What is Structure? Why Care about It?

This chapter explains the notion of structure that will be the focus of the book and illustrates it by means of examples drawn from mathematics and physics. The discussion begins with a simple example of the structure of the Euclidean plane, and goes on to explain how similar ideas apply to physical theories such as Newtonian physics and special relativity. Taken together, the examples illustrate that this notion is implicit in many aspects of our theorizing in physics and mathematics. The chapter also discusses the idea of allowable coordinate systems and reference frames; contrasts the relevant notion of structure with other related notions, including invariance, symmetry, and objectivity; and explains how to compare different types and amounts of structure.

Knowledge is closed under analytic content

I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p, then S knows that q. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox.

Non-Native English Speaker Teacher Narration of Nativism

The 21st century ELT world is trying to migrate into the more relevant notion of international English. This notion, supposedly, supports every English speaker of a different nation, background, and culture. However, the public preference in native speaker is still apparent. This study is aimed to explore one non-native English speaker teacher’s experiences in teaching English along with a native English speaker teacher. This study employed narrative inquiry, the data gathered by interviews, and document analysis. The non-native English speaker teacher experiences several discriminations in the form of job division, job requirements, and even the wage difference. The public preference for native English speaker teachers is still apparent, looking at the growth of schools with native-speaker teachers.

Exploring the Utility of a Global Coaching Framework: Sociocultural Perspectives From Japanese Secondary School Rugby Coaches

Having investigated the history of rugby over the last century in Japan, a study reported that, historically, rugby participation has been underpinned by the quest to develop young males’ character. The traditional Japanese view of rugby as a medium for education and dominant cultural values has also been considered to be a contrasting view to the Westernised professional perspectives of rugby as a form of entertainment. With a focus on the role of rugby in the school-based club experience, this article presents hermeneutic interpretations of conversations held with four Japanese secondary school rugby coaches and four players, and it explores the socioculturally relevant notion of kimochi (気持ち; feeling/attitude/vitality) in players’ corporeal experiences. Furthermore, the ways in which kimochi is described by the coaches as a means to cultivate kokoro (mind/heart/spirit) and prepare players for adult life are investigated. The extent to which this idea emerged from the participants’ comments is offered as an important consideration for the International Coach Development Framework and the International Sport Coaching Framework, and we posit that the exploration of inherent sociocultural discourses must be carefully contemplated if the future conceptualisation, interpretation and utility of such frameworks is to be enduring.

Scheler’s Reflections on “What is Good?”

In Max Scheler’s non-formal ethics of value, “good” is a value but by no means a “non-moral value”; rather, it is a second-order “moral value,” always appearing in the realization of first-order non-moral values. According to the relevant notion of the a priori of phenomenology, whilst all the non-moral values are given in “value cognition,” the moral value of good is self-given in “moral cognition”. The reflections and answers offered by Scheler’s non-formal ethics of value on “What is good?” constitute the foundation of a phenomenological “meta-ethics”.

Shifted Poisson Structures on Differentiable Stacks

The purpose of this paper is to investigate $(+1)$-shifted Poisson structures in the context of differential geometry. The relevant notion is that of $(+1)$-shifted Poisson structures on differentiable stacks. More precisely, we develop the notion of the Morita equivalence of quasi-Poisson groupoids. Thus, isomorphism classes of $(+1)$-shifted Poisson stacks correspond to Morita equivalence classes of quasi-Poisson groupoids. In the process, we carry out the following program, which is of independent interest: (1) We introduce a ${\mathbb{Z}}$-graded Lie 2-algebra of polyvector fields on a given Lie groupoid and prove that its homotopy equivalence class is invariant under the Morita equivalence of Lie groupoids, and thus they can be considered to be polyvector fields on the corresponding differentiable stack ${\mathfrak{X}}$. It turns out that $(+1)$-shifted Poisson structures on ${\mathfrak{X}}$ correspond exactly to elements of the Maurer–Cartan moduli set of the corresponding dgla. (2) We introduce the notion of the tangent complex $T_{\mathfrak{X}}$ and the cotangent complex $L_{\mathfrak{X}}$ of a differentiable stack ${\mathfrak{X}}$ in terms of any Lie groupoid $\Gamma{\rightrightarrows } M$ representing ${\mathfrak{X}}$. They correspond to a homotopy class of 2-term homotopy $\Gamma$-modules $A[1]\rightarrow TM$ and $T^{\vee } M\rightarrow A^{\vee }[-1]$, respectively. Relying on the tools of theory of VB-groupoids including homotopy and Morita equivalence of VB-groupoids, we prove that a $(+1)$-shifted Poisson structure on a differentiable stack ${\mathfrak{X}}$ defines a morphism ${L_{\mathfrak{X}}}[1]\to{T_{\mathfrak{X}}}$.

