scholarly journals An Epistemological Study of Theory Change

Author(s):  
Theofanis Aravanis

Belief Revision is a well-established field of research that deals with how agents rationally change their minds in the face of new information. The milestone of Belief Revision is a general and versatile formal framework introduced by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, known as the AGM paradigm, which has been, to this date, the dominant model within the field. A main shortcoming of the AGM paradigm, as originally proposed, is its lack of any guidelines for relevant change. To remedy this weakness, Parikh proposed a relevance-sensitive axiom, which applies on splittable theories; i.e., theories that can be divided into syntax-disjoint compartments. The aim of this article is to provide an epistemological interpretation of the dynamics (revision) of splittable theories, from the perspective of Kuhn's inuential work on the evolution of scientific knowledge, through the consideration of principal belief-change scenarios. The whole study establishes a conceptual bridge between rational belief revision and traditional philosophy of science, which sheds light on the application of formal epistemological tools on the dynamics of knowledge.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joe Roussos

The problem of awareness growth, also known as the problem of new hypotheses, is a persistent challenge to Bayesian theories of rational belief and decision making. Cases of awareness growth include coming to consider a completely new possibility (called expansion), or coming to consider finer distinctions through the introduction of a new partition (called refinement). Recent work has centred on Reverse Bayesianism, a proposal for rational awareness growth due to Karni and Vierø. This essay develops a "Reserve Bayesian" position and defends it against two challenges. The first, due to Anna Mahtani, says that Reverse Bayesian approaches yield the wrong result in cases where the growth of awareness constitutes an expansion relative to one partition, but a refinement relative to a different partition. The second, due to Steele and Stefánsson, says that Reverse Bayesian approaches cannot deal with new propositions that are evidentially relevant to old propositions. I argue that these challenges confuse questions of belief revision with questions of awareness change. Mahtani’s cases reveal that the change of awareness itself requires a model which specifies how propositions in the agent’s old algebra are identified with propositions in the new algebra. I introduce a lattice-theoretic model for this purpose, which resolves Mahtani’s problem cases and some of Steele and Stefánsson’s cases. Applying my model of awareness change, then Reverse Bayesianism, and then a generalised belief revision procedure, resolves Steele and Stefánsson’s remaining cases. In demonstrating this, I introduce a simple and general model of belief revision in the face of new information about previously unknown propositions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (7) ◽  
pp. 1357-1376
Author(s):  
Theofanis Aravanis

Abstract Rational belief-change policies are encoded in the so-called AGM revision functions, defined in the prominent work of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson. The present article studies an interesting class of well-behaved AGM revision functions, called herein uniform-revision operators (or UR operators, for short). Each UR operator is uniquely defined by means of a single total preorder over all possible worlds, a fact that in turn entails a significantly lower representational cost, relative to an arbitrary AGM revision function, and an embedded solution to the iterated-revision problem, at no extra representational cost. Herein, we first demonstrate how weaker, more expressive—yet, more representationally expensive—types of uniform revision can be defined. Furthermore, we prove that UR operators, essentially, generalize a significant type of belief change, namely, parametrized-difference revision. Lastly, we show that they are (to some extent) relevance-sensitive, as well as that they respect the so-called principle of kinetic consistency.


Author(s):  
Safia Laaziz ◽  
Younes Zeboudj ◽  
Salem Benferhat ◽  
Faiza Haned Khellaf

The problem of belief change is considered as a major issue in managing the dynamics of an information system. It consists in modifying an uncertainty distribution, representing agents’ beliefs, in the light of a new information. In this paper, we focus on the so-called multiple iterated belief revision or C-revision, proposed for conditioning or revising uncertain distributions under uncertain inputs. Uncertainty distributions are represented in terms of ordinal conditional functions. We will use prioritized or weighted knowledge bases as a compact representation of uncertainty distributions. The input information leading to a revision of an uncertainty distribution is also represented by a set of consistent weighted formulas. This paper shows that C-revision, defined at a semantic level using ordinal conditional functions, has a very natural representation using weighted knowledge bases. We propose simple syntactic methods for revising weighted knowledge bases, that are semantically meaningful in the frameworks of possibility theory and ordinal conditional functions. In particular, we show that the space complexity of the proposed syntactic C-revision is linear with respect to the size of initial weighted knowledge bases.


