Nash equilibria for non-binary choice rules

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

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Asynchronous distributed algorithm for seeking generalized Nash equilibria

2018 European Control Conference (ECC) ◽

10.23919/ecc.2018.8550331 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Peng Yi ◽

Lacra Pavel

Keyword(s):

Distributed Algorithm ◽

Nash Equilibria ◽

Generalized Nash Equilibria

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Binary Choice Model with Endogeneity: Identification via Heteroskedasticity

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2466226 ◽

2014 ◽

Author(s):

Minxian Yang

Keyword(s):

Choice Model ◽

Binary Choice ◽

Binary Choice Model

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Estimation of Structural Parameters and Marginal Effects in Binary Choice Panel Data Models with Fixed Effects

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.869085 ◽

2005 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Ivan Fernandez-Val

Keyword(s):

Panel Data ◽

Fixed Effects ◽

Structural Parameters ◽

Data Models ◽

Binary Choice ◽

Panel Data Models ◽

Marginal Effects

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Berge and Nash Equilibria in a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game

Automation and Remote Control ◽

10.1134/s0005117920110119 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 81 (11) ◽

pp. 2108-2131

Author(s):

V. I. Zhukovskiy ◽

A. S. Gorbatov ◽

K. N. Kudryavtsev

Keyword(s):

Differential Game ◽

Quadratic Differential ◽

Nash Equilibria ◽

Linear Quadratic

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A binary choice model with partial observability for panel data

Model Assisted Statistics and Applications ◽

10.3233/mas-200503 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 15 (4) ◽

pp. 315-322

Author(s):

Ekaterina Batalova ◽

Kirill Furmanov ◽

Ekaterina Shelkova

Keyword(s):

Job Search ◽

Latent Class ◽

Choice Model ◽

Maximum Likelihood Estimates ◽

Binary Choice ◽

Panel Model ◽

Binary Response Variable ◽

Monitoring Survey ◽

Binary Choice Model ◽

Time Invariant

We consider a panel model with a binary response variable that is a product of two unobservable factors, each determined by a separate binary choice equation. One of these factors is assumed to be time-invariant and may be interpreted as a latent class indicator. A simulation study shows that maximum likelihood estimates from even the shortest panel are much more reliable than those obtained from a cross-section. As an illustrative example, the model is applied to Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey data to estimate a proportion of the non-employed population who are participating in job search.

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Expressiveness and Nash Equilibrium in Iterated Boolean Games

ACM Transactions on Computational Logic ◽

10.1145/3439900 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 22 (2) ◽

pp. 1-38

Author(s):

Julian Gutierrez ◽

Paul Harrenstein ◽

Giuseppe Perelli ◽

Michael Wooldridge

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Nash Equilibria ◽

Infinite Sequence ◽

Multi Agent Systems ◽

Temporal Logics ◽

Agent Systems ◽

Temporal Properties ◽

Multi Agent ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Boolean Games

We define and investigate a novel notion of expressiveness for temporal logics that is based on game theoretic equilibria of multi-agent systems. We use iterated Boolean games as our abstract model of multi-agent systems [Gutierrez et al. 2013, 2015a]. In such a game, each agent has a goal , represented using (a fragment of) Linear Temporal Logic ( ) . The goal captures agent ’s preferences, in the sense that the models of represent system behaviours that would satisfy . Each player controls a subset of Boolean variables , and at each round in the game, player is at liberty to choose values for variables in any way that she sees fit. Play continues for an infinite sequence of rounds, and so as players act they collectively trace out a model for , which for every player will either satisfy or fail to satisfy their goal. Players are assumed to act strategically, taking into account the goals of other players, in an attempt to bring about computations satisfying their goal. In this setting, we apply the standard game-theoretic concept of (pure) Nash equilibria. The (possibly empty) set of Nash equilibria of an iterated Boolean game can be understood as inducing a set of computations, each computation representing one way the system could evolve if players chose strategies that together constitute a Nash equilibrium. Such a set of equilibrium computations expresses a temporal property—which may or may not be expressible within a particular fragment. The new notion of expressiveness that we formally define and investigate is then as follows: What temporal properties are characterised by the Nash equilibria of games in which agent goals are expressed in specific fragments of ? We formally define and investigate this notion of expressiveness for a range of fragments. For example, a very natural question is the following: Suppose we have an iterated Boolean game in which every goal is represented using a particular fragment of : is it then always the case that the equilibria of the game can be characterised within ? We show that this is not true in general.

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