The metaethical dilemma of epistemic democracy

Epistemic democracy aims to show, often by appeal to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, that democracy has a high chance of reaching correct decisions. It has been argued that epistemic democracy is compatible with various metaethical accounts, such as moral realism, conventionalism and majoritarianism. This paper casts doubt on that thesis and reveals the following metaethical dilemma: if we adopt moral realism, it is doubtful that voters are, on average, more than 0.5 likely to track moral facts and identify the correct alternative. By contrast, if we adopt conventionalism or majoritarianism, we cannot expect that voters are both competent and sincere. Either way, the conditions for the application of Condorcet’s theorem are not met.

A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Large Poisson Elections with Multiple Alternatives

Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We also assume that this is a Poisson voting game with population uncertainty. The question is whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently so that the correct alternative is elected with probability tending to one when the number of voters tends to infinity. The previous literature shows that the CJT holds for large elections with two alternatives, but there is also an example of a large election with three alternatives that has an inefficient equilibrium. We show that there always exists an efficient equilibrium, independent of the number of alternatives. Under certain circumstances (informative types), it is unique in elections with two alternatives. The existence of inefficient equilibria in elections with more than two alternatives is generic.

CONHECIMENTO DOS ACADÊMICOS DE ENFERMAGEM SOBRE A TÉCNICA EM CATETERISMO VESICAL

The objective ofthis study was to identify nursing students' knowledge about long-term bladder catheterization. This is a descriptive, cross-sectional research with a quantitative approach. An instrument with multiple choice questions was applied to graduates of a university in the interior of São Paulo. The sample consisted of 81 students from the seventh term, most of them female, 20 to 30 years old, night students, singles, family income of 1 to 4 minimum salaries, no training and no experience in the area of nursing. The questions that presented the highest percentage of correct answers were the materials needed for the procedure (93.8%), a step that is not part of the end of the technique (87.7%) and part of the catheterization process (76.5%). It is concluded that most of the students have knowledge about the technique, since in most of the questions more than 50%of the group pointed out the correct alternative.

AVALIAÇÃO IN VITRO DO POTENCIAL ANTIOXIDANTE DOS EXTRATOS ETANÓLICOS DAS CASCAS DE Spondias dulcisForst F. ESpondias purpureaL

The objective of this study was to identify nursing students' knowledge about long-term bladder catheterization. This is a descriptive, cross-sectional research with a quantitative approach. An instrument with multiple choice questions was applied to graduates of a university in the interior of São Paulo. The sample consisted of 81 students from the seventh term, most of them female, 20 to 30 years old, night students, singles, family income of 1 to 4 minimum salaries, no training and no experience in the area of nursing. The questions that presented the highest percentage of correct answers were the materials needed for the procedure (93.8%), a step that is not part of the end of the technique (87.7%) and part of the catheterization process (76.5%). It is concluded that most of the students have knowledge about the technique, since in most of the questions more than 50% of the group pointed out the correct alternative.

The Classic Framework

In the classic setup of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, voters decide by majority vote between two different options. The Competence Assumption is that all voters are more likely than not to identify the correct alternative with the same probability. The Independence Assumption is that the votes are statistically independent. The Sincerity Assumption is that the voters always vote for the alternative they believe to be correct. Two results follow if these conditions are met. First, the Non-asymptotic Result says that the probability of a correct decision increases in group size. Second, the Asymptotic Result says that this probability converges to 1. We show that this convergence happens very quickly.