ON THE THREAT OF COUNTERFEITING

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (S1) ◽  
pp. 10-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiting Li ◽  
Guillaume Rocheteau
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Economics ◽  
Terms Of Trade ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Fiat Money ◽  
Monetary Equilibrium ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Value Of Money

We study counterfeiting of currency in a search-theoretic model of monetary exchange. In contrast to Nosal and Wallace [Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 229–246 (2007)], we establish that counterfeiting does not pose a threat to the existence of a monetary equilibrium; i.e., a monetary equilibrium exists irrespective of the cost of producing counterfeits, or the ease with which genuine money can be authenticated. However, the possibility of counterfeiting fiat money can affect its value, velocity, output, and welfare, even if no counterfeiting occurs in equilibrium. We provide two extensions of the model under which the threat of counterfeiting can materialize: counterfeits can circulate across periods, and sellers set terms of trade in some matches. Policies that make the currency more costly to counterfeit or easier to recognize raise the value of money and society's welfare, but the latter policy does not always decrease counterfeiting.

The Interrelationship between Estimated Tax Payments and Taxpayer Compliance

2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (s-1) ◽  
pp. 27-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenn D. Feltham ◽  
Suzanne M. Paquette
Keyword(s):  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
High Type ◽  
Compliance Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Audit Strategy ◽  
Tax Payments ◽  
The Cost

This paper examines taxpayers' compliance behavior and the tax agency's audit decision in a broader, more realistic, setting. Whereas prior research has taken the taxpayer's prepayment position as exogenous, this study extends the literature by incorporating the estimated tax payment decision into a tax compliance game. A two-period game-theoretic model is used to examine the effect that the estimated tax payment rules have on taxpayers' incentives to evade and on the tax agency's audit strategy. Our primary results are as follows. First, in equilibrium taxpayers' estimated tax payment decision will depend upon the uncertainty about their true tax liability, and the cost from overpayment (the taxpayer's cost of capital) or underpayment (penalty interest) of installments of estimated tax. Second, under reasonable assumptions, high-type taxpayers who make higher installments of estimated tax are less likely to lie about their level of income than those who make lower installments—that is, taxpayers who pay low are more likely to evade. Third, the tax agency audits taxpayers who have made low reports and low estimated tax payments with a higher probability than those who have made high estimated tax payments. The gain to the tax agency from auditing taxpayers who make lower payments and evade arises not only from the penalties charged for evasion, but also from the interest charged on deficient installments of estimated tax.

Is There a December Effect? Strategic Prepayments of Deductible State Income Tax

2010 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-71
Author(s):  
John Shon ◽  
Stanley Veliotis
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Time Value Of Money ◽  
State Income Tax ◽  
Federal Income Tax ◽  
State Income ◽  
Tax Savings ◽  
Tax Payments ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Value Of Money

ABSTRACT: Individuals’ state income tax payments are deductible in the year paid for federal income tax purposes. This study investigates whether, and to what extent, individuals implement federal tax planning by prepaying state estimated income taxes before year-end, even though those payments are not due until January 15. Based on a study of 34 states’ aggregate data on estimated income tax receipts from individuals, we find strong evidence of this effect. We also find that this effect is increasing with the cost of state income tax payments. The results suggest that individual taxpayers take steps to reduce taxes by shifting deductions from one year to an earlier year and/or exploit the time value of money provided by accelerating federal tax savings by one year.

scholarly journals OPTIMAL MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES IN A SEARCH-THEORETIC MODEL OF MONEY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1330-1354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Gomis-Porqueras ◽  
Benoît Julien ◽  
Chengsi Wang
Keyword(s):  
American Economic Review ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
Search Frictions ◽  
Fiat Money ◽  
Lump Sum ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
Optimal Policies ◽  
Dividend Tax

