Necessary Properties And Linnaean Essentialism

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berent Enç
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Subjunctive Conditionals ◽  
De Re ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
De Dicto

Quine's arguments against the attribution of essential properties de re to individuals have been the motivation for attempts at reinstating essentialism as a respectable metaphysical thesis and at defending the coherence of modal logic in general.I shall argue here along somewhat different lines, that the particular version of essentialism Quine objects to is in fact untenable but that this conclusion is far from entailing a commitment to some version of conventionalism, and in particular that it does not entail the view that the only kind of necessity that is coherent is de dicto necessity.In what follows, I shall assume, without arguing for it, that de re essentialism and subjunctive conditionals are intimately related, and in particular, that any version of de re essentialism which conflicts with our basic intuitions about subjunctive conditionals is untenable.

Modal Types

2020 ◽  
pp. 107-138
Author(s):  
David Corfield
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Modal Logic ◽  
Temporal Logic ◽  
Homotopy Type ◽  
Type Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
De Re ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Homotopy Type Theory ◽  
De Dicto

Modal logic flourished throughout the twentieth century. Kripke provided a semantics in terms of possible world recognized by mathematicians to be an example of varying sets. This allows a formulation in terms of monads generated by adjunctions. Modal homotopy type theory adds the radical idea that modalities apply to all types, not just propositions, so as to make sense of possible steps and necessary ingredients. The proximity is shown between the structures discovered by modal logicians and common ideas in mathematics of stability under variation. We can then reformulate many ideas in current philosophical metaphysical uses of modal logic, such as rigid designators, counterparts, the de re/de dicto distinction, and so on. Worlds are understood as extended contexts, allowing a formulation of counterfactuals. A form of temporal logic is also easily generated in the same vein.

scholarly journals Counterparts, Essences and Quantified Modal Logic

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Tomasz Bigaj
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Quantified Modal Logic ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
De Re ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Sufficiency Condition ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
Natural Modification ◽  
Translation Scheme

It is commonplace to formalize propositions involving essential properties of objects in a language containing modal operators and quantifiers. Assuming David Lewis’s counterpart theory as a semantic framework for quantified modal logic, I will show that certain statements discussed in the metaphysics of modality de re, such as the sufficiency condition for essential properties, cannot be faithfully formalized. A natural modification of Lewis’s translation scheme seems to be an obvious solution but is not acceptable for various reasons. Consequently, the only safe way to express some intuitions regarding essential properties is to use directly the language of counterpart theory without modal operators.

scholarly journals Theological Compatibilism and Essential Properties

2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Ciprotti
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
De Re ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
Individual Entity ◽  
De Dicto

Alvin Plantinga defends Theological Compatibilism (TC) and Essentialism about property possession (E). TC is the claim that human freedom to act otherwise and God's essential omniscience are compatible, while E is the claim that every individual entity whatsoever has a modal profile consisting in having both essential and accidental properties. I purport to show that, if E is assumed in the argument for TC, then the latter leads to a very puzzling upshot. I also intend to show that, even if TC is suitably fixed in order to avoid that upshot, TC is still unconvincing in that it merges into one the de re and the de dicto rendering of 'human freedom to act otherwise'; I end up by briefly sketching why the two renderings should instead be kept well apart.

scholarly journals Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Field
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
De Re ◽  
Moral Appraisal ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
The Right

AbstractDe Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content of the reasons an agent is responsive to (de re or de dicto), but rather whether she is responsive to the reasons it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive to, irrespective of their content. I argue that this account does a better job of dealing with neuroatypical agents, while agreeing with the De Re Significance accounts on more ordinary cases.

scholarly journals De Re MEDIJI : POLITIKA MEDIJA

2019 ◽  
pp. 9-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Misko Suvakovic
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
De Dicto

Namera mi je da dijagramski postavim jednu moguću potencijalnu teoriju De-Re medija lociranu u savremenosti globalnih ekoloških, ekonomskih, ratnih i, svakako, klasnih kriza. Razmatrana je piosebna situacija transformacije slike sveta u događaj sveta, drugim rečima, načinjen je obrt od prikazivanja sveta do izvođenja sveta ili izvođenja u svetu. Postavljena je rasprava o sredstvima medijskog rada, proizvodnje i delovanja, tj. o instrumentima i njihovim konstruktivnim funkcijama. Analiziran je kontekst medijskog rada, proizvodnje i delovanja posredstvom modela dispozitiva/aparatusa. Reinterpretirana je iz agrarne nauke i ratne terminologije teorija rojeva te primenjna na novi pojam medijuma/medija. Preuzeta je i primenjena tradicionalna i moderna rasprava razlike De Dicto i De Re sudova. Postavljena je teorija De Re medija u odnosu na koncepte medijuma i medija, postmedijuma i postmedija, digitalnih i postdigitalnih medija.

Metaphysics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McGinn
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
De Dicto

This chapter explores philosophical issues in metaphysics. It begins by distinguishing between de re and de dicto necessity. All necessity is uniformly de re; there is simply no such thing as de dicto necessity. Indeed, in the glory days of positivism, all necessity was understood as uniformly the same: a necessary truth was always an a priori truth, while contingent truths were always a posteriori. The chapter then assesses the concept of antirealism. Antirealism is always an error theory: there is some sort of mistake or distortion or sloppiness embedded in the usual discourse. The chapter also considers paradoxes, causation, conceptual analysis, scientific mysteries, the possible worlds theory of modality, the concept of a person, the nature of existence, and logic and propositions.

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