Absolute and relative support among citizen-voters for local law enforcement agencies: Correlates with selected dimensions of political ideology

1986 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-162
Author(s):  
Jesse C. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Law Enforcement Agencies ◽  
Local Law Enforcement ◽  
Local Law

Racializing Crimmigration

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amada Armenta
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Immigration Enforcement ◽  
Law Enforcement Agencies ◽  
Local Law Enforcement ◽  
Local Jail ◽  
Colorblind Ideology ◽  
Local Actors ◽  
Local Law

Deporting “criminal aliens” has become the highest priority in American immigration enforcement. Today, most deportations are achieved through the “crimmigration” system, a term that describes the convergence of the criminal justice and immigration enforcement systems. Emerging research argues that U.S. immigration enforcement is a “racial project” that subordinates and racializes Latino residents in the United States. This article examines the role of local law enforcement agencies in the racialization process by focusing on the techniques and logics that drive law enforcement practices across two agencies, I argue that local law enforcement agents racialize Latinos by punishing illegality through their daily, and sometimes mundane, practices. Investigatory traffic stops put Latinos at disproportionate risk of arrest and citation, and processing at the local jail subjects unauthorized immigrants to deportation. Although a variety of local actors sustain the deportation system, most do not see themselves as active participants in immigrant removal and they explain their behavior through a colorblind ideology. This colorblind ideology obscures and naturalizes how organizational practices and laws converge to systematically criminalize and punish Latinos in the United States.

An Exploratory Study of Local Homeland Security Preparedness

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
William V. Pelfrey
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Homeland Security ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Law Enforcement Agencies ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Local Law Enforcement ◽  
Law Enforcement Agency ◽  
Measurement Tools ◽  
Local Law ◽  
Local Agencies

As an artifact of the war on terror, local law enforcement agencies have been asked to serve as the “eyes and ears” of federal intelligence agencies. The federal Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) has assembled a set of guidelines to assist agencies in terrorism prevention and weapons of mass destruction identification. However, there is a dearth of metrics and measurement tools available to assess preparedness. Based on ODP guidelines, a methodology to tap preparedness levels is defined. Additionally, preliminary findings from an assessment of a large law enforcement agency are presented. Application of this methodology will enhance the preparedness of local agencies by identifying areas of strength and those areas which require attention. Once these deficit areas are defined, policy makers can define appropriate training and programmatic changes.

Compensation as a Police Candidate Attraction Tool: An Organizational-Level Analysis

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Giblin ◽  
Phillip M. Galli
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Organizational Level ◽  
Full Time ◽  
Law Enforcement Agencies ◽  
Local Law Enforcement ◽  
Police Agencies ◽  
Local Law ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Law Enforcement Management

In 2008, state and local law enforcement agencies hired 61,000 new full-time sworn personnel. To develop a sufficient applicant pool, organizations may use a variety of attraction strategies, including financial inducements, especially when broader factors lessen the appeal of a job. Using data from the 2007 and 2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey, the present study tests whether unfavorable contingencies (e.g., high cost of living, rigorous application standards) are related to officer compensation—pay, supplemental incentives, and reimbursements—within a sample of large metropolitan police agencies. Results are generally consistent with contingency theory, at least with respect to salaries. Departments offer higher salaries to offset more rigorous hiring standards, high costs of living, and other unfavorable contingencies. The implications of the findings for police officer recruitment are discussed.

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