scholarly journals Persistence of Translational Symmetry in the BCS Model with Radial Pair Interaction

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 1507-1527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Deuchert ◽  
Alissa Geisinger ◽  
Christian Hainzl ◽  
Michael Loss
1993 ◽  
Vol 07 (13) ◽  
pp. 2529-2538
Author(s):  
V. DALLACASA ◽  
M. PAIUSCO ◽  
L. MANES

A numerical solution of the Cooper-BCS model is given, taking into account the energy dependence of the pair interaction U(ε) in the form suggested by Fröhlich. At energies corresponding to scales Δx≈100 A this model is found to predict a high Tc≈100 K, with absence of isotope effect, in the weak to moderate coupling limit, and to reduce to the usual BCS model with constant interaction at macroscopic scales.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrey Yu. Kotov ◽  
Daniel Nogradi ◽  
Kalman K. Szabo ◽  
Lorinc Szikszai

Abstract In previous work, [arXiv:1905.01909], we have calculated the mϱ/fπ ratio in the chiral and continuum limit for SU(3) gauge theory coupled to Nf = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 fermions in the fundamental representation. The main result was that this ratio displays no statistically significant Nf-dependence. In the present work we continue the study of the Nf-dependence by extending the simulations to Nf = 7, 8, 9, 10. Along the way we also study in detail the Nf-dependence of finite volume effects on low energy observables and a particular translational symmetry breaking unphysical, lattice artefact phase specific to staggered fermions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (8) ◽  
pp. 835-837
Author(s):  
N. E. Dubinin ◽  
G. M. Bhuiyan ◽  
F. I. Abbas
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Szolnoki ◽  
Xiaojie Chen

AbstractThe conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (8) ◽  
pp. 083015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sascha Brinker ◽  
Manuel dos Santos Dias ◽  
Samir Lounis
Keyword(s):  

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