas from the entry into force of the new treaty and for some policy areas considered more controversial the extension would take place later. For the most controversial areas no extension to qualified majority voting was considered. During the intergovernmental conference, which negotiated the new treaty, the topic of “enhanced cooperation” was added. Most of these topics were quite controversial, and afterward there was a feeling that the treaty did not adequately deal with all the issues. This in turn led to further efforts to improve the institutions, first in the failed Constitutional Treaty (2004) and eventually in the successful Lisbon Treaty (2007).

scholarly journals Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the European Union

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Crombez ◽  
Simon Hix
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
The Political ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Legislative Procedures ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Legislative Activity

This article develops a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making that suggests that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval. This is consistent with Krehbiel's study of US politics. This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors and (2) the legislative procedures used in a particular period. Actors’ preferences and procedures are not expected to have any effect beyond their impact on the gridlock interval. The study predicts smaller gridlock intervals, and thus more legislative activity, under the co-decision (consultation) procedure when the pivotal member states and the European Parliament (Commission) are closer to each other. More activity is expected under qualified majority voting in the Council than under unanimity. The results find support for these propositions in an empirical analysis of EU legislative activity between 1979 and 2009.

PROVIDING A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EU: ARTICLE 59 OF THE DRAFT EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 407-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
J Friel Raymond
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
European Council ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Constitution ◽  
Article 59 ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Draft Constitution

After almost 50 years in existence in a variety of different forms, the EU finally has an express proposal on the table dealing with the potential withdrawal of a Member State. Article 59 of the draft Constitution states that any Member State may now ‘decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’.1 The Member State would have to formally notify the European Council of this decision. The Council and the Member State would then enter into negotiations on a mutually agreeable basis for withdrawal, including a framework for the future relationship between the EU and the Member State. The results of this negotiation would require approval by a qualified majority of the Council after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.2 In any event, withdrawal would occur not later than two years following the notification unless extended by agreement between the Member State and the European Council.3

The European Union and International Outcomes

1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Jupille
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Maastricht Treaty ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
The European Union ◽  
External Relations ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
International Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Positions ◽  
The Eu

Analysts of the European Union (EU) and international bargaining have generally failed to appreciate how the shift within the EU from unanimity to qualified majority voting has affected European bargaining positions and international outcomes. I analyze the international effects of changes in EU decision-making rules with a simple spatial model and assess the utility of the model in two cases of environmental bargaining that span the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. The EU can decisively shape international outcomes by concentrating the weight of its fifteen member states on a single substantive position and rendering that position critical to any internationally negotiated agreement. The findings generalize to numerous areas of EU external relations and suggest that analysts should attend specifically to the EU and more generally to domestic and regional institutional factors in explaining international bargaining outcomes.

Equitable Voting in the EU?: Options for Change

Politics ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-87
Author(s):  
Mark Baimbridge ◽  
Brian Burkitt
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Population Size ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
European Council ◽  
Alternative Methods ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
The Eu

The disagreement within the European Union (EU) concerning the system of qualified majority voting highlighted the inequalities within the present allocation of votes. With enlargement these inequalities are likely to intensify. We suggest that the EU should examine alternative methods for the allocation of Council votes. Two possible scenarios are allocation according to population size, and second, allocation based upon contributions to the EU budget. We conclude that either of these methods would offer a greater degree of equity, stability and flexibility in the decision-making process of the European Council.

scholarly journals Where does implementation lie? Assessing the determinants of delegation and discretion in post-Maastricht European Union

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Marta Migliorati
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Several Variables ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
The One ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selection Of

Abstract Drawing on a principal–agent framework the article analyses the European Union (EU) politics of delegation in the post-Maastricht era. By means of statistical analysis, it tests the impact of several variables upon the selection of national and supranational agents, as well as on the discretion they enjoy, on the basis of a recently collected data set of EU laws. Findings reveal that pooling and policy complexity favour the involvement of supranational actors in the implementation of EU laws. Moreover, the degree of supranational integration of a policy affects the likelihood of choosing supranational implementers. On the one hand, the Commission enjoys higher discretion vis-à-vis national actors when qualified majority voting applies, and when higher levels of conflict in the Council of Ministers is present. On the other, conflict between the European Parliament and the Council under codecision seems associated with lower supranational discretion, although the result needs further corroboration.

Various Forms of Differentiation and Majority Voting as an Alternative

2021 ◽  
pp. 12-42
Author(s):  
Caroline Heber
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
The People ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Law Making

This chapter sets out the different forms of differentiation and asks whether qualified majority voting in the field of taxation would be a practical and suitable alternative to differentiated law-making. The first sections show that enhanced cooperation is not the only flexibility mechanism within the European Union. Member States can also establish differentiation through primary EU law, secondary EU law, or by using partial international agreements. Partial international agreements may be a real alternative to enhanced cooperation law-making as they grant Member States the possibility to introduce rules which are only binding between some Member States. However, these sections reveal the clear differences between enhanced cooperation laws and partial international agreements which allow a protection of enhanced cooperation laws within the EU’s legal framework. Based on constitutional legal theory, in particular consociational democracy, the second part of this chapter argues that qualified majority voting should not be pursued in the field of taxation because it may lead to a European Union plagued by internal frustration and conflicts. The people of Europe are too heterogeneous, and unlike many other subject areas, taxation is a vehicle to pursue sensitive national policy objectives. Taxation is not only a revenue raiser, it is also a nuanced tool to steer taxpayers’ behaviour, achieve justice and equal opportunities through redistribution, and address economic needs.

scholarly journals Coalition Building and Consensus in the Council of the European Union

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank M. Häge
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Positive Effect

Although qualified-majority voting is possible, member states in the Council of the European Union (EU) still adopt most policies by consensus. The agent-based model of coalition building in multilateral negotiations presented here addresses this puzzle. The model demonstrates that consensual decisions may emerge as an unintended by-product of government representatives’ desire to form blocking coalitions. A qualitative case study demonstrates the plausibility of the model's assumptions and resulting coalition-building dynamics. Moreover, a quantitative test shows that the model's predictions correspond closely to the observed consensus rates. Finally, computational experiments predict a positive effect of the voting threshold but no effect of increases in membership on winning coalition size, which has important practical implications for institutional design and enlargement policy.

The Conflict over Qualified Majority Voting in the European Union Council of Ministers: An Analysis of the UK Negotiating Stance Using Power Indices

1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. J. Johnston
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Conservative Party ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Power Indices ◽  
The European Union ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Voting Procedures ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Council Of Ministers

Conflict within the British Conservative Party over the European Union provided a great deal of copy for media political coverage during 1992–94. It was undoubtedly responsible for severely damaging the prime minister's reputation within his party and the country. In July 1993, he could only achieve ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by making voting for it an issue of confidence in the House of Commons, thereby obtaining the support of most ‘Eurosceptic’ Conservative MPs. Nine months later, failure to achieve the United Kingdom's goal regarding voting procedures in the Council of Ministers following enlargement of the EU in 1995 led to several calls for his resignation from among his own party's MPs, including one in the House itself.

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