Game theoretic modeling of economic denial of sustainability (EDoS) attack in cloud computing

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
KC Lalropuia ◽  
Vandana Khaitan (nee Gupta)
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Numerical Illustration ◽  
Defense Strategies ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Edos Attacks ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Pooling Equilibrium

Abstract In this paper, we develop a novel game theoretic model of the interactions between an EDoS attacker and the defender based on a signaling game that is a dynamic game of incomplete information. We then derive the best defense strategies for the network defender to respond to the EDoS attacks. That is, we compute the perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBE) of the proposed game model such as the pooling PBE, separating PBE and mixed strategy PBE. In the pooling equilibrium, each type of the attacker takes the same action and the attacker's type is not revealed to the defender, whereas in the separating equilibrium, each type of the attacker uses different actions and hence the attacker's type is completely revealed to the defender. On the other hand, in the mixed strategy PBE, both the attacker and the defender randomize their strategies to optimize their payoffs. Numerical illustration is also presented to show the efficacy of the proposed model.

scholarly journals Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (19) ◽  
pp. 10210-10217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Lampert
Keyword(s):  
General Theorem ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Multiple Agents ◽  
Severe Damage ◽  
Global Challenge ◽  
Species Population ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Harmful Species

The management of harmful species, including invasive species, pests, parasites, and diseases, is a major global challenge. Harmful species cause severe damage to ecosystems, biodiversity, agriculture, and human health. In particular, managing harmful species often requires cooperation among multiple agents, such as landowners, agencies, and countries. Each agent may have incentives to contribute less to the treatment, leaving more work for other agents, which may result in inefficient treatment. A central question is, therefore, how should a policymaker allocate treatment duties among the agents? Specifically, should the agents work together in the same area, or should each agent work only in a smaller area designated just for her/him? We consider a dynamic game-theoretic model, where a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a possible set of contributions that the agents could adopt over time. In turn, the allocation by the policymaker determines which of the Nash equilibria could be adopted, which allows us to compare the outcome of various allocations. Our results show that fewer agents can abate the harmful species population faster, but more agents can better control the population to keep its density lower. We prove this result in a general theorem and demonstrate it numerically for two case studies. Therefore, following an outbreak, the better policy would be to split and assign one or a few agents to treat the species in a given location, but if controlling the harmful species population at some low density is needed, the agents should work together in all of the locations.

Scheduling Multi-Workflows Over Heterogeneous Virtual Machines With a Multi-Stage Dynamic Game-Theoretic Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 82-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wu ◽  
Yuandou Wang
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Machines ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Scientific Workflow ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Heterogeneous Cloud ◽  
Cloud Infrastructures

Cloud computing, with dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to geographically distributed computational capabilities, is becoming an increasingly popular platform for the execution of scientific applications such as scientific workflows. Scheduling multiple workflows over cloud infrastructures and resources is well recognized to be NP-hard and thus critical to meeting various types of Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements. In this work, the authors consider a multi-objective scientific workflow scheduling framework based on the dynamic game-theoretic model. It aims at reducing make-spans, cloud cost, while maximizing system fairness in terms of workload distribution among heterogeneous cloud virtual machines (VMs). The authors consider randomly-generated scientific workflow templates as test cases and carry out extensive real-world tests based on third-party commercial clouds. Experimental results show that their proposed framework outperforms traditional ones by achieving lower make-spans, lower cost, and better system fairness.

scholarly journals Equilibrium Signal and Purchase Decision in China’s IPO Net Roadshow: A Dynamic Game Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Zhao ◽  
Dong Li
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Pooling Equilibrium ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

The net roadshow has been dominant in China’s IPO (initial public offerings) roadshow structure. Considering the dynamic game with incomplete information between the issuer and investor during China’s IPO net roadshow, the quality of the letter of intent is presented as a discrete signal in this paper in accordance with China’s IPO net roadshow characteristics. A signaling game model is established to conclude the issuer’s equilibrium signal and the investor’s purchase action. The issuer disguised a letter of intent to uplift its quality if the disguising cost per share stands below the bidding spread. If the investor judges the letter of intent as high-quality, the basis of purchase is that the opportunity cost per share is less than the expectation on the intrinsic value of the IPO stock. Otherwise the investor rejects purchasing on the condition that the opportunity cost outnumbers the valuation of intrinsic value. In conclusion, there exist unique separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium as a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and the existence and uniqueness of their equilibrium domains have been verified by numerical simulation. Finally, the comprehensive empirical studies have validated only one separating and pooling equilibrium existing in China’s real-world IPO market.