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 85-108
Author(s):  
Theofanis Aravanis ◽  
Pavlos Peppas ◽  
Mary-Anne Williams

The AGM paradigm for belief change, as originally introduced by Alchourron, Gärdenfors and Makinson, lacks any guidelines for the process of iterated revision. One of the most influential work addressing this problem is Darwiche and Pearl's approach (DP approach, for short), which, despite its well-documented shortcomings, remains to this date the most dominant. In this article, we make further observations on the DP approach. In particular, we prove that the DP postulates are, in a strong sense, inconsistent with Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom (P), extending previous initial conflicts. Immediate consequences of this result are that an entire class of intuitive revision operators, which includes Dalal's operator, violates the DP postulates, as well as that the Independence postulate and Spohn's conditionalization are inconsistent with axiom (P). The whole study, essentially, indicates that two fundamental aspects of the revision process, namely, iteration and relevance, are in deep conflict, and opens the discussion for a potential reconciliation towards a comprehensive formal framework for knowledge dynamics.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
KRISTER SEGERBERG

The success of the AGM paradigm—the theory of belief change initiated by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson—is remarkable, as even a quick look at the literature it has generated will testify. But it is also remarkable, at least in hindsight, how limited was the original effort. For example, the theory concerns the beliefs of just one agent; all incoming information is accepted; belief change is uniquely determined by the new information; there is no provision for nested beliefs. And perhaps most surprising: there is no analysis of iterated change.In this paper it is that last restriction that is at issue. Our medium of study is dynamic doxastic logic (DDL). The success of the AGM paradigm The particular contribution of the paper is detailed completeness proofs for three dynamic doxastic logics of iterated belief revision.The problem of extending the AGM paradigm to include iterated change has been discussed for years, but systematic discussions have appeared only recently (see Segerberg, 2007 and forthcoming, but also van Benthem, 2007; Rott, 2006; Zvesper, 2007).


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Bonawitz ◽  
Patrick Shafto ◽  
Yue Yu ◽  
Sophie Elizabeth Colby Bridgers ◽  
Aaron Gonzalez

Burgeoning evidence suggests that when children observe data, they use knowledge of the demonstrator’s intent to augment learning. We propose that the effects of social learning may go beyond cases where children observe data, to cases where they receive no new information at all. We present a model of how simply asking a question a second time may lead to belief revision, when the questioner is expected to know the correct answer. We provide an analysis of the CHILDES corpus to show that these neutral follow-up questions are used in parent-child conversations. We then present three experiments investigating 4- and 5-year-old children’s reactions to neutral follow-up questions posed by ignorant or knowledgeable questioners. Children were more likely to change their answers in response to a neutral follow-up question from a knowledgeable questioner than an ignorant one. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of common practices in legal, educational, and experimental psychological settings.


Author(s):  
John Bishop

The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human fulfilment. Dealing with this problem at the cognitive level involves commitment to a view of reality as favourable to practical commitment to ethical ideals. An intellectual problem of evil then arises to the extent that it seems that the fact of evil is evidence against the truth of the salvific worldview we are inclined to adopt for dealing with it. In relation to theism’s ‘revelatory’ worldview, this intellectual problem is expressible as an Argument from Evil. A ‘normatively relativized’ version of the Argument from Evil is proposed that seeks to exclude rational belief in the ‘personal omniGod’. As a viable alternative conception of God is possible, however, the Argument fails to justify outright atheism.


Author(s):  
LAURENT PERRUSSEL ◽  
JEAN-MARC THÉVENIN

This paper focuses on the features of belief change in a multi-agent context where agents consider beliefs and disbeliefs. Disbeliefs represent explicit ignorance and are useful to prevent agents to entail conclusions due to their ignorance. Agents receive messages holding information from other agents and change their belief state accordingly. An agent may refuse to adopt incoming information if it prefers its own (dis)beliefs. For this, each agent maintains a preference relation over its own beliefs and disbeliefs in order to decide if it accepts or rejects incoming information whenever inconsistencies occur. This preference relation may be built by considering several criteria such as the reliability of the sender of statements or temporal aspects. This process leads to non-prioritized belief revision. In this context we first present the * and − operators which allow an agent to revise, respectively contract, its belief state in a non-prioritized way when it receives an incoming belief, respectively disbelief. We show that these operators behave properly. Based on this we then illustrate how the receiver and the sender may argue when the incoming (dis)belief is refused. We describe pieces of dialog where (i) the sender tries to convince the receiver by sending arguments in favor of the original (dis)belief and (ii) the receiver justifies its refusal by sending arguments against the original (dis)belief. We show that the notion of acceptability of these arguments can be represented in a simple way by using the non-prioritized change operators * and −. The advantage of argumentation dialogs is twofold. First whenever arguments are acceptable the sender or the receiver reconsider its belief state; the main result is an improvement of the reconsidered belief state. Second the sender may not be aware of some sets of rules which act as constraints to reach a specific conclusion and discover them through argumentation dialogs.