In this paper we study optimal policies in an environment where search frictions both in labor and goods markets give rise to unemployment and fiat money, as in Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright (American Economic Review, 2011). The underlying frictions that give rise to endogenous unemployment and fiat money also result in inefficient outcomes. Here we show that efficiency can be restored whenever lump sum monetary transfers are possible and a decentralized production subsidy financed by money printing and a vacancy subsidy financed by a dividend tax exist. This is the case even when the Hosios and Friedman rules do not hold.

scholarly journals Analisis Sistem Pengadaan Kendaraan Dinas Operasional Pemerintah Melalui Sistem Pembelian dan Sewa (Studi Pada Politeknik Negeri Padang)

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-101
Author(s):  
Elfitri Santi ◽  
Afridian Wirahadi ◽  
Arif Wahyu Saputra ◽  
Rasyidah Mustika ◽  
Ferdawati
Keyword(s):  
Net Present Value ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Research Result ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Present Value ◽  
Analysis Instrument ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Value Of Money

The official goverment vehicles supply demand the goverment allocate fund in carefully and precise based on the needs. The value of money analysis between buy, rent, and leasing to supplying the official vehicles in Polytechnic State’s of Padang. intent on calculating, analyze, and comparing which alternative that make more value of money between the provisions system of buying, renting and leasing. Methods this Research is Qualitative and The analysis instrument that use in this research is Net Present Value Method also calculating the cost benefit analysis . The research examine 3 type or merk that represent the officeholder vehicles, such as Toyota Hiace Commuter, Kijang Innova V A/T, dan Avanza Veloz. The result of this research indicated that officeholder vehicles supplying system through the buying system is has more benefit that follow by the leasing system and the renting system. This research result could be a reference for Goverment in choosing supplying system of officeholder vehicles in Padang State’s Polytechnic.

scholarly journals Sexual signaling and the persistence of alternative reproductive tactics: a test of game theoretic predictions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Courtney R. Garrison ◽  
Scott K. Sakaluk ◽  
Ned A. Dochtermann
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Variation ◽  
Individual Variation ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Relative Cost ◽  
Reproductive Tactics ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Fitness Value ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost

AbstractIn many species, males produce signals to attract females. However, in some species and populations, only some males produce these signals with other males competing for and “sneaking” reproductive opportunities. In these systems, at least three tactics are expected: always signal, signal only when others are not (assessors), and never signal. The representation of these tactics within a population is unknown in part because the costs of signaling (C) and the fitness value of a single reproductive bout (V) are unknown. Using a game-theoretic model we predict that the always signal strategy only persists if the fitness value of calling is greater than twice the cost. We also show that always signal males are apparently absent in decorated crickets (Gryllodes sigillatus). Moreover, males of this species were not strict assessors and instead signaled infrequently (30% of the time) when signaling by others was constant. Males also exhibited substantial among-individual variation in the propensity to call when other males were not signaling (τ = 0.3). Our results suggest a high relative cost of signaling (2C > V) in this species. The presence of among-individual variation is indicative of underlying genetic variation and a mixed evolutionary stable strategy.

Manufacturer’s “1-Up” from Used Games: Insights from the Secondhand Market for Video Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antino Kim ◽  
Rajib L. Saha ◽  
Warut Khern-am-nuai
Keyword(s):  
Video Game ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Information Goods ◽  
Gaming Industry ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Technological Means ◽  
Types Of Information ◽  
The Cost

In contrast to industries of other types of information goods, the video game industry still has a sizable secondhand market for games. This is particularly notable because some of the major gaming-console companies (e.g., Sony and Microsoft) actually possess the ability to annihilate the secondhand market altogether; it appears that those companies have given tacit approval to buying and selling used games. Naturally, the question is, what is the special ingredient in the gaming industry that gives a manufacturer incentive to keep a healthy secondhand market even when it has the technological means to shut it down? In this study, leveraging a game-theoretic model, we investigate the effect of gaming console on a manufacturer’s strategy in the presence of a secondhand market for games. We find that when the manufacturer offers a valuable console that provides utilities in addition to playing games, the secondhand market increases the manufacturer’s profit, and that is not at the cost of consumers; the consumers—as well as the society as a whole—also benefit from the secondhand market. This is in stark contrast with settings where there are no consoles involved or the consoles do not offer any intrinsic value; in such settings, the manufacturer would opt to shut down the secondhand market. In the case with a valuable console, however, the increasing appeal of the secondhand market to consumers may improve the manufacturer’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare, all at the same time. We discuss our findings along with managerial and welfare implications.

