Liberal eugenics: In defence of human enhancement

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-115
Author(s):  
Peter Hobbins ◽  
Lynley Anderson ◽  
Nikki Cunningham ◽  
Mike Carnahan ◽  
Julie Park ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
David CHAI

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in English; abstract also in Chinese.是否有一種道家的基因增強倫理學?考慮到時間差異,道家思想能容納這樣一種提問嗎?就生命科技的持續進展而言,我們所面臨的存在論威脅是無比真實的。圍繞著自然與人造的爭論曾經牢固地樹立在神學家與哲學家的頭腦之中;然而最近在自由優生學的喧囂中上述爭論已然消失殆盡。這一運動激起了幾位傑出人士的反對,包括哲學家尤爾根.哈貝馬斯。他們反對的立足點就是基因操控抹煞了人性本質與人造物之間的差別。道家原則上贊同這一反對,但卻是出於不同的理由。本文將表明道家可以提供一種存在-宇宙論辯護——如莊子在關於疾病與畸形的故事中所表明的——以加強哈貝馬斯從社會-政治視角出發的對自由優生學的批評。雖然沒有直接提到自由優生學本身,但與哈貝馬斯一樣,這些故事表明人類生命的開端根本說來是超出人類控制的,而改變這一根基就意味著重塑自我與自由的涵義。What would a Daoist ethics of human enhancement look like? Can Daoism even entertain such a question given the temporal disparity? In light of the ongoing advancement of biotechnology, the ontological threat awaiting us is all too real. Indeed, the debate surrounding natural versus artificial has long been entrenched in the minds of theologians and philosophers alike; in recent years, however, it has been swept up in the commotion over liberal eugenics. This movement has prompted several prominent figures, such as the philosopher Jurgen Habermas, to interject on the grounds that genetic manipulation erases the distinction between the human and the manufactured. Daoism, in principle, would agree, but for different reasons. This paper shows how Daoism can contribute to Habermas’s social-political opposition to liberal eugenics by offering an onto-cosmological line of defense, as seen in the stories on illness and malformation in the Zhuangzi. While not referring to liberal eugenics per se, these stories argue, as does Habermas, that humans have a beginning to life that is ultimately beyond their control, and to alter this origin is to recast the meaning of selfhood and freedom.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 165 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.



Author(s):  
Qin WANG

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English only.Chai attempts to demonstrate how Zhuangzi can be used to supplement Habermas’s arguments against liberal eugenics. He argues that both Habermas and Zhuangzi would view liberal eugenics as falling on the wrong side of the natural/artificial divide. It is debatable whether his interpretation of Zhuangzi as both fatalist and epistemically modest suits this conclusion. In particular, it is doubtful that someone who is suspicious of whether humans can ever have knowledge of nature would be entitled to assert that liberal eugenics is unnatural. Even if this position is possible, it would be one that equally rejects Habermas. Habermas attempts to isolate genetic engineering from acceptable interventions in a person’s life. Daoism, to the extent that it rejects liberal eugenics, would equally view the latter kinds of interventions as misguided. Chai’s Daoist ethics of human enhancement, therefore, could hardly be used to supplement Habermas’s position.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 54 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.



2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 91-123
Author(s):  
Sung-Won Moon
Keyword(s):  




2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Thibaut Moulin

The emergence of new technologies might challenge our assumptions about biomedical research: medical progress may not only cure but enhance human capacities. In particular, the emergence of brain-machine interfaces will admittedly allow disabled people to move or communicate again, but also has various military applications, such as remote control of drones and avatars. Although there is no express legal framework pertaining to the experimental phase of human enhancement techniques, they are actually constrained by international law. According to international humanitarian law, civilians and prisoners of war may be subjected to experiments only when required by their state of health or for medical treatment. According to international human rights law, experimentations are permissible when they meet two conditions: (i) free consent, and (ii) proportionality (that is, the adequacy of risk and benefit). In light of these conditions, this article assesses the situations in which experimentation involving brain-computer interfaces would be lawful. It also gives specific attention to those experimentations carried out on members of the armed forces. In fact, owing to the military hierarchy and the unique nature of its mission (to protect national security at the risk of their own lives), it is necessary to determine how the military may comply with this legal framework.



2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 34-39
Author(s):  
Elena Grebenschikova ◽  
Keyword(s):  


Human Affairs ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-45
Author(s):  
Leandro Gaitán

Abstract In a future highly technological society it will be possible to modify the personality using different kinds of technological tools. Consequently, we could become buyers and consumers of personality. As such, personality, which is a core aspect of the self, could turn into a commodity. This article intends to address the following questions: 1) How can new technologies modify personality? 2) Why might personality become a commodity? 3) What is wrong with turning personality into commodity?



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