1999 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 117-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Friedman ◽  
J. Y. Halpern

The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we introduce a new framework to model belief change. This framework combines temporal and epistemic modalities with a notion of plausibility, allowing us to examine the change of beliefs over time. In this paper, we show how belief revision and belief update can be captured in our framework. This allows us to compare the assumptions made by each method, and to better understand the principles underlying them. In particular, it shows that Katsuno and Mendelzon's notion of belief update (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a) depends on several strong assumptions that may limit its applicability in artificial intelligence. Finally, our analysis allow us to identify a notion of minimal change that underlies a broad range of belief change operations including revision and update.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jhenifer Santos ◽  
Luciano Wolff ◽  
Lucíola Baldan ◽  
Ana Guimarães

Background Iguaçu National Park (INP) is known worldwide due to Iguaçu Waterfalls, being considered a World Natural Heritage by UNESCO. The INP is one of the last large forested extensions of inland Brazil that provides protection to the Atlantic Forest, one of the world’s biodiversity hotspots. However, its Natural Heritage status has been threatened by the construction and operation of the Baixo Iguaçu dam, agricultural and urban impacts on its boundaries and the increasing interest of the Brazilian government in re-opening of the “Colono road”, an old illegal road that crossed the interior of the park. Indeed, since benthic macroinvertebrates have been widely used for the environmental assessment of streams, records and abundance of their taxa under different seasonal periods may provide an additional dataset for biomonitoring of hydrographic systems in the face of current anthropogenic impacts on the INP boundaries and other similar streams on forest edges. New information In this study, we improved the sampling design of benthic macroinvertebrates and provided seasonal records covering distinct precipitation/temperature periods between 2016 and 2017 of a stream on the eastern edge of the Iguaçu National Park, Brazil. The records total 2,840 individuals distributed in 88 different taxa. The most abundant taxa were the Diptera subfamilies, Chironominae (n = 1,487) and Tanypodinae (n = 256), besides the Heterelmis genus (n = 152, Elmidae; Coleoptera). Diptera was the richest order in number of families (n = 8), while Leptophlebiidae (Ephemeroptera) was the richest taxonomic family in number of genera (n = 11). Aegla (Crustacea) and the Insecta genera, Heterelmis, Hexacylloepus, Noelmis, Phylloicus and Thraulodes, were recorded through all samplings. Twenty-five genera of Ephemeroptera, Plecoptera, Trichoptera (EPT) and Odonata were recorded during intermediate precipitation/temperature periods. Twenty-one of them were recorded in May 2016, with five genera standing out in abundance (Hydrosmilodon, Anacroneuria, Argia, Coryphaeschna, Americabaetis) and four (Needhamella, Tikuna, Simothraulopsis, Neocordulia) in December 2016. Four general taxa were exclusive of the lower precipitation/temperature period (August 2016), standing out in abundance were the Oxystigma (Odonata) and Corydalus (Megaloptera) genera. In March 2017 (higher precipitation/temperature period), four exclusive taxa were recorded, amongst them, the Chimarra (Trichoptera) genus. Furthermore, seasonal records demonstrated higher occurrences and abundance of macroinvertebrates during the intermediate and lower precipitation/temperature periods, besides a varied taxa composition throughout the year, with the presence of both sensitive and tolerant groups to environmental impacts. Our findings suggest that the number and composition of the local-stream macrobenthic fauna were influenced by the seasonal climatic regime. These changes should be considered in the limnological monitoring developed on the hydrographic systems of INP eastern edges to improve the assessment of environmental quality under different local seasonal conditions.


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