Dynamic Game Theoretic Model of Multi-Layer Infrastructure Networks

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
PENGCHENG ZHANG ◽  
SRINIVAS PEETA ◽  
TERRY FRIESZ
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Infrastructure Networks ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

A Game-Theoretic Model of Collaboration in Engineering Design

2010 ◽  
Vol 132 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Takai
Keyword(s):  
Curriculum Development ◽  
Product Family ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Design Project ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Individual Project ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Team Project ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Functional Teams

This paper proposes a game-theoretic model that provides insights into conditions when two engineers collaborate on a design project which has both team and individual components. Collaboration of engineers with diverse technical backgrounds, such as those found in cross-functional teams, has been addressed as a key for successful product development. Similarly, the benefit of a team-based-project class is increasingly emphasized in curriculum development. In a single product design, a team project (in which two engineers work together) may be the design of a product base, and an individual project (in which engineers work individually) may be the design of chunks or modules assembled to the base. In a product family design, a team project may be the design of a product platform and an individual project may be the design of modules assembled to the platform that creates product variants. The proposed model assumes that the engineers receive the same evaluation on their team project (whether they actually contribute to the project or not), and independent evaluations on their individual projects. The proposed model identifies conditions that lead to collaboration of two engineers in the team project, which maximizes product performance. The insights obtained from the model and possible implications in design project and curriculum development are discussed.

scholarly journals A game theoretic analysis of resource mining in blockchain

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 2035-2046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajani Singh ◽  
Ashutosh Dhar Dwivedi ◽  
Gautam Srivastava ◽  
Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel ◽  
Xiaochun Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mining System ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Digital World ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

Abstract Blockchain and cryptocurrency are a hot topic in today’s digital world. In this paper, we create a game theoretic model in continuous time. We consider a dynamic game model of the bitcoin market, where miners or players use mining systems to mine bitcoin by investing electricity into the mining system. Although this work is motivated by BTC, the work presented can be applicable to other mining systems similar to BTC. We propose three concepts of dynamic game theoretic solutions to the model: Social optimum, Nash equilibrium and myopic Nash equilibrium. Using the model that a player represents a single “miner” or a “mining pool”, we develop novel and interesting results for the cryptocurrency world.

scholarly journals In-queue priority purchase: a dynamic game approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongbin Wang ◽  
Luyi Yang ◽  
Shiliang Cui ◽  
Jinting Wang
Keyword(s):  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Purchasing Behavior ◽  
Light Traffic ◽  
Sequential Rule ◽  
Classical Models ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Do So

AbstractPay-for-priority is a common practice in congestion-prone service systems. The extant literature on this topic restricts attention to the case where the only epoch for customers to purchase priority is upon arrival, and if customers choose not to upgrade when they arrive, they cannot do so later during their wait. A natural alternative is to let customers pay and upgrade to priority at any time during their stay in the queue, even if they choose not to do so initially. This paper builds a queueing-game-theoretic model that explicitly captures self-interested customers’ dynamic in-queue priority-purchasing behavior. When all customers (who have not upgraded yet) simultaneously decide whether to upgrade, we find in our model that pure-strategy equilibria do not exist under some intuitive criteria, contrasting the findings in classical models where customers can only purchase priority upon arrival. However, when customers sequentially decide whether to upgrade, threshold-type pure-strategy equilibria may exist. In particular, under sufficiently light traffic, if the number of ordinary customers accumulates to a certain threshold, then it is always the second last customer who upgrades, but in general, it could be a customer from another position, and the queue-length threshold that triggers an upgrade can also vary with the traffic intensity. Finally, we find that in-queue priority purchase subject to the sequential rule yields less revenue than upon-arrival priority purchase in systems with small buffers.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Model of Iranian Labor Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Younes Brumand ◽  
Masoomeh Salary
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Status ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we analyze the interactions among workers, employers, and the government in the Iranian labor market using game theory. For this purpose, different games among the factors affecting the labor market are analyzed in both static and dynamic situations. In each case, intervention and non-intervention of the government are also examined. Thus, four different types of games are studied, including a static game between worker and employer, without government intervention; a static game among workers, employers, and the government; a dynamic game between worker and employer, without government intervention; and a dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government. In the first three games, Nash equilibrium implies low productivity of worker, low employer’s profits, and high unemployment rate in which players want to maintain the status quo. However, in the dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game can provide some conditions in which the labor market gets away from the low productivity situation

The Economics of Crime Reconsidered

2012 ◽  
pp. 352-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph P. McGarrity
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Major League Baseball ◽  
Total Effect ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Economics Of Crime ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategy Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

This article uses data on hit batsmen from Major League Baseball to illustrate a mixed-strategy, game theoretic approach to the decisions of the pitcher and the batter. The pitcher would like to throw to a batter who stands in the middle of the batter's box. The game theoretic model predicts that the pitcher will throw at fewer batters as velocity increases, while the standard crime model would assume that the pitcher's throw-ats would remain unchanged and the batter would respond by leaning in less often. The Total Effect curves suggest that there will be more throw-ats in the American League for any level of velocity. The number of purposeful inside pitches will decrease at an increasing rate as velocity increases. The game theoretic model predicts that a pitcher who can throw with greater velocity will have to waste fewer inside pitches to keep a batter from leaning into a pitch.

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