The ad Hominem argument as an informal fallacy

Argumentation ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas N. Walton
Keyword(s):  
2011 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-51
Author(s):  
Rosalia Hatzilambrou
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-156
Author(s):  
PAUL CAMERON
Keyword(s):  
Gay Men ◽  

Accuracy is the most important aspect of empiricism. If investigators are clear about their method and employ it to generate ‘facts,’ their opinions are irrelevant. So it is of some significance that Morrison, who spends more than one-third of his paper attacking my motives — indeed accusing me of ‘hatred of gay men and lesbian women’ — does not dispute my findings. Strip away the ad hominem attacks and little remains.


2001 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 56-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bettina Bergmann

We have reached an important moment in the study of the Roman house. The past 20 years have been extremely active, with scholars approaching domestic space down different disciplinary and methodological avenues. Since the important essay on Campanian houses by A. Wallace-Hadrill in 1988, new excavations and scores of books and articles have changed the picture of Pompeii and, with it, that of the Roman house. Theoretical archaeologists have taken the lead, approaching Pompeii as an "archaeological laboratory" in which, armed with the interpretative tools of spatial and statistical analysis, they attempt to recover ancient behavioral patterns. The interdisciplinary picture that emerges is complex and inevitably contradictory. There is so much new information and such a tangle of perspectives that it is time to consider what we have learned and what kinds of interpretative tools we might best employ. Without doubt this is an exciting time in Roman studies. But two overviews of recent scholarship to appear this year, the present one by R. Tybout and another by P. Allison (AJA 105.2 [2001]), express considerable frustration and resort to ad hominem recriminations that signal a heated backlash, at least among some.


Author(s):  
Julio Robledo Bordas

Este trabajo trata de ahondar en la noción de desacuerdo profundo propuesta por Robert Fogelin, comparando la idea de Fogelin de que los desacuerdos profundos emergen del choque entre dos marcos o trasfondos conceptuales (e incluso vitales) con el concepto kuhniano de inconmensurabilidad entre paradigmas. A su vez, argumento que ciertos elementos de dichos trasfondos no son enteramente revisables por medios puramente lógicos (dándole la razón a Fogelin) y dependen de una elección voluntaria fundamental entre distintos criterios sobre los que hacer pivotar la propia posición (siguiendo a Alasdair MacIntyre). Por último, contra Fogelin, propongo un método de resolución racional (parcial) de los desacuerdos profundos basado en la argumentación ad hominem en el sentido de Henry Johnstone y en la argumentación por analogía, que llamo «exigencia de coherencia».


2021 ◽  
pp. 0261927X2110668
Author(s):  
Susan L. Kline ◽  
Tiffany N. White ◽  
Ralph J. Martins

Conversation argument theory is used to analyze seven online discussions of colorism, a form of skin tone prejudice. Discussants’ comments (N = 587) expressed ad hominem acts (17%), reasoning activities (59%) and delimitors (e.g., addressed objections, 37%). Unlike general forums confrontation-initiated forums had more ad hominem acts. Posts with compared to posts without ad hominem acts had fewer reasoning activities and delimitors. General colorism forums were the most civil and developed, findings that have implications for designing online forums.


1992 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Walton

This paper, based on research in a forthcoming monograph, Commitment in Dialogue, undertaken jointly with Erik Krabbe, explains several informal fallacies as shifts from one type of dialogue to another. The normative framework is that of a dialogue where two parties reason together, incurring and retracting commitments to various propositions as the dialogue continues. The fallacies studied include the ad hominem, the slippery slope, and many questions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-166
Author(s):  
Carlo Martini

Abstract In this paper, I contend that evidence-focused strategies of science communication may be complemented by possibly more effective rhetorical arguments in current public debates on vaccines. I analyse the case of direct science communication - that is, communication of evidence - and show that it is difficult to effectively communicate evidential standards of science in the presence of well-equipped anti-science movements. Instead, I argue that effective rhetorical tools involve ad hominem strategies, that is, arguments involving claims of expertise. I provide a rationale, and sketch a methodology, for using ad hominem arguments in science communication.


2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Bondy

Argumentation theorists are beginning to think of ad hominem arguments as generally legitimate. Virtue argumentation theorists argue that a character trait approach to argument appraisal can explain why ad hominems would are legitimate, when they are legitimate. But I argue that we do not need to appeal to virtue argumentation theory to explain the legitimacy of ad hominem arguments; a more straightforward evidentialist approach to argument appraisal is also committed to their legitimacy. I also argue that virtue argumentation theory faces some important problems, and that whereas the virtue-theoretic approach in epistemology is (arguably) well-motivated, that motivation does not carry over to virtue argumentation theory.


2010 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Moti Mizrahi

In this paper, I argue that ad hominem arguments are not always fallacious. More explicitly, in certain cases of practical reasoning, the circumstances of a person are relevant to whether or not the conclusion should be accepted. This occurs, I suggest, when a person gives advice to others or prescribes certain courses of action but fails to follow her own advice or act in accordance with her own prescriptions. This is not an instance of a fallacious tu quoque provided that such circumstantial ad hominem arguments are construed as rebuttals to appeals to (administrative) authority (of expertise), or so I argue.


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