Sharing Manufacturer’s Demand Information in a Supply Chain with Price and Service Effort Competition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunjie Wang ◽  
Albert Y. Ha ◽  
Shilu Tong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Price Distortion ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Private Demand ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Share Information

Problem definition: This paper investigates the issue of sharing the private demand information of a manufacturer that sells a product to retailers competing on prices and service efforts. Academic/practical relevance: In the existing literature, which ignores service effort competition, it is known that demand signaling induces an informed manufacturer to distort the wholesale price downward, which benefits the retailers, and so, they do not have any incentive to receive the manufacturer’s private information. In practice, many manufacturers share demand information with their retailers that compete on prices and service efforts (e.g., demand-enhancing retail activities), a setting that has not received much attention from the literature. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model with one manufacturer selling to two competing retailers and solve for the equilibrium of the game. Results: We show how an informed manufacturer may distort the wholesale price upward or downward to signal demand information to the retailers, depending on the cost of service effort, the intensity of effort competition, and the number of uninformed retailers. We fully characterize the impact of such wholesale price distortion on the firms’ incentive to share information and derive the conditions under which the manufacturer shares information with none, one, or both of the retailers. We derive conditions under which a higher cost of service effort makes the retailers or the manufacturer better off. Managerial implications: Our results provide novel insights about how service effort competition impacts the incentives for firms in a supply chain to share a manufacturer’s private demand information. For instance, when the cost of effort is high or service effort competition is intense, a manufacturer should share information with none or some, but not all, of the retailers.

Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 1540006
Author(s):  
Omkar D. Palsule-Desai
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Efficient Technology ◽  
Sharing Rules ◽  
Coalition Stability ◽  
Partial Collusion ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Stability Of Coalitions ◽  
The Cost

In this paper, we develop a non-cooperative game theoretic model for our problem context in which the competing producers adopt one of the two alternate production and marketing technologies — efficient and inefficient. We examine stability related implications of the producers' decisions regarding the choices of (i) technologies, (ii) coalition formation, (iii) coalition form, (iv) intensity of collusion. The coalitions can adopt either complete collusion or partial collusion by determining intensity of collusion using endogenously determined sharing rules. The motivation for our study comes from the Costa Rican coffee industry and interesting findings presented in the existing literature focusing on a variety of competing-coalitions settings. Our results can be categorized as: (i) Nash equilibrium of the endogenously determined sharing rules, (ii) the equilibrium coalition forms, and (iii) stability of coalitions. They highlight the dynamics between the number of coalition producers and the cost of inefficiency. We show that the equilibrium sharing rules may have interior solutions and they are not necessarily (a)symmetric. We also show that both coalitions forming complete collusion of the respective producers in not always a Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium coalition forms need not be (a)symmetric. Our main contribution to existing literature rests in determining the situations in which (i) competing players form coalitions, and (ii) they adopt the coalition form of either complete or partial collusion. Moreover, we provide an alternate explanation to why competing producers horizontally merge in the presence of a competing coalition adopting partial collusion in spite of the merger paradox. We also show that none of the two types of producers considered in this paper have any incentives in not making the information on their coalition form public. Moreover, we establish that situations yielding stable coalitions always exist. Our results demonstrate that the cost advantage to the efficient producers decreases in the number of producers adopting the efficient technology, and the coalition stability related conditions need not imply better profitability for one type of producer vis-à-vis the other. Our model essentially provides a platform for future research in a variety of competing-coalitions settings adopting endogenously determined sharing rules.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document