Model theory for modal logic part I?The De re/de dicto distinction

1978 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kit Fine
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
De Re ◽  
De Dicto

Modal Types

2020 ◽  
pp. 107-138
Author(s):  
David Corfield
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Modal Logic ◽  
Temporal Logic ◽  
Homotopy Type ◽  
Type Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
De Re ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Homotopy Type Theory ◽  
De Dicto

Modal logic flourished throughout the twentieth century. Kripke provided a semantics in terms of possible world recognized by mathematicians to be an example of varying sets. This allows a formulation in terms of monads generated by adjunctions. Modal homotopy type theory adds the radical idea that modalities apply to all types, not just propositions, so as to make sense of possible steps and necessary ingredients. The proximity is shown between the structures discovered by modal logicians and common ideas in mathematics of stability under variation. We can then reformulate many ideas in current philosophical metaphysical uses of modal logic, such as rigid designators, counterparts, the de re/de dicto distinction, and so on. Worlds are understood as extended contexts, allowing a formulation of counterfactuals. A form of temporal logic is also easily generated in the same vein.

Necessary Properties And Linnaean Essentialism

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berent Enç
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Subjunctive Conditionals ◽  
De Re ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
De Dicto

Quine's arguments against the attribution of essential properties de re to individuals have been the motivation for attempts at reinstating essentialism as a respectable metaphysical thesis and at defending the coherence of modal logic in general.I shall argue here along somewhat different lines, that the particular version of essentialism Quine objects to is in fact untenable but that this conclusion is far from entailing a commitment to some version of conventionalism, and in particular that it does not entail the view that the only kind of necessity that is coherent is de dicto necessity.In what follows, I shall assume, without arguing for it, that de re essentialism and subjunctive conditionals are intimately related, and in particular, that any version of de re essentialism which conflicts with our basic intuitions about subjunctive conditionals is untenable.

Epistemic logic

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaakko Hintikka ◽  
Ilpo Halonen
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Deductive System ◽  
De Re ◽  
Modern Treatment ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
Objects Of Knowledge

Modern treatment of epistemic logic began in the 1950s when some philosophers noticed (as scholastics had done before them) certain regularities in the logical behaviour of the concept of knowledge (for example, that knowing a conjunction is equivalent to knowing all its conjuncts) and began to systematize them. Initially these regularities were presented in the form of an axiomatic-deductive system, as in other branches of logic. Later, questions began to be asked concerning the model theory on which such an ‘epistemic logic’ is based. Still later, the concrete interpretation of this model theory has become an issue. In this way, gradually a bridge has begun to be forged from purely logical questions to such central epistemological questions as those concerning the objects of knowledge, different kinds (or even senses) of knowledge (and their interrelations), the intensional character of knowledge, the de dicto versus de re distinction, and so on.

scholarly journals Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Field
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
De Re ◽  
Moral Appraisal ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
The Right

AbstractDe Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content of the reasons an agent is responsive to (de re or de dicto), but rather whether she is responsive to the reasons it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive to, irrespective of their content. I argue that this account does a better job of dealing with neuroatypical agents, while agreeing with the De Re Significance accounts on more ordinary cases.

scholarly journals De Re MEDIJI : POLITIKA MEDIJA

2019 ◽  
pp. 9-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Misko Suvakovic
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
De Dicto

Namera mi je da dijagramski postavim jednu moguću potencijalnu teoriju De-Re medija lociranu u savremenosti globalnih ekoloških, ekonomskih, ratnih i, svakako, klasnih kriza. Razmatrana je piosebna situacija transformacije slike sveta u događaj sveta, drugim rečima, načinjen je obrt od prikazivanja sveta do izvođenja sveta ili izvođenja u svetu. Postavljena je rasprava o sredstvima medijskog rada, proizvodnje i delovanja, tj. o instrumentima i njihovim konstruktivnim funkcijama. Analiziran je kontekst medijskog rada, proizvodnje i delovanja posredstvom modela dispozitiva/aparatusa. Reinterpretirana je iz agrarne nauke i ratne terminologije teorija rojeva te primenjna na novi pojam medijuma/medija. Preuzeta je i primenjena tradicionalna i moderna rasprava razlike De Dicto i De Re sudova. Postavljena je teorija De Re medija u odnosu na koncepte medijuma i medija, postmedijuma i postmedija, digitalnih i postdigitalnih medija.

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