Spatial aspects of pollution control when pollutants have synergistic effects: Evidence from a differential game with asymmetric information

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. List ◽  
Charles F. Mason
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Synergistic Effects

scholarly journals A differential game of international pollution control

1991 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 409-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick van der Ploeg ◽  
Aart de Zeeuw
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Pollution Control

A differential game of international pollution control with evolving environmental costs

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 680-700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nahid Masoudi ◽  
Georges Zaccour
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Environmental Cost ◽  
Environmental Externalities ◽  
Environmental Costs ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Cooperative Solutions ◽  
Definition Of

AbstractWe consider a two-player differential game of international emissions to represent the interactions between two groups of countries, namely, developed and developing countries. We adopt a broader-than-usual definition of environmental cost for developing countries to account for their evolving involvement in tackling environmental externalities. Cooperative and non-cooperative solutions are characterized and contrasted. We find that it may not be the best course of action to push developing countries to reduce their emissions in the short term, and that cooperation may not create enough dividend, also in the short term, to be implementable.

scholarly journals On the Effect of the Absorption Coefficient in a Differential Game of Pollution Control

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 961
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Marova ◽  
Ekaterina Gromova ◽  
Polina Barsuk ◽  
Anastasia Shagushina
Keyword(s):  
Characteristic Function ◽  
Absorption Coefficient ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Characteristic Functions ◽  
Ecological Situation ◽  
The Real ◽  
Irkutsk Region ◽  
Function Construction

We consider various approaches for a characteristic function construction on the example of an n players differential game of pollution control with a prescribed duration. We explore the effect of the presence of an absorption coefficient in the game on characteristic functions. As an illustration, we consider a game in which the parameters are calculated based on the real ecological situation of the Irkutsk region. For this game, we compute a number of characteristic functions and compare their properties.

scholarly journals Multiple Agents, and Agricultural Nonpoint-Source Water Pollution Control Policies

1999 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodney B.W. Smith ◽  
Theodore D. Tomasi
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Management Practice ◽  
Nonpoint Source ◽  
Source Water ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Agricultural Nonpoint Source

Assuming asymmetric information over farmer profits and zero transaction costs, prior literature has suggested that when regulating nonpoint source water pollution, a tax on management practices (inputs) can implement full-information allocations and is superior to a tax on estimated runoff. Using mechanism design theory under asymmetric information, this paper shows that under the same assumptions, management practice taxes and taxes on estimated runoff are equally efficient.

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