A note on asymmetric and mixed strategy equilibria in the search-theoretic model of fiat money

In this paper we study optimal policies in an environment where search frictions both in labor and goods markets give rise to unemployment and fiat money, as in Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright (American Economic Review, 2011). The underlying frictions that give rise to endogenous unemployment and fiat money also result in inefficient outcomes. Here we show that efficiency can be restored whenever lump sum monetary transfers are possible and a decentralized production subsidy financed by money printing and a vacancy subsidy financed by a dividend tax exist. This is the case even when the Hosios and Friedman rules do not hold.

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Game theoretic modeling of economic denial of sustainability (EDoS) attack in cloud computing

Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0269964821000334 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-25

Author(s):

KC Lalropuia ◽

Vandana Khaitan (nee Gupta)

Keyword(s):

Mixed Strategy ◽

Dynamic Game ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Numerical Illustration ◽

Defense Strategies ◽

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽

Proposed Model ◽

Edos Attacks ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Pooling Equilibrium

Abstract In this paper, we develop a novel game theoretic model of the interactions between an EDoS attacker and the defender based on a signaling game that is a dynamic game of incomplete information. We then derive the best defense strategies for the network defender to respond to the EDoS attacks. That is, we compute the perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBE) of the proposed game model such as the pooling PBE, separating PBE and mixed strategy PBE. In the pooling equilibrium, each type of the attacker takes the same action and the attacker's type is not revealed to the defender, whereas in the separating equilibrium, each type of the attacker uses different actions and hence the attacker's type is completely revealed to the defender. On the other hand, in the mixed strategy PBE, both the attacker and the defender randomize their strategies to optimize their payoffs. Numerical illustration is also presented to show the efficacy of the proposed model.

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The Economics of Crime Reconsidered

The Oxford Handbook of Sports Economics ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195387780.013.0020 ◽

2012 ◽

pp. 352-379 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Joseph P. McGarrity

Keyword(s):

Mixed Strategy ◽

Major League Baseball ◽

Total Effect ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Theoretic Approach ◽

Economics Of Crime ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Strategy Game ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Game Theoretic Approach

This article uses data on hit batsmen from Major League Baseball to illustrate a mixed-strategy, game theoretic approach to the decisions of the pitcher and the batter. The pitcher would like to throw to a batter who stands in the middle of the batter's box. The game theoretic model predicts that the pitcher will throw at fewer batters as velocity increases, while the standard crime model would assume that the pitcher's throw-ats would remain unchanged and the batter would respond by leaning in less often. The Total Effect curves suggest that there will be more throw-ats in the American League for any level of velocity. The number of purposeful inside pitches will decrease at an increasing rate as velocity increases. The game theoretic model predicts that a pitcher who can throw with greater velocity will have to waste fewer inside pitches to keep a batter from leaning into a pitch.

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Generalized Replicator Dynamics as a Model of Specialization and Diversity in Societies

Advances in Complex Systems ◽

10.1142/s0219525998000211 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 01 (04) ◽

pp. 325-359 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Vivek S. Borkar ◽

Sanjay Jain ◽

Govindan Rangarajan

Keyword(s):

Mixed Strategy ◽

Replicator Dynamics ◽

Pure Strategy ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Payoff Matrix ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Final States ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Pure Strategies

We consider a generalization of replicator dynamics as a non-cooperative evolutionary game-theoretic model of a community of N agents. All agents update their individual mixed strategy profiles to increase their total payoff from the rest of the community. The properties of attractors in this dynamics are studied. Evidence is presented that under certain conditions the typical attractors of the system are corners of state space where each agent has specialized to a pure strategy, and/or the community exhibits diversity, i.e., all strategies are represented in the final states. The model suggests that new pure strategies whose payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities with respect to the existing ones can destabilize existing attractors if N is sufficiently large, and be regarded as innovations that enhance the diversity of the community.

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ON THE THREAT OF COUNTERFEITING

Macroeconomic Dynamics ◽

10.1017/s1365100510000544 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 15 (S1) ◽

pp. 10-41 ◽

Cited By ~ 24

Author(s):

Yiting Li ◽

Guillaume Rocheteau

Keyword(s):

Monetary Economics ◽

Terms Of Trade ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Fiat Money ◽

Monetary Equilibrium ◽

The Cost ◽

Value Of Money

We study counterfeiting of currency in a search-theoretic model of monetary exchange. In contrast to Nosal and Wallace [Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 229–246 (2007)], we establish that counterfeiting does not pose a threat to the existence of a monetary equilibrium; i.e., a monetary equilibrium exists irrespective of the cost of producing counterfeits, or the ease with which genuine money can be authenticated. However, the possibility of counterfeiting fiat money can affect its value, velocity, output, and welfare, even if no counterfeiting occurs in equilibrium. We provide two extensions of the model under which the threat of counterfeiting can materialize: counterfeits can circulate across periods, and sellers set terms of trade in some matches. Policies that make the currency more costly to counterfeit or easier to recognize raise the value of money and society's welfare, but the latter policy does not always decrease counterfeiting.

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Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2017-3-120-130 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 120-130

Author(s):

A. Lyasko

Keyword(s):

Social Control ◽

Institutional Economics ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Transfer System ◽

Value Transfer ◽

Partner Interaction ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

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