Plantinga on warrant and acceptability of Christian Belief

Alvin Plantinga wants to answer the following question: Is Christian belief intellectualy or rationaly acceptable? We will present the answer John Locke gives, based on his evidentialism, to the aforementioned question, as well as Plantinga?s critique of Locke?s evidentialist approach. Plantinga thinks that the question ?Is Christian belief intellectualy or rationaly acceptable?? is best understood as meaning ?Is Christian belief warranted??. We will analyze Plantinga?s argument for the claim that Christian belief probably has warrant if it is true, which implies that we first have to show that Christian belief (probably) is false in order to show that it (probably) has no warrant. But than that means that we have to show that Christian belief is false in order to show that it is unacceptable, making it very hard, if not impossible, to show that Christian belief is unacceptable. We will then present one objection to Plantinga?s argument, ?the Great Pumpkin Objection?. Relying on Linda Zagzebski?s analysis, we will claim that the Great Pupmpkin objection shows that Plantinga?s notion of ?warrant? does not adequately capture the meaning of the relevant notion of ?intellectual or rational acceptability? of beliefs, and that, hence, his conclusion about warrant of Christian belief are not necessary relevant for the claims about intellectual or rational acceptability of Christian belief. We will also analyze a solution given by Kyle Scott. He thinks that if we have, in addition to Plantinga?s argument showing that Christian belief is warranted if true, favouring evidence in support of Christian belief, which he thinks we obviously have, than Christian belief is acceptable. We will point out that Scott does not elaborate what makes adequate favouring evidence in support of some belief, and we will calim that adequate understanding of favouring evidence will, in some respects, be very similar to Locke?s evidentialism. If so, than Scott proposal will reintroduce some elements of Locke?s evidentialism, and the question of whether there is favouring evidence in support of Christian belief will not have an obvious and easy answer.

Trust and Distrust

This chapter introduces the philosophical study of trust, and explains the distinction between trust and reliance. It argues for an analogous distinction between distrust and non-reliance. Keeping distrust in focus highlights problems with existing accounts of trust, most especially those accounts according to which trust involves imputing a certain kind of motive to the trusted person. A new view of both trust and distrust is introduced, according to which both of these attitudes involve attribution of a commitment to the (dis)trusted person. The relevant notion of commitment is explicated, though it is not explicitly defined, and some initial advantages of the commitment account are explored. The account permits a sensible understanding of what makes trust appropriate or inappropriate, likewise for distrust; sometimes neither attitude is appropriate. The account also helps explain what betrayal is, and conversely what trustworthiness might be. The chapter ends by discussing the scope of this project, and previewing some later discussions.

Spatial information extraction from travel narratives: Analysing the notion of co-occurrence indicating closeness of tourist places

Recent advancements in social media have generated a myriad of unstructured geospatial data. Travel narratives are among the richest sources of such spatial clues. They are also a reflection of writers’ interaction with places. One of the prevalent ways to model this interaction is a points of interest (POIs) graph depicting popular POIs and routes. A relevant notion is that frequent pairwise occurrences of POIs indicate their geographic proximity. This work presents an empirical interpretation of this theory and constructs spatially enriched POI graphs, a clear augmentation to popularity-based POI graphs. A triplet pattern, rule-based spatial relation extraction technique SpatRE is proposed and compared with standard relation extraction systems Ollie and Stanford OpenIE. A travel blogs data set is also contributed containing labelled spatial relations. The performance is further evaluated on SemEval 2013 benchmark data sets. Finally, spatially enriched POI graphs are qualitatively compared with TripAdvisor and Google Maps to visualise information accuracy.

News Ecology and News Ecosystems

“News ecology” and “news ecosystems” are two terms often used in journalism studies. They are, however, different concepts that draw from different lines of research and are used by different groups of scholars rarely connected to one another. The notion of “news ecology” stems from media ecology, a branch of media theory that aims at understanding the effects that mediated technologies have on communication and social interactions. Media ecology has challenged traditional media research by focusing on how communicative technologies impact media consumption on a daily basis. Specifically it argues that communicative technologies encompass a set of implicit rules that affect how humans see, understand, and think about the contents that are being mediated. Building on these principles, “news ecology” is a relevant notion to reflect on how citizens get acquainted with the news as well as the diversity of technologies involved in news use. The notion aims at capturing the fact that news products exist in a diversity of formats, are consumed in diverse manners, and take place on different sites and platforms. Out of all the economic, social and technological changes of the last decades, the popularization of the Internet is often seen as the keystone of this change. However, most recent reception studies mention the terms “news ecology” without relating it to media ecology. The use of the “news ecosystem” metaphor in journalism studies is more recent and focuses on the diversity of actors involved in news production and diffusion. If some scholars use a restricted definition of ecosystems (i.e., the ecosystems of blogs, websites, or social networking sites), others give it a more organic and composite meaning (i.e., the ecosystems of actors, technologies, and contents produced in a specific area or regarding a specific topic). Using the first definition, one can analyze the configuration of news ecosystems online, the diversity of actors involved in news production and their relationships, as well as how news circulates through diverse technologies. Using the second definition forces researchers to consider news as a complex social practice in which a diversity of actors competes to influence the news narrative through mediated and unmediated practices. The two research traditions rarely intersect, as media and news ecology focus more on the reception side of news (i.e., the impact of mediums on people) and the study of news ecosystems has so far paid more attention to the production and diffusion of news. However, they share similarities—such as the facts that they both analyze media as dynamic processes are not normative in nature, or focus on complexity and change more than structure and stability—and could inspire one another in an effort to break the production/reception dichotomy in journalism studies.