Rational belief change, popper functions and counterfactuals

Abstract Rational belief-change policies are encoded in the so-called AGM revision functions, defined in the prominent work of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson. The present article studies an interesting class of well-behaved AGM revision functions, called herein uniform-revision operators (or UR operators, for short). Each UR operator is uniquely defined by means of a single total preorder over all possible worlds, a fact that in turn entails a significantly lower representational cost, relative to an arbitrary AGM revision function, and an embedded solution to the iterated-revision problem, at no extra representational cost. Herein, we first demonstrate how weaker, more expressive—yet, more representationally expensive—types of uniform revision can be defined. Furthermore, we prove that UR operators, essentially, generalize a significant type of belief change, namely, parametrized-difference revision. Lastly, we show that they are (to some extent) relevance-sensitive, as well as that they respect the so-called principle of kinetic consistency.

An Epistemological Study of Theory Change

Bulletin of the Section of Logic ◽

10.18778/0138-0680.2021.26 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Theofanis Aravanis

Keyword(s):

Belief Revision ◽

Belief Change ◽

Theory Change ◽

Rational Belief ◽

Dominant Model ◽

Traditional Philosophy ◽

New Information ◽

Formal Framework ◽

The Face ◽

Main Shortcoming

Belief Revision is a well-established field of research that deals with how agents rationally change their minds in the face of new information. The milestone of Belief Revision is a general and versatile formal framework introduced by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, known as the AGM paradigm, which has been, to this date, the dominant model within the field. A main shortcoming of the AGM paradigm, as originally proposed, is its lack of any guidelines for relevant change. To remedy this weakness, Parikh proposed a relevance-sensitive axiom, which applies on splittable theories; i.e., theories that can be divided into syntax-disjoint compartments. The aim of this article is to provide an epistemological interpretation of the dynamics (revision) of splittable theories, from the perspective of Kuhn's inuential work on the evolution of scientific knowledge, through the consideration of principal belief-change scenarios. The whole study establishes a conceptual bridge between rational belief revision and traditional philosophy of science, which sheds light on the application of formal epistemological tools on the dynamics of knowledge.

Self-belief change and self-concept clarity

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e527772014-635 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Andrew Hertel

Keyword(s):

Belief Change ◽

Self Concept

Keynes’s Logical, Objective, Relation of Probability, P(a/H)=α, Where α Is a Degree of Rational Belief, Has Nothing to Do With Truth: Both Orthodox and Heterodox Economists Fail to Realize That There Is No Such Thing as a True Probability, True Expectation, Or True Expected Value

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3449906 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Michael Emmett Brady

Keyword(s):

Expected Value ◽

Rational Belief ◽

True Probability

On the Impossibility That Any Academic Will Ever Understand Keynes’s 1931 Assessment of Ramsey’s Work in Probability, When Compared to His Own, Until Part II of the A Treatise on Probabilit y(1921) Has Been Read: Ramsey’s Subjective Theory of Probability (Precise, Exact, Numerical, Linear, Additive, Degree of Belief) Is a Special Case of Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability (Imprecise, Inexact, Non Numerical, Nonlinear, Non Additive, Degree of Rational Belief)

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3634436 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Michael Emmett Brady

Keyword(s):

Rational Belief ◽

Logical Theory ◽

Degree Of Belief ◽

Subjective Theory ◽

Special Case

J M Keynes’s 1931 Comment, “…I Yield to Ramsey, I Think He Is Right” Refers to Ramsey’s Work on Precise Probability and Degrees of Belief, Not to Imprecise Probability and Degrees of Rational Belief: 20th and 21st Century Philosophers and Economists Simply Are Ignorant About Keynes’s Imprecise Theory of Probability Contained in Part II of the A Treatise on Probability

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3719147 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Michael Emmett Brady

Keyword(s):

21St Century ◽

Rational Belief ◽

Imprecise Probability ◽

Degrees Of Belief

Conclusion

10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0011 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Ralph Wedgwood

Keyword(s):

Rational Choice ◽

Mental State ◽

Rational Belief ◽

True Proposition ◽

The Other ◽

Relevant Notion

It is explained how the conception of rationality proposed earlier in this book can set the agenda for the study of rational belief and rational choice. Part of the task will be to investigate the kind of ‘rational probability’ that was introduced in Chapter 9; the other part will be to study the conditions under which each kind of mental state counts as ‘correct’. There are reasons for thinking that the relevant notion of correctness must be such that in the case of belief, a correct belief is a belief in a true proposition, and in the case of choice, it is ‘akratic’ to choose something if one is fully confident that it is not correct to choose it. It is explained what light this approach could shed on the traditional issues about rational belief and rational choice.

Is Rationality Normative?

10.1093/oso/9780198802693.003.0002 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Ralph Wedgwood

Keyword(s):

Rational Choice ◽

Rational Belief ◽

False Beliefs ◽

Ought Implies Can ◽

Normative Concept ◽

Original Meaning ◽

Formal Theories

In its original meaning, the word ‘rational’ referred to the faculty of reason—the capacity for reasoning. It is undeniable that the word later came also to express a normative concept—the concept of the proper use of this faculty. Does it express a normative concept when it is used in formal theories of rational belief or rational choice? Reasons are given for concluding that it does express a normative concept in these contexts. But this conclusion seems to imply that we ought always to think rationally. Four objections can be raised. (1) What about cases where thinking rationally has disastrous consequences? (2) What about cases where we have rational false beliefs about what we ought to do? (3) ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’—but is it true that we can always think rationally? (4) Rationality requires nothing more than coherence—but why does coherence matter?

On Identifying the Problem of Evil and the Possibility of Its Theist Solution

10.1093/oso/9780198821625.003.0003 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

John Bishop

Keyword(s):

Problem Of Evil ◽

Rational Belief ◽

Alternative Conception ◽

Viable Alternative ◽

Cognitive Level ◽

The Problem Of Evil ◽

The Face ◽

Argument From Evil ◽

Existential Problem ◽

Foundational Problem

The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human fulfilment. Dealing with this problem at the cognitive level involves commitment to a view of reality as favourable to practical commitment to ethical ideals. An intellectual problem of evil then arises to the extent that it seems that the fact of evil is evidence against the truth of the salvific worldview we are inclined to adopt for dealing with it. In relation to theism’s ‘revelatory’ worldview, this intellectual problem is expressible as an Argument from Evil. A ‘normatively relativized’ version of the Argument from Evil is proposed that seeks to exclude rational belief in the ‘personal omniGod’. As a viable alternative conception of God is possible, however, the Argument fails to justify outright